I.—LIMITATION OF TIME BY MEANS OF CASES IN EPIC SANSKRIT.

In *JAOS*. xxiii, p. 150, I have given an instance of a predicate nominative taking the place of a space-accusative: *yojanānāṁ sahasrāṇi caturaçītir ucchritaḥ*, (the mountain is) "eighty-four (nom.) thousands of leagues high" (nom.). So in time, although the accusative is the norm, the nominative serves, but in parataxis, to indicate duration. Thus iii. 296. 26: *saṁvatsaraḥ kiṁcid ūno na niṣkrāntā 'ham āçramāt*, "a year (nom.) almost, I have not gone out from the hermitage". Usually, when an event is described as subsequent, such a clause is filled out with its verb, and *atha* follows: *tato nā 'timahān kālaḥ samatīta ivā 'bhavat, atha*, etc., "a short time passed, then", etc., i. 39. 3; *māsajātas pitā bhavati atha jagmuḥ*, "thy father becomes a month old, then came they", xiv. 70. 13. But there is another construction, which has been credited with the implication of preterite time. It is common enough in the epic, though our Sanskrit Syntax illustrates the case but scantily. This is the nominative with a dependent genitive. The examples following, showing that the time does not depend on the case, may introduce the general question as to the kind of time indicated by

THE GENITIVE.

The examples are: *ṣaṣṭho hi divasas te 'dya prāptasye 'ha*, "it is to-day the sixth day (since) you got here"; *saptāṣṭa divasās tv adya viprasye 'hā 'gatasya vāi*, "a week (since) the priest came hither", xii. 359. 5; 360. 13; *sāgraḥ saṁvatsaro jātaḥ tava paçyataḥ*, "a whole year has been born (*while*) you (were)

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looking on", xiii. 19. 48; *tasya vahyataḥ kālo munimukhyān abhyavartata*, "a long time elapsed (while) he (was) making the saints his bearers", xiii. 99. 12; *catvāriñçad ahāny adya dve ca me niḥsṛtasya vāi*, (it is) "now forty-two days (since) I set out", ix. 34. 6; *evaṁ vimṛçatas tasya dīrghaḥ kālo vyatikrāntaḥ*, "a long time passed (while) he was", etc., xii. 267. 44; *kadācid bhramamāṇasya hastinaḥ . . . kālo 'gacchan niçāniçam*, "time passed night by night (while) the elephant (was) wandering", xii. 117. 6; *kālo mahāṅs*[1] *tv atīto me çūrasūnum apaçyataḥ*, "a great while has passed since[2] I saw" (without seeing), xiv. 50. 20. Compare *mṛtakasya tṛtīyāhe* and *mṛtasya daçarātreṇa*, in xiii. 136. 15 ff.

The so-called "genitive of time after" (the only meaning given by Professor Speyer, *Syntax*, § 128) is confined exclusively to indefinite phrases and (as is usually said) may have been developed from the construction *trir abdasya*, "thrice a year," etc. But it does not really, so far as I have observed, connote time after, but time in which, interchanging with the "within" of the ablative (in this sense, see below) and instrumental, *dīrghasya kālasya = dīrgheṇa kālena*. The epic phrases are few and stereotyped, *cirasya, kasya cit kālasya*, and (accompanied with the word for "then") *tataḥ katipayāhasya*, i. 8. 17; xiv. 71. 10, "then within a few days".

Of course, in the ptc. construction (above), a preterite idea lies neither in the ptc. (as it is also present), nor in the genitive, which is either absolute or loosely dependent, e. g. "forty-two days (of) me gone", or "me being gone". At any rate, "since" is only a convenience suited to our idiom and does not imply that the genitive gives time after. A strong argument against "after" is that we never find a case where definite periods of after-time are so construed, but only a vague time-notion; e. g. 'after three days' is never expressed by *trayāṇāṁ divasānām*. On the contrary, a definite time in the genitive never means "after" but "within".

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[1] This is the right form. In xiv. 56. 18, *mahākālaḥ* must be changed to *mahān*, as in C.

[2] This may be expressed (but not often) by *cira*: *mātulaç ciradṛṣṭo me tvayā*, "it is long since you saw my uncle", xiv. 53. 45. The idea here is really "long ago", as in *svargato 'pi pitā ciraṁ tava*, "died long ago", i. 157. 28. But with a ptc. this *cira* (*cirarātra*) usually means for a long time, *cirasupta*, long asleep, *cirarātroṣita*, i. 168. 3.

In this instance, as in the case of the ablative, to get the real
meaning we must not start with a theory of the genitive, then
make it apply in examples so indefinite as to explain nothing
(for whether we say "in" or "after" a long time is indifferent),
and finally force this meaning upon the definite cases or regard
them as exceptions; but start with the definite time-words,
establish their required genitival significance, then apply this to
the indefinite time-words, and if it suits these also, construct a
theory. Thus we may take the definite time indicated by a
fortnight. There are two in a month and the second is called
the "other wing" of the month. Now in the ritualistic rule of
Āp. ii. 7. 16. 4, there is something mentioned which must be done
every month in the "other wing" of the month, and this is
expressed by *māsi māsi kāryam aparapakṣasya*, and it is quite
impossible to translate it otherwise than by "month by month
in the other wing this is to be done" (not "after"). So in Manu
xi. 260 and iii. 281, *trir ahnaḥ* and *abdasya* is "three times in a
day, in a year", and though we may dispose of this as a partitive
genitive, we cannot do so when "year" stands alone in the
genitive. Thus in Manu v. 21, *saṁvatsarasyāi 'kam api* must
mean "at least one in a year"; and in Manu vii. 137, *varṣasya*
means "in a year" or yearly (not "after a year", as given by
Professor Speyer, *Ved. u. Sk. Syntax*, § 65). So when we find
in the epic, i. 152. 8, *upapannaç cirasyā 'dya bhakṣaḥ*, we should
render it "food furnished now in a long time", rather than
"after"; and *sudīrghasya 'pi kālasya*, Manu viii. 216, etc., "in a
very long time", however well, in these general time-words,
"after" will suit our idiom. The genitival relation is really
adjectival, *saṁvatsarasya = saṁvatsarīṇa; saṁvatsarābhiçasta*,
"a year-accused" is "accused within a year", Manu viii. 373.
Parallel stands *antar* with the genitive of space, *sarvabhūtānām
antaç carati*, "permeates all", iii. 76. 34 (*tasyā 'nu*, "after", is
incorrect).

When this genitive is formally identical with the locative, it
is impossible to tell which is intended. Thus in Manu ix. 104,
jīvatoḥ means "in the life-time of the two" (parents), and may
be either genitive or locative, though probably the former.

Again, time within, or during, which is the only time-meaning
implied when other words are used, as, for example, when one
says "he shall not study while his hands are wet", *prodakayoḥ
pāṇyoḥ*, Āp. i. 3. 10. 25.

Finally, in ἠοῦς = *vastos*, the meaning is not "after" but "in, within", the dawn-time; and πολλῶν ἐτῶν should also be taken in the same way, "in many years," that is, in the course of many years, rather than "after". Compare the Avest. gen. "in the night, day," etc. So *nahts*, in Gothic, etc. In emphasizing in and within as the force of the temporal genitive, I wish merely to protest against the meaning "after". The fundamental meaning seems to me to be rather the loose adjectival relation usually implied by the genitive, best expressed in English by "of". Old English offers good parallels, as well as our colloquial "of old", "of a morning". Compare (cited in Cent. Dict.) "earn ten shillings of a night" (Mayhew); "Sir, I moste go, and of long tyme ye shul not se me ageyn", (Merlin, E. E. T. S.); "not wink of all the day" (Shakespeare).

THE LOCATIVE.

As in *tasminn ahani*, "on that day", *aparedyuḥ*, "on the next day" (i. 63. 20; iii. 65. 35); *samaye*, "in good time", iii. 192. 38, the locative gives the time "at or (with) in". The notion "after" lies not in the case but in the idiom of translation. In xii. 122. 16, "after a thousand years it fell" is the natural English of "on the thousand years completed it fell" (as he sneezed, *kṣuvato 'patat;* after the words "he carried it many years", acc.). The "after" idea is formally expressed when required, *tato 'ṣṭame tu divase*, "on the eighth day from this", i. 129. 20; *tataḥ samvatsarasyā 'nte (kāle)*, "at the end of a year from this", i. 139. 1; 167. 4; *pūrṇe samvatsare tataḥ*, xiii. 111. 70; or, as above, simple completion is expressed, ib. 136. 16, *dvādaçāhe vyatīte*, "on the twelfth day completed". So *sthite Pārthe (ājagmuḥ)*, xviii. 3. 1, "on (or at) his standing". So xv. 1. 6; 3. 12 and 34, etc. In *kāle bahutithe*, iii. 65. 2; *bahutithe 'hani*, i. 108. 2; *kāle bahutithe vyatikrānte kadācana*, "once on some time being passed," iii. 296. 1; *dvimāsoparame kāle vyātīte*, "at the expiration of two months' time," xii. 282. 26; xii. 360. 1, etc., time at and not (as generally rendered) time after is expressed. In iii. 61. 12, PW. renders this "viele Tage hindurch", although the verb is "saw", and the action immediate; the meaning being "in (within) considerable time he saw some birds." In i. 173. 14 and 31, the same event is narrated, *sthite tasmin . . . jagāma viprarṣis tadā dvādaçame 'hani*, "on his standing there (night and day), then on the twelfth day came

the priest"; and again, *dvādaçarātre . . . samāhite*, (he came) "on the twelfth day completed". So ib. 45, *tasmin praviṣṭe pravavarṣa*, "it rained on his returning". The locative absolute connotes the same time as does the simple locative.

The asterism at (under) which is usually locative; but with Puṣya, Tiṣya, regularly, and with other asterisms occasionally, Hasta, Abbijit, the instrumental is used. *Puṣyeṇa samprayāto 'smi Çravaṇe punar āgataḥ*, ix. 34. 6, is a typical case.

The durative sense, though found, as in ÇB. vi. 1. 3. 20, "recite during a year or two", *saṁvatsare, dvayor (vā)*, and ib. xi. 4. 2. 19–20 (where "during a year" is expressed by both acc. and loc.), is often injected into a locative because the accompanying verb seems to require it. Thus in i. 3. 35, "on going to the teacher's house at the end of the day, *divasakṣaye*, after guarding the cows in (during) the day," *ahani gā rakṣitvā (ahni*, i. 185. 29), like *ekāhnā*, "in the course of one day." So in i. 148. 17, "they stood guarding the house in (during) the night", *rātrāu*. In the repeated locative, *māsi māsi çataṁ samāḥ*, "month by month, a hundred summers", i. 79. 6, the pure locative sense is not lost, though the concurrent construction, *anudinam*, "day by day," i. 185. 15, equal to *divase divase*, is durative. The translation "during" is often given for the meaning "at some time in the course of". Thus, strictly speaking, though too pedantic for practical use, when in Manu iii. 28, *yajñe tu vitate sutādānam* is translated (the gift of a daughter) "during the course of the sacrifice", the translation is incorrect; for the gift is not given "during" the sacrifice but at some one time in the course of the sacrifice, and "at the sacrifice begun" is the literal meaning. In the subsequent stanza, iii. 108, *vāiçvadeve tu nirvṛtte*, the translation "after the offering has been finished" puts the meaning of the verb into the case. It is not quite wrong, but it is not quite right; since, as far as the time goes, it means "on the completion". The compass of the locative is formally expressed by *antar, antardaçāhe*, "within ten days", M. v. 79, etc.

It is customary, since Gaedicke, to say that the locative means "after", when it marks the culminating time and (Delbrück, *Syntax*, p. 225) to compare the Sanskrit use with ἐνιαυτῷ, "after a year", πολλῷ χρόνῳ, "after a long time", etc. But in reality the "in" sense not only suffices but is the real meaning in all these

cases.   The Hindu, who uses these expressions, *saṁvatsare*, "in a
year", etc., never really uses them in the sense of "after a year",
etc.   For example, to take a case carefully measured, the epic war
lasts eighteen whole days.   On the evening of the fourteenth day,
the prophecy of victory is expressed in the words *pañcame divase
tāta pṛthivī te bhaviṣyati*, vii. 183. 65, "on (not "after") the fifth
day earth will be yours."   One does not and cannot express
"the fourth day is after the third day" by putting "third" in
the locative.   So *çvobhūte dvyahe vā* cannot be "after", but
"on the morrow or next day".   Hence the locative expresses
"after" only because we choose to render it so in accordance
with our idiom, and in so doing sometimes mistranslate, as
when Delbrück, *AIS.* p. 117, renders *daçame māsi sūtave*,
"after the tenth month", whereas (cf. *JAOS.* xxiv. 1) the real
meaning (as in the loc. at Manu ii. 34–35) is "in the course
of the tenth month", this marking the usual limit of time
in cases like that of the pregnant sentence under consideration
(sometimes even in the ninth month).   In his *Syntax*, p. 224,
Delbrück thus renders *quadriduo quo haec gesta sunt* and *is
occisus est* by "on the fourth day after", though the real (locative)
meaning (in or within which *quadriduum*) is as clear as in *qua
nocte*.   But this can be only a matter of translation and I wish
merely to point out that the locative in no wise really connotes
"time after", any more than "place from", e. g. *yad yonāv abhi
jāyate*, "when one is born from (in) the womb", Manu ii. 147.
If we translate in ĀB. v. 29. 3, *astamite sāyam* as "at eve *after*
sunset" we must remember that the following *anudite* means
just as well "*before* sunrise" (ib. iv. 17. 5, *paçce'va ṣaṣṭyām* is
"after, in sixty" years).

THE DATIVE.

Cirāya, cirakālāya, cirarātrāya, "for (up to) long"; *ānantyāya*,
"for ever"; *ahnāya ca cirāya ca*, "for ever and a day", xiii. 8. 19
(*ahnāya*, "up to a day", "soon").   We have to do (in the epic)
with a few phrases only, and as in the case of the genitive the
meaning "after" will do in a translation but is not in the original.
For example, *sucirāya nagarīṁ viveça*, i. 177. 38, "he came up
to very long to the town" is in sense not "for a long time" but
"after a long time", yet only for our idiom ; since the literal sense
is clearly "it was for (or up to) a long while (as) he came".   So
also in *cirarātrāya*, not only in *cirarātrāya jīvitum*, iii. 131. 8,

"live for a long time", but also in *adhyāsva cirarātrāya pitṛpāilā-maham padam*, iii. 299. 7 (N. *bahukālam*), and in *çasayec cira-rātrāya yogakṣemavad avyayam*, v. 129. 5, where the meaning is "for long" (not "at last" or "after a long time", as given in PW.). Thus in Mbh., in R. (e. g. ii. 40. 18), and in the rare but more specific *saṁvatsarāya*, "for a year", of ÇB. xii. 2. 1. 9; 3. 3. 1, etc. The "for", "up to", idea as practically equivalent in our idiom to since or after, when of a past action (as in the example above "to a long while he came"), may be illustrated by the use of the preposition *prati* in the same sense; for this means not only "toward" (sunrise, etc.) and "for, during", *pratitryaham pibed uṣṇān*, Manu xi. 215, but, in *kāṅkṣitaṁ ciram prati*, "desired up to (i. e. for or since) a long while".   Cf. M. iv. 26; Y. i. 125; M. iii. 119; Y. i. 110.

THE ACCUSATIVE.

The durative sense is implied by an acc. with an active verb, *kālam, rātrim*, etc. with *vartayati, viharati*, pass or dissipate the time, *vartayām āsa varṣāṇi catvāri*, i. 100. 45 (intransitive sense, iii. 79. 3, *vartayām āsa muditaḥ*); *samāḥ sapta viharan*, i. 102. 70 (intransitive, iv. 1. 28).   Whether the accusative is objective or durative, since, like Latin *degere*, the verbs are both intransitive (even when active in form) and transitive, is as difficult to say as in the parallel English, "he dissipated a whole day," compared with "he dissipated his time" and "he dissipates all the time." So doubtful is the acc. in *ekaviñçatim ājātir jāyate*, "he (in sinful wombs) is born twenty-one births" (during these rebirths), Manu iv. 166.[1]

Three shades of meaning appear in the epic time-accusative, (a) during, (b) in the course of, (c) at.

(a) The usual durative sense is illustrated by *bahulāḥ samāḥ, avasaṁ suciram*,[2] "for many summers I lived, a long time", i. 131. 41; *na sarvakālam puṣpavanto bhaviṣyatha*, "for all time not" (never), xii. 343. 59 (cf. *na bhūyaḥ*, "no longer"); *bahūn kālān*, i. 94. 41; *yasmāi vavarṣa Parjanyo hiraṇyam parivatsarān*, "rained gold for years", vii. 56. 5; *uvāsā 'bdagaṇān bahūn*, xii. 283. 18; *ṣaṇ māsān nityayuktaḥ* (phrase, passim); with a verb or

[1] On the development from an inner accusative, compare Delbrück, *AIS.* p. 170.   In Manu v. 35, the acc. above is wholly durative, "becomes an animal (for) twenty-one existences".

[2] So *kiyantaṁ kālam avasat*, xii. 344. 27; *nyavasan māsamātram*, xii. 1. 2. etc.

ptc.   But the verbal idea may be nominal : *saptāham bhūmikam-panam,* "an earthquake for a week ", iii. 202. 25 ; *etāvān iha saṁ-vāso vihitaḥ . . . ṣaṇ māsān, saptame māsi,* etc., "so long a stay is settled, six months ", xi. 20. 29.   Cf. *vāyubhakṣā* as well as verb with acc., v. 186. 20–33.   So time distributed but durative takes the acc., as in v. 182. 30 :

> *tataḥ punar vimale ' bhūt sughoram*
> *kalyaṁ kalyaṁ viṅçatiṁ vāi dināni*
> *tathāi 'va cā 'nyāni dināni trīṇi,*[1]

"then again, at dawn, a terrible (fight) occurred, morn-and-morn, days a twenty and three more", that is, every morning during this time.

(b) The idea of duration passes into that of 'in the course of,' i. e. the final result is indicated by the acc., as if it were an instrumental.   For example, *tvagasthimātraçeṣaḥ sa ṣaṇ māsān abhavat,* xv. 37. 13, means " (in the course of) six months he became mere skin and bone " (not "during").   According to the free translations noticed above in other cases, this might also be rendered "after six months he became a mere skeleton".   Compare the ancient equivalent of *saṁvatsare jātaḥ* found in ÇB. ix. 5. 1. 68, *yaḥ saṁvatsaraṁ jātaḥ syāt,* "who should be born (in) a year ".

(c) The accusative of time when (sume niht, ealne daeg, sume hwile, aelce niht ic sice & wepe) is still in the epic a similar visible modification of the durative use.   Thus,[2] in ix. 30. 21, *yadì 'māṁ rajanīṁ vyuṣṭāṁ na hi hanmi parān raṇe,* "if in the course of (not during all) this night".   But in i. 121. 34, *aṣṭamīm . . . saṁ-viçethā mayā saha,* which Professor Speyer, *Syntax* §54 R. i, gives as "time when", the durative idea still seems prominent, "stay through (the fourteenth or) the eighth night with me".   It can scarcely be distinguished from *rātriṁ tām uṣitvā, uṣitve 'ha niçām ekām,* i. 214. 34 ; xiv. 81. 28 ; *sukhoṣitās te rajanīm,* ii. 58. 38 ; and *uvāsa kila tāṁ rātriṁ saha tena . . . vyatītā sā niçā kṛtsnā sukhena divasopamā,* xii. 357. 9, "she stayed that night with him ; that whole night passed", etc.[3]

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[1] Compare my *Great Epic,* p. 243 (light syllable in epic poetry before *tr*). On this page there is no case of *st* (*h*) ; but the example is put under *triṣṭubh* forms, p. 280 ; and I have given no Mbh. (only R.) cases of *tr,* which omission is herewith made good.

[2] Holtzmann, *Grammatisches,* §276.

[3] So in *tad ahar brahmacārī syāt,* Gāutama xv. 23, the acc. may be durative.

The "time when" idea is antique in phrases and is probably extended gradually, just as already in Homer's ἀτῆμαρ, but especially in late Greek inscriptions, as illustrated by Professor Delbrück in his *Syntax*.

Other examples where the durative notion seems to have disappeared are: *agamat tāṁ velāṁ nartanāgāram*, "he came that evening to the dance-hall", iv. 22. 39; *sa pūrvasaṁdhyāṁ yāti sarvadā; ubhe dvirātrisaṁdhye vāi nā 'bhyagāt sa mamā 'layam*, "he always comes (at) the gloaming; both the (last) two days' gloamings he has not come", xii. 172. 6–7 (C. *ubhe dvirātraṁ saṁdhye*); *gamiṣyati vanaṁ rājan āgatāṁ kārtikīm imām*, "that full-moon Kārtika day arrived [when it arrives] he will go", xv. 11. 3. But in these cases, as in Manu iii. 273, *yat pradadyāt trayodaçīm*, and like cases in the epic, there may (as above) be a notion of the course of the day, as in the adverbial accusative, e. g. *ekarātraṁ tu te kāmaṁ dāsyāmi bhojanam*, "one night I will give thee food", i. 131. 73. A good example of this is offered by (ĀB. viii. 15. 2=) R. vi. 20. 33. *yāṁ ca rātrim mariṣyāmi jāye rātriṁ ca yām aham*, "the night I am born, the night I die". So in xiii. 85. 155 ff., after "at sunrise," *ādityodayasamprāpte* and *uditamātre*, follows "at midday" and "the gloaming" (acc.): *madhyāhne dadato rukmaṁ hanti pāpam anāgatam, dadāti paççimāṁ saṁdhyāṁ yaḥ suvarṇam*, etc., not "during". Just where " in the course of" shades into the "at" of *naktam, trivelam, tad ahaḥ* and such phrases,[1] is impossible to determine. Thus *vyuṣṭāṁ niçām* in vi. 60. 1 takes the place of a stereotyped locative (56. 1; 69. 1, etc.) and can mean scarcely more than "at dawn".[2] So perhaps in xii. 138. 24, (*eti*) *prabhātāṁ çarvarīm*, though one might render "in the course of the morning". The word time itself gives an opportunity for three accusatives in one clause, for not only have we *trikālam abhiṣekaḥ*, xiii. 142. 6 and 23; and *dvikālam agniṁ juhvānaḥ*, xiv. 46. 4; but also *ekakālaṁ caran bhāikṣyaṁ kulāni daça pañca ca*, i. 119. 12. The adverbial

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[1] The word *trivelam*, like *triṣavaṇam*, occurs at xiii. 136. 15, *sa trivelaṁ samunmajya dvādaçāhena çudhyati*. Instead of the antithesis of *pūrvāṁ* (*saṁdhyām*) and *paççimām* in i. 2. 393 (at gloaming) we find *paççāt saṁdhyām* in the same sense, xviii. 5. 43 ff. (with *ahnā, rātrāu*).

[2] Manu iv. 128 has *amāvāsyām aṣṭamīṁ ca*, acc.; but xiii. 104. 29 has in the same stanza all locatives. Gāutama xviii. 22, *saptamīm*, "on the seventh," is loc. in Manu xi. 16.

form of *cira* is used in all oblique cases; thus it is indifferently accusative, dative, and instrumental, *ciraṁ na paritapyate, cireṇa niçcayaṁ kṛtvā, cirāya yadi te sāumya ciram asmi na duḥkhitaḥ,* in the Cirakārika story, xii. 267. 67–73.

Of these meanings, the first and last are most ·antique, and the second may perhaps be found in the later Vedic language; but I have seen no epic examples cited for this use, though it is clearly to be differentiated from the other two classes. As a specimen unique in form I may cite *dvirūnaṁ daçarātram*, "eight days", xii. 359, 10, apparently an accusative of time, though it might be an independent nominative, such as is given above.[1] The repeated *ahar-ahaḥ* accusative, *çvaḥ-çvaḥ,* ÇB. iv. 3. 4. 33; *nimeṣam-nimeṣam,* ib. iii. 6. 2. 9; *kalyaṁ-kalyaṁ* (above), adds nothing to the syntax of the case, but it shows how durative may have glided into punctual time, if it is necessary to assume any transition at all.

The Instrumental.

How this borders on yet differs from the accusative may be seen by comparing these examples: (*akhanat) ahāni triñçat pañca,* "he dug (for) thirty-five days", xiv. 58. 27; *saptabhir divasāiḥ khātvā dṛṣṭaḥ,* "seen with a week's digging", iii. 204. 21 ; *kadācid divasān pañca samutpatya . . . ṣaṣṭhe 'hani samājagmuḥ . . . kadācin māsamātreṇa samutpatya nāi 'vā 'gacchan,* "once flying off (during) five days they returned on the sixth day; once flying off with (in the course of) a month they returned not", xii. 262. 35 ff. So there are cases where the instrumental (means) is absent: *tasya kālena mahatā tasmiṅs tapasi vartataḥ, tam āçramam anuprāptāḥ,* "they came to the asylum of that man, when he was engaged in that austerity, at the end of a long time ", i. 107. 4. Thus *divā* (cf. *doṣā*), "by day ", etc., shows the weakest sense of the case in the earliest period; no means but only the "with" idea.

But the epic instrumental usually indicates accompanying (temporal) means, which necessarily implies the end of the whole time: *atyakrāman mahārṇavam . . . setunā 'nena māsenāi 'va,* "he crossed the sea with (by) that dike and with (by the end of) a month", iii. 283. 50 ; *ekenā 'bhipataty ahnā yojanāni caturdaça,* "he gets over fourteen leagues with (by the end of) one day",

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[1] The context shows that the meaning is (ten less two) eight days, so the v. l. *dviguṇam* (cited by Mohan Ganguli) will not answer.

v. 86. 12; *so 'bhavad dvādaçasamo dvādaçāhena*, "he became twelve years old with (by the end of) twelve days", vii. 62. 9; *jagmus tribhir ahorātrāiḥ Kāmyakam*, "they reached K. with (by going all of) three days"; *sabhāṁ kṛtvā māsāiḥ paricaturdaçāiḥ* "made the hall by (the end of) fourteeen months", ii. 3. 37; *tribhir varṣāir labdhakāmaḥ*, "he got his wish by (the end of) three years", i. 62. 41. "By means of" is actually implied in some instances (see below).[1]

We thus see that the notion of "time after" is suggested but not expressed by the instrumental. In the example above, for example, *kālena mahatā* does not mean (the robbers came) "after" a long time (a great while), but with or in the course of a long time; and when, i. 75. 58, we find *kālena mahatā paçcāt*, this also means the same, not "after a great while" but "afterwards in the course of a great while". So in i. 160. 7, *sa vāro bahubhir varṣāir bhavaty asukaro narāiḥ*, "the choice comes (not after but) in the course of many years"; Manu x. 93, *saptarātreṇa*, "by the end of a week". Of course, in indefinite time-expressions it makes no difference whether we say "comes after a long time", or "comes in the course of a long time", but as soon as a definite period is given it makes a great difference: *kālenāi 'tāvatā punaḥ, udghāṭanīyāni*, "they are to be reopened by the end of just so much time", i. 115. 23;[2] *akṣāuhiṇyo daçā 'ṣṭāu ca aṣṭādaçāhena hatāḥ*, "killed in the course of or by the end of eighteen days" (not afterwards), xv. 10. 29 ff.; *tenā 'hnā gatvā sumahad antaram*, "going a great distance in the course of that day", ib. 18. 16.[3]

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[1] The instrumental sense is clearly expressed in Manu's phrase, viii. 394, *saptatyā sthaviraḥ* "a man aged by (reason of) seventy " (years).

[2] It is not often that, as in this section, i. 115. 3 ff., one finds so many time-cases together and so clearly marked: *kiyatā kālena jajñe*, "in how much time"; *saṁvatsaradvayam*, "during two years" (and *dvivarṣasambhṛtā*); *kālaparyayāt*, "in course of time"; *kālenāi 'tāvatā*, "by (and not after) the end of just so much time"; *yasminn ahani*, "the day in which." In giving the limit of time the instrumental has the same function as in its non-temporal use, e. g. "the size of the mouthful is within (limited by) non-distorting of the mouth," *pramāṇam, avikāreṇa*, Gāut. xxvii. 10.

[3] I append some of the epic phrases: *kālena, kālayogena, kālena mahatā, alpena kālena, adīrgheṇa kālena, dīrghakālena mahatā*, xii. 285. 69 (a mighty long time); *acireṇāi 'va k. svalpena*.

THE ABLATIVE.

The "from" meaning of the ablative glides so naturally into that of "after" that it is rather surprising how restricted is the time-function of this case. Most of the early examples are still clearly "from", interchanging with the causal "in consequence of", such as *tataḥ* and *etasmāt*, "from this", "therefore". No Indo-European time-function is claimed for the ablative (but Avest. has abl. "by day and night") and the Vedic language offers no examples of time-words used in the pure ablative (i. e. without preposition) in the sense of "after". Even in the Sūtras this sense with time-words is quite lacking and there is but one case in Manu where it is probable, although this case also is not that of a time-word, as will be shown. All that we have from this earlier period is the Vedic examples (above) continued, together with such examples as *janmataḥ = janmaprabhṛti*[1] or (as well), "in consequence of birth",[2] and the similar use of *garbhāt*, "from conception". The test of the meaning "after" as applied to time must be sought, however, not in such expressions as these, but in the application of the ablative to words of time in the sense of "after". For example, we should find "I will go after three days", or its like, expressed by an ablative; and if we do not find any such examples, or only doubtful and late cases; if on the contrary we find that a time-word in the ablative instead of meaning "after" always means "up to", then we may safely declare that the meaning attributed to the ablative of time-words must be in accordance with this necessary interpretation.

Even from the examples *tataḥ*, "from that", *itaḥ*, "from this", it may be seen that the meaning of the case is "from", measured in either direction, and that therefore "after" is not a necessary meaning. Thus, in the epic, *itaḥ* may measure time back to a

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[1] Or *janmataḥ prabhṛti*, and other such phrases marking time locally from a station, *suciram bālyāt prabhṛti*, "for a long time, from boyhood onward", i. 131. 44, etc.

[2] Or "according to", Manu ix. 125 ff. For *garbhāt* in the parallel cases, Āp. and Vas. use the indefinite *garbhāṣṭameṣu*, etc.; Āp. i. 1. 18, etc. It is scarcely necessary to insist that *mṛtyoḥ sa mṛtyum āpnoti*, from the earlier Upaniṣad period (e. g. K. 4. 10), like *tamasaḥ tamaḥ praviçati*, Āp. i. 1. 10, means "from", and that from such phrases no "after" sense can be shown from the ablative; that is, "one (coming) out of darkness enters into darkness" (not "after darkness one enters darkness").

certain point, as well as forward, and so imply "before" rather
than "after". For example, in i. 126. 29, *itaḥ saptadaçe 'hani*,
means "on the seventeenth day before this" (i. e. "from this",
reckoned back), the event referred to having taken place seven-
teen days previously. The *prabhṛti* clauses also, even when
taken by themselves, oppose the sense of "after" in an ablative
not really required by the construction; while in *cirāt prabhṛti*,
for example, the meaning is clearly not "after a long time
onwards", but "from a long time onwards".

Besides the "from" ablative, however, there is the ablative
with an adverb-preposition, the usual type of which is *ā*, meaning,
as in RV. iii. 53. 20, "up to", with a background which may
be analyzed as "toward (or hither) from", *ā Manoḥ*, i. 95. 3, a
meaning afterwards quite reduced to "toward", "up to".

This ablative may include the time of the ablative-word,
though this is left to the sense of the hearer; as it is in the
construction with space-words, when *ā* is expressed. Compare,
for example, Manu ii. 108, *ā samāvartanāt*, "up to his return
home"; ib. 161, *ā nakhāgrebhyaḥ*, "up to (including) the nail-
points"; ib. 22, *ā samudrāt*, "up to (excluding) the ocean". In
pure time-words, however, the whole time is included in Manu's
examples (see below).

All these local and temporal examples, which may be called
the *ā tamitoḥ* type of the Brāhmaṇas and Sūtras, Āp. ii. 5. 12. 15,
etc., indicate the end reached in place or time, and they are the
usual type through legal and epic literature, as in the oft repeated
phrase *ā ṣoḍaçāt*, "up to the sixteenth" (year). Thus: Vas. v.
21, *ā dinakṣayāt*; ib. vii. 4, *ā çarīramokṣāt*; Manu, ii. 243, *ā
çarīravimokṣaṇāt*; ib. iv. 137, *ā mṛtyoḥ*; Mbh. xiii. 26. 71, *ā
dehapatanāt*; Gāut. ii. 11, *ā jyotiṣo darçanāt*; Gāut. i. 36 and Vas.
iii. 26, *ā maṇibandhanāt* (place); Vas. ii. 6, *ā māuñjibandhanāt*
(time); Manu v. 88, *ā vratasya samāpanāt*; Āp. i. 3. 10. 27, *ā ca
vipākāt*; Āp. ii. 6. 15. 23–25, *opanayanāt, sā niṣṭhā*, "up to the
initiation, this is the limit". This ablative is sometimes paralleled
by the instrumental, as when *ā saptamād yugād*, Manu x. 64, is
distinctly within the seventh generation, and is paralleled by
saptamena in Gāut. iv. 22. Cf. also ĀB. iii. 19. 16, adv. *ājarasam*
(RV. x. 85. 43, *ājarasāya*), as limit.

As in the case of the genitive, where we lack the basis for a
true interpretation in such examples as *cirasya*, "in a long time",
and first find the real sense of the case in definite time-words,

not in words so indefinite that it makes no difference whether we translate by 'within' or 'after', so, as regards the ablative, to adduce *kṣaṇāt, cirāt, muhūrtāt* as examples of the "after" sense of the ablative is inadmissible till the sense in definite time-words is established. That this latter, in pure ablatives as well as in the *ā*-cases just cited, is not "after" but "by the end", or "up to the end", can I think be shown by the cases in the Sūtras, Manu, and epic. It may be that an "after" sense creeps into grammatical phraseology, but it is not in connection with words of time but with the position of one letter as marked from another, as illustrated by the example in Whitney's grammar, § 291, b. The BS. has an "after" abl., but this is late Sanskrit.

All this, however, is in direct opposition to the received teaching of our grammarians, and for this reason must be established by a careful examination of the examples.

In his *Sanskrit Syntax*, Professor Speyer asserts that the meaning "after" is fundamental to the genitive and ablative of time, saying: "It does always express after what time something is happening", § 128; and again: "When denoting time the ablative carries the meaning from, since, after", § 99. Adhering to this still, in his *Ved. u. Sk. Syntax*, the same eminent authority gives again the same examples and carries them back into the Vedic language with the help of one further specimen of the same interpretation. He adduces Pāṇ. ii. 3. 7 as authority for this view. Whitney in his Grammar, as has been said, adds the example of a letter "after" another, adopting Speyer's view and employing one of his examples. In my opinion, the statements in both these works should be greatly modified if not radically altered, somewhat as follows: When denoting time, the pure ablative of time-words in epic and earlier Sanskrit means "up to" (as a limit) and not "after".

As to Pāṇini's authority, he permits either locative or ablative (in the rule cited) as follows: "The accusative of time and space in uninterrupted continuation, *atyantasaṁyoge*; the instrumental in giving the end, *apavarge*; the locative or ablative in giving the interval for the agent, *kārakamadhye*". The scholiast gives an example "having eaten to-day Devadatta will eat in two days", *dvyahe* or *dvyahāt*. But "by the end of" two days serves as well as "after" to fulfil the rule, and the former is more probable because the other example, given to illustrate space, says that *kroçe* or *kroçāt* the mark will be hit, stationed,

obviously, not more than a *koss* away, but within an interval, to the limit of a *koss*. Compare Yājñ. ii. 272, *bahiḥ kroçāt*, "up to a *koss* outside (the village)".

The one Vedic example recently added (*Ved. u. Sk. Syntax*) by Professor Speyer (Professor Delbrück gives no Vedic case of pure ablative in this sense) is ĀB. i. 12. 2, *tam* (*somam*) *trayodaçān māsād akriṇan*, which he translates "they bought Soma after the thirteenth month". But the thirteenth month is here classed with the wicked Soma-seller as "unfit", and what is the time after the thirteenth month? And if bought in that after-time, how can the thirteenth month be implicated in the transaction and thereby made unfit? The words must mean "they bought from the thirteenth month" (as a Soma-seller). Compare ÇB. v. 1. 2. 14; vi. 2. 2. 29; xii. 7. 2. 12, "buy from" (abl.).

Some of Professor Speyer's examples are of the *janmataḥ* class already referred to and cannot be utilized till the usage with real words of time has shown that they must bear this sense. Others are from Manu and the epic where the interpretation, as it seems to me, is either incorrect (as shown below) or dubious, the last case being Manu iii. 119, *parisaṁvatsarāt*, "after a year". But this example is ill able to support the weight of the contention, for Kullūka takes it as *pari saṁvatsarāt*, and Medhātithi (the older commentator) reads *parisaṁvatsarān*, an adj. pl. acc., which is the construction of the epic parallel (see Jolly's text) and Gautama's parallel has *saṁvatsare punaḥ*, v. 28. Even if Āp. ii. 4. 8. 7 has the form of Manu, it may be questioned whether Kullūka's interpretation is not valid here, especially since in all other cases Āpastamba uses this ablative in the sense of "up to" and never in the sense of "beyond". Thus *çamyā-prāsāt*, "up to the cast of the stick", i. 3. 9. 6; *iṣumātrāt*, "up to the length of an arrow", i. 5. 15. 19; *uttamād ucchvāsāt*, "up to his last breath", i. 10. 29. 1.

The ablative sometimes seems to mark time where in reality it does not. Thus in Āp. ii. 6. 14. 16, *pāṇigrahaṇād dhi kar-masu sahatvam*, is not "union in religious acts after marriage", but rather "from the joining of hands in marriage there is union in religious acts". One is typical of the other, and that other union is not simply posterior but is symbolized by the joining of hands. On the other hand, there is occasionally an ellipse that prevents the assumption of a pure ablative. Thus in Vas. xi. 15, *anujñātād vā*, "or till permitted", is preceded by *ā sīmāntād*

anuvrajed, "accompany up to the border", and the *ā* doubtless affects the second clause; as in iv. 9–10, *dvivarsāt prabhṛti* . . . *dantajananād ity eke*, the *prabhṛti* is to be supplied with the second ablative (compare Manu v. 71, *nā 'trivarṣasya* . . . *jātadantasya vā*; 58, *dantajāte 'nujāte ca*), ("by death made impure) from (a child of) two years and onward; some say from teething" (onward).

Turning from the Sūtra, I will now examine the examples I have found in Manu and the epic, including among them those already used by Professor Speyer.

Manu ii. 101, *pūrvāṁ saṁdhyāṁ japaṅs tiṣṭhet sāvitrīm arka-darçanāt*, the ablative can mean only "till sunrise".

Manu v. 64–67, the time is given at the end of which one becomes pure. The limit is set by the instrumental, *rātryā*, "pure by the end of the night"; by the ablative, *trirātrāt*, "by the end of three nights"; and by the adjective, *viçuddhir nāiçikī*, "purification that ensues in a night". Here the circumstances are in each case the same. The purification is attained by the end of the time mentioned, as expressed by the ablative, within, up to the end. This formal within, as in the case of the locative, is actually expressed in Manu viii. 222, where "within ten days" (giving the limit of time allowed to repent of a bargain and undo it) is *antardaçāhāt*.[1]

In Manu viii. 142, interest by the month is *māsasya*; in Yājñ. ii. 37, *māsi māsi*; in Gāut. xii. 29, *māsam*, giving the limit; but these two last stanzas correspond in content to Manu viii. 140, where the same rule is expressed by: *açītibhāgaṁ gṛhṇīyād māsād vārdhuṣikaḥ çate*, when *māsāt* must also give the limit, "up to the end of the month".

In Manu xi. 131, one is directed to perform a vow *ṣaṇmāsāt*, "up to the end of six months".

In Manu viii. 108, *saptāhāt* is said in PW. *s. v.* and by Speyer, *Sk. Syntax*, loc. cit., to mean "after a week".[1] But a closer examination of the passage will show that this is exactly what the ablative does not mean. Manu is asserting here that proof of a sinner's guilt may be seen in misfortune coming to him *within* a week. This is the very proof, for otherwise he would be liable on account of misfortune at any time after a week. But no judgments of God are framed in such wise. In Yājñ. ii. 113,

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[1] PW. renders "before" (literally "up to a *within-ten* period").

the time is simply doubled, *arvāk caturdaçād ahnaḥ*, "up to the fourteenth day". In the very stanza preceding, Manu uses the same construction in the same sense, *tripakṣād abruvan*, "if he does not make a declaration within, by the end of, three fortnights". The corresponding passage in Yājñ. ii. 76, gives the first day *for the fine* as the forty-sixth. In M. viii. 58, occurs again, *na cet tripakṣāt prabrūyāt*, not "after" but "by the end of three fortnights", as an extreme limit of time allowed for silence.

In every one of these cases the ablative fails to show the meaning "after" time, but in all clear passages means "within" (up to, by the end of) the time. Of the doubtful *parisaṁvatsarāt*, I have spoken above. There remains a *taḥ* ablative of a noun in viii. 375, *vāiçyaḥ sarvasvadaṇḍyaḥ syāt saṁvatsaranirodhataḥ*, "a Vāiçya shall be mulcted in all his possessions after a year's imprisonment". But, as in the other doubtful passage, so there is here a varied reading *nirodhitaḥ*, and this weakens the force of this example, which, strictly speaking, is an ablative of a word implying time, rather than of a time-word.

I turn now to the epic examples. First, there are endless cases of *cirāt, kṣaṇāt, muhūrtād iva*, etc., all of which I should provisionally render as "up to the end of", in accordance with the sense given by the examples above, e. g. i. 133. 4, and xii. 326. 43, *tato muhūrtād utthāya*, "up to or by the end of an hour from midnight"; i. 135. 21, *kṣaṇāt . . . kṣaṇāt . . . kṣaṇena*, "within a moment, in a moment", etc. Similarly, as in the law-examples, i. 99. 38, (*mokṣas te bhavitā*) *kasmāc cit kāla-paryayāt*, "within (by the end of) some time", *anusaṁvatsarāt*, "in the course of (not after) a year", i. e. by the end of it (you will be free from the curse). Then we have cases where the instrumental might be expected: *ekāhāt pṛthivī vijitā çāsanāt*, "he conquered earth within (by the end of) one day by an edict", iii. 126. 39. Conversely, the instrumental where the ablative might be looked for (and if used would be rendered by "after"), *saptāṣṭabhir dināir darçayiṣyati*, "he will appear within a week" (the same verb, cf. Eng. "show up" for appear, without object in i. 63. 85), xii. 358. 8.

This interchange brings us to the case where the ablative and instrumental are used indifferently in the same word and phrase, *varṣaçatāir* and *varṣaçatād* followed by *api*, "even by the end of a hundred years". The former case is found several times

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(as in Manu ii. 227) in the epic, i. 97. 13; ii. 33. 7; and with a redundant *api* in *api varṣaçatāir api*, xiii. 161. 44. The ablative form has been taken by Professor Speyer (loc. cit.) as an example of the ablative meaning "after", in the verse found in the Rāmāyaṇa v. 34. 6 (= Gorr. vi. 110. 2) and vi. 126. 2:

eti jīvantam ānando naraṁ varṣaçatād api.

But, as in the case with the example chosen from Manu, "after" is here exactly what the ablative does not mean. The hundred years ("living even to the end of a century") are the conventional equivalent of a long life, and what the poet says is: "However long one lives (not after one's life) joy is sure to come to a man". This is the very sense and application of the proverb, that one should not despair but live bravely, for sometime within one's long life one is sure to find joy (compare the scholiast on R. v. 34. 6). This is in fact the same thought as that expressed in Manu iv. 137 (compare ib. ix. 300), "till death seek bliss nor deem it hard to win":

ā mṛtyoḥ çriyam anvicchen nāi 'nām manyeta durlabhām.

Professor Speyer does not translate his example from Mbh.; but since it is found in this group it has been taken up in Whitney's grammar, § 291, b, and translated "they went to the shrine after a whole day". The passage is i. 170. 3; the words are *te tv agacchann ahorātrāt tīrtham*; and the meaning is, "they arrived at the shrine (for which they had already started) within a day and night" (that is by the end of a whole day).

As the ablative interchanges with the instrumental in the example above, so does it with the accusative. The PW. gives a case of *avatiṣṭate kṣaṇam*, "stop for a moment". So in xii. 332. 6, we find an example where the ablative gives the same limit (expressed idiomatically by our dative): "Night and day pass away; the change of bright and dark halves of the month does not cease for a moment", *nimeṣān nā 'vatiṣṭhate* (up to a moment's length).

Again, we find the date of a new moon set by the ablative. The locative or instrumental in giving dates is the concurrent construction, and as one would not translate, iii. 282. 20, *sa māsaḥ pañcarātreṇa pūrṇo bhavitum arhati*, by an indefinite "after" but render, "the month will be complete by the end of

five nights", so in *saptamāc cā 'pi divasād amāvāsyā bhaviṣyati*, v. 142. 18, we should render, "there will be a new moon within (by the end of) the week ".

A very clear epic case is given by the drama of i. 41 ff. Here the announcement of a man's death is made in the words *saptarātrād ito netā Yamasya sadanam prati*, çl. 14, "by the end of (within) seven days from this I shall lead him to hell ". Then in 18 follows the locative of the precise time, *saptame 'hani*, "on the seventh day"; and then again, 42. 20, the instrumental sets the date, *saptarātreṇa*, "by the end of seven days"; and finally, when the fatal day arrives, *prāpte divase*, just at sunset, *astam abhyeti savitā*, 42. 32–33, in the last moment of the allotted seven days, even as the victim thinks he has escaped the curse, death nabs him. The scene is repeated at i. 50. 11 ff.

To give one more epic illustration. In the same account, *ā caturdaçakād varṣāt* stands parallel to the pure ablative, *bālo hi dvādaçād varṣāj janmato yat kaiṣyati*, "what a boy may do from his birth up to his twelfth year" (inclusive), i. 108. 14 and 17. The same *ā* is used with the adverb-accusative: *ā-kumāraṁ ca paurāḥ*, (all) the citizens (were grieved) "even to boys", xv. 21. 7, as in a temporal sense, the Sūtra phrase, *ākālam, ākālikam*, "to the (same) time" (next day).

The limitation of the ablative in time and place (*yojanāt = ā vojanāt*) is paralleled by the limitation in action. Thus in i. 128. 71, *ekocchvāsāt tataḥ kuṇḍam pibati sma*, "then he drank up the jar with one swallow", i. e. by the limit of a swallow.

It is of some interest to see how time-limit is given apart from the pure cases. The use of adverb-prepositions, illustrated by *ā* above, is the oldest and in the Vedic stage of the language the only way of limiting time with an ablative case. Whether the limit is before or after depends not on the case but on the meaning of the word that governs it. Thus *purā*, before, with the ablative in Veda, Sūtra, *purā kālāt*, etc., and epic, *purodayāt;* *prāk*, both as adverb, e. g. *prāg evā 'nāgate kāle*, "a little before the time arrived", i. 54. 15; and as preposition, *prāg astagamanād raviḥ*, i. 155. 17; also *arvāk*, in the same way, especially as preposition: *arvāg eva hi te sarve mariṣyanti çaracchalāt*, "they will all die before (they are) a hundred years (old)", xii. 104. 20; *nā 'rvāṅ niçūthāt*, "not before midnight", ii. 21. 34; *nā 'rvāk saṁvatsarāt*, "not till the end of the year", xii. 96. 5.

The same means is employed to express "after"; *param*, *parataḥ*, *pareṇa*, *ūrdhvam;* not giving the sense of the ablative but explaining the nature of its limit: *ūrdhvaṁ tribhyo 'pi varṣebhyaḥ*, "beyond, more than, three years", xii. 165. 56 (compare *adhikam*, "more" and "longer"); *ata ūrdhvaṁ tataḥ*, "then after that", i. 165. 1 (often in Sūtras); *ūrdhvaṁ dehāt karmaṇā jṛmbhamāṇāt*, "after a body has been developed by acts", i. 90. 7 (*parastāt*, "afterwards" in 17). So Manu uses *ūrdhvaṁ kālāt*, "beyond the time"; and either genitive or ablative with *para* forms: *abhivādāt param, pareṇa daçāhasya*, ix. 90; ii. 122; viii. 222. Compare *ūrdhvam pituḥ*, "after the father" (is dead or gone away), M. ix. 104; Yājñ ii. 123. Āpastamba still uses *adhi* in the same sense, *pāṇigrahaṇād adhi* "after marriage", ii. 1. 1. 1.

More precise is the actual employment of *anta*, common in the Sūtras, e. g. *vidyākarmāntam*, Āp. i. 1. 1. 12; *dvādaçarātrasyā 'nte*, Gāut. xxvi. 15: so *trirātrānte*, Yājñ iii. 288, etc. The adjective corresponding is joined with *ā* in iii. 88. 7, and Manu ix. 101, Yājñ. ii. 183, *āmaraṇāntikaḥ*, "ending up with death" (Manu, ib. 89, *ā maraṇāt*). For "next after" the (negative) interval is used, *anantaras tasmāt* (*ekavarṣāntarāḥ*, "at intervals of a year", i. 221. 86), or an adverb of coordination, *ānupūrvyeṇa samprāptāḥ*, "arriving one after the other", in due order, i. 185. 4 ff. So "before" is implied by a negative, *anirdaça*, "before ten days", Manu, v. 75; *ūnadvivārṣika*, "before he is two years old", ib. 68. Then "before and after" are expressed by two adverbs or by a combination of a compound and adverb, *pūrvotthāyī caramaṁ co 'paçāyī*, "rising before (him) and retiring after", i. 91. 2; *uttiṣṭhet prathamaṁ cā' sya caramaṁ cāi 'va saṁviçet*, Manu ii. 194. The usual preposition is *anu*, as in ÇB. xii. 1. 1. 7, *kḷptim anu;* ĀB. viii. 12. 4, *tān anu*, of time and place. Finally, "after" is implied by participles, *samāvṛttavrataḥ*, "(after) having completed his vow", i. 77. 1. etc., passim, and, to our idiom, by gerunds (instrumentals, *gatvā*, with).

There is, however, quite a different method by which the limit of time may be expressed, and as I have discussed other means so fully, I may add a word on this old usage as it survives in the epic. I refer to *yāvat* used adverbially, as in *yāvadāyuṣam*, Ch. Up. viii. 15. 1, etc. Either the accusative or instrumental here marks the limit, *yāvadjīvam, yāvatkālam, yāvadjīvena, yāvatkālena*, "as long as one lives", "as long as life lasts"; the last also as "until", v. 35. 68; xii. 303. 13; i. 155. 20 (*yāvatkālena*

*bhavati putrasyo 'tpādanaṁ çubhe, tāvatkālaṁ gamiṣyāmi tvayā
saha,* "I will accompany you so long, until a son is born ". Time
as long as possible (all time) is expressed by this phrase, *yan na
kṣarati pūrveṇa yāvatkālena vā 'py atha,* "which perishes not by
reason of time past or (future) however long", xii. 303. 13. The
ordinary correlation is accusative in both clauses.[1] A more
definite word is sometimes used with *tāvat,* as in xii. 319, 32,
muhūrtam uṣyatāṁ tāvad yāvad evaṁ vicintaye, "just wait a
moment (so long) while (or till) I think it over."

The epic has taken up a Suçruta phrase in its description of the
attacks of the grippe, and in doing so illustrates an extension
of the use of *yāvat,* iii. 230. 57:

yāvat saptativarṣāṇi bhavanty ete grahā nṛṇām, "these attacks
of grippe last up to the seventies."

Compare the following verse, with its interesting metaphor,
xii. 83. 7:

te tvāṁ tāta niṣeveyur yāvad ārdrakapāṇayaḥ,

"they will court you as long as they are wet-handed ", that is,
as long as they are not empty-handed. The metaphor occurs
again in xii. 139. 30, *bhrātā çatruḥ klinnapāṇir vayasyaḥ,* "your
brother is your enemy; he whose hand has been wetted is your
friend" (N. *upakriyamāṇaḥ,* "benefited ").[2]

As regards the evolution of the meaning of the ablative in
connection with words of time, it is easy to see how a case that
means "from" glides into the meaning "after". Even where
the "from" is still clearly marked, as in the expression found
in Vedic prose *tasmād dvitīyaḥ,* "second from him", secundus
ab, it requires a moment's thought to realize that "after" is not
the meaning of the ablative (which in this stage of the language
never, when pure, has this meaning). Yet even in English,
"from" and "after" are not always interchangeable. We can

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[1] "A homely man thinks himself beautiful as long as he does not see his face
in a mirror", *yāvat (na) tāvat,* i. 74. 87; the same in i. 203. 11 ("a man lives
as long as his glory is not destroyed "), and in i. 128. 69 (" give to him as long
as he drinks "). As a simple time-word, *tāvat,* passim, means "for a while",
"now", "to begin with" (cf. tantum); and *na tāvat,* as in xiv. 81. 30, *na sa
tāvat pravekṣyāmi puram,* "not at present".

[2] But *ārdrapāṇiḥ samuttiṣṭhet* and *pañcārdro bhojanam bhuñjyāt,* "one should
wash the hands before rising"; "one should eat only after washing the
five ", i. e. hands, feet, and mouth, xii. 193. 6–7.

say "I will walk from breakfast till dinner", but we cannot say
"I will walk from breakfast", without suggesting that we are
walking away from it. Now this "from", marking continuity,
is found only in a very few phrases, "from now", "from this",
"from birth", etc., but it was never developed into a free
"ablative of time after" used with words of time. On the other
hand, in the earliest period, the *ā* + ablative construction means
"hither to (*ā*), from", so that this construction still preserves
the true "from" of the ablative, but unites with it by means of
an adverb the notion of "up to" (from). Thus, *tasmād ā* is
"from that hither" i. e. "since" (Whitney, Gr. § 293 c). So *ā*
mūlāc chākābhiḥ, ĀB. ii. 1. 6, is "here-to (from) the root, with
the branches". But in the later language the force of the
adverb, "up to", gains in power and ends by suppressing
altogether the sense of "from", so that *ā* + ablative finally
mean simply "up to". The next step is to elide the adverb-
preposition and use the ablative in the same sense without it,
both in space and time. Compare for the former, *yojanāt*
("from" or) "up to a league".[1]

Synchronous with this transformation of the ablative-meaning
is its causal modification from "from" to "in consequence of",
and from this to "by reason of", and eventually to "by"
(concurrent in this with the instrumental).[2] Thus even in
Brāhmaṇa style we find *ekān na çatam* (*AIS.* p. 112), i. e.
ninety-nine, as "not one hundred, up to or by one". The parallel
construction in this case, being instrumental, is opposed to Del-
brück's interpretation "from the point of view of one, not a
hundred" (loc. cit.). Thus in time-words employed in legal
phrases, "made pure by" a month's penance is expressed either
with the instrumental or ablative of the month, and it seems
hypercritical to say that while *kṛcchreṇa pūtaḥ* is "purified by
penance", *kṛcchrābdena* must be "by the end of a year of
penance". For the latter is also "by a year of penance", as
time in the instrumental still clearly in many cases is "by means
of". By analogy, with *māsena*, therefore, *māsāt pūtaḥ* may be

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[1] In Manu iii. 91, one is directed to give an offering to the Manes *dakṣiṇataḥ*,
not "from the south" but "toward the south", or "on the south", the ablative
having in such *-taḥ* phrases from antiquity an indefinite case of locality. So
māsam antataḥ is "(during) a month, to its end", iv. 36. 3.

[2] Compare *na nāmagrahaṇād eva*, "not by naming it alone" (will the
kataka purify), Manu vi. 67, and other cases interchangeable with instrumental.

either "purified by reason of a month" (of penance), or "by
the end of a month". It is worth while to regard this correlation
rather closely, as the sense of "after" in the instrumental is
admitted by all to be merely a convention of translation. The
instrumental (with, by) gives the time as accompaniment or
means, thereby implying all of the time within which anything
is done, and this interchanges with the ablative in the same
phrases and in almost the same sense, "within" or "up to the
end". This may be shown first by words which merely imply
time and are often translated as if they were used in the sense
of after (in the ablative), for example *maraṇāt*, in legal language,
"after death" (he is purified, etc.). But it is doubtful whether
time is even implied in this phrase since it interchanges with
constructions implying no time when the same rule is given.
For example, in Vas. xx. 41–42, *maraṇāt pūto bhavati* inter-
changes (in the same law) with *çāçanāt* in Manu viii. 316, and
with *vadhe* in Āp. i. 9. 25. 4. So Vas. ib. 14, *maraṇān mukto
bhavati*, interchanges with *mṛtyunā sa viçudhyati* in Manu xi.
104, and with *mṛtaḥ* in Gāut. xxiii. 11. Here then *maraṇāt*
(though there is no objection to adapting an English translation
to our idiom and rendering it "after death") means "by death".
But this is also the meaning, as is shown by other parallels
like *mṛtyunā = maraṇāt*, in time-words used in the same way;
for example, "by a month" he is purified, when a penance is
enjoined. Compare, for instance, Manu v. 64 and 83, where one is
purified *trirātrāiḥ* and *trirātrāt*; xii. 54, *tatkṣayāt*; so *tryahāt* in
xi. 254; *māsāt*, xi. 249. One is not purified "after", but "within,
by the end of" the time of penance; in completing the penance
one is *ipso facto* purified. Compare the instr. case of time "by
means of", ĀB. v. 1. 5; ÇB. iv. 6. 2. 1; M. xi. 163. Thus in
Yājñ. i. 188, earth is "purified by sweeping and by time",
mārjanāt kālāt (not "after a time"). So in evil prophecies, as
in BS., *ṣaṇmāsāt*, etc., the dire event is to happen "by the end
of six months".

Just how this meaning arose, whether by syncretism or by a
shortening process, may be argued. But it seems to me indis-
putable that the pure ablative of time in the case of real time-
words means "by the end" and not "after", and that "after",
when found in connection with words implying time, *janmataḥ*,
etc., is really "from", implying in all cases a continuity of time
lacking in "after". One can say in Sanskrit "he was wise from

birth" and use the pure ablative, because there is an unbroken series. So "on the third day from birth" implies a series, from one end of which one reckons. But one cannot say "this unborn one will marry after his birth" (implying a non-serial interval of time) and use the ablative, unless prefaced with the formal word "after". Conversely, if one wishes to say "he will do this before the week is over" (implying an interval) one can use "before", but, just as well, the pure ablative meaning "by the end of the week". In such cases the difference between "by the end" and "after", which is dimmed in adverbs ("up to, in, or after a long time") and in loose phrases, stands plainly forth. To say "I will slay him *saptarātrāt*" (within a week), and not having done so to claim on the morning of the eighth day that the promise was to kill *after* a week, would be impossible. This seems to me to settle the meaning in respect of time. The only remaining question in regard to the meaning of a pure ablative (without preposition) of a real word of time is whether it means "all the time up to" or simply "by the end of". In the Sūtras, the former meaning reigns supreme in (place and) time-words. In Manu, the same meaning obtains in time-words, all the examples giving the meaning "within up to", the time set by the case. The epic use seems at first to be a little looser. Thus, "there will be a new moon within a week" evidently does not indicate full time exactly as it is indicated in "let him stand till sunrise". But it may still imply the interval up to, if we look on it as "in the course of time up to the seventh day", and as this seems to be the only exception to the general implication of time measured up to the point limited by the ablative, the latter may perhaps be accepted as the real meaning, especially as it accords with the ā+ablative meaning, out of which construction the ablative in this sense seems to me to have been evolved.[1]

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[1] Professor Eggeling, at ÇB. iv. 2. 4. 5, renders *āitasmāt kālāt* (*upaçete*) by "from that time"; better, "up to this", as in 7, *āitasya homāt* (*na sarpet*), "up to the offering of this". Cf. iv. 2. 5. 13 (*upaçete*) *ātṛtīyasavāt*, "up to" (till); iii. 2. 2. 1, *ā 'stamayāt*, "till sundown", and so in all other cases. On the Construction in BS., see a note in the next number of *JAOS.* (xxiv, First Half).

II.—THE ORDER OF CONDITIONAL THOUGHT.[1]

I.

· The intellection that finds expression in speech has two aspects.
First, we may lay stress on the *selective process by which words
are chosen and grouped* to express the thought; this is the point
of view of (e. g.) Morris in Chap. II of "On Principles and
Methods in Syntax". Secondly, stress may be laid on the
process of thought itself which is to find expression in words.
I need not argue that these two kinds of intellection are different,
and that the second is the real and essential thing, the first being
merely an incidental. For otherwise the untrained deaf and
blind who do not know that things (to say nothing of abstractions)
have names, would be incapable of intellection; this, of course, is
not true. James (Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, p. 253 ff)
makes such a distinction very clearly; he says in part, "and has
the reader never asked himself what kind of a mental fact is his
intention of saying a thing before he has said it? It is an
entirely definite intention . . . . an absolutely distinct state of
consciousness therefore; and yet how much of it consists of
definite sensorial images? Hardly anything! Linger, and the
words and things come into the mind; the anticipatory intention,
the divination is there no more. But as the words that replace
it arrive, it welcomes them successively and calls them right if
they agree with it, it rejects them and calls them wrong if they
do not. It has therefore a nature of its own of the most positive
sort, and yet what can we say about it without using words that
belong to the later mental facts that replace it? . . . . One may
admit that a good third of our psychic life consists in these rapid

premonitory perspective views of *schemes of thought not yet
articulate*" (italics mine).   In the sections of this paper num-
bered 1–3 inclusive I invite the reader's undivided attention to the
schemes of thought—the attitudes of mind—that find expression
in conditional sentences, leaving for consideration in the following
sections the wholly different problem of the words and the verbal
form generally through which we communicate these schemes of
thought to others.

<div align="center">I.</div>

In the panorama known as the stream of consciousness there
is a constant progression of concept-groups.   Every conditional
thought-period involves at least two groups; these, according to
their function, may be called the *conditioning* and the *conditioned*
concept-groups.[1]   Obviously there are two possible orders for
the concept-groups that are most intimately concerned in con-
ditional thought-periods; a concept-group may *condition* another
group that lies further down the stream of consciousness, or a
concept-group may *be conditioned* by a subsequent group.   Of
course, complicated cases arise—the two groups may not be
closely contiguous, or a group already conditioned by a pre-
ceding group may be again conditioned by a following group,
but *ultimately* all conditional thought-periods can be reduced to
the two types above mentioned.

According as the prior group conditions or is conditioned, the
result may be styled a Consequence or a Proviso period.   The
distinction thus drawn is not a mere formal one; the thinking of
a Proviso Period involves a process of intellection quite different
from that which occurs in the thinking of a Consequence Period.
This I hope to make clear by a careful analysis of the two orders
of conditional thought.   In order to get examples of conditional
thinking in which there is no suspicion of complication from
previous concept-groups, it is perhaps most satisfactory to sup-

[1] I hesitate to use a more definite term than "concept".   However,
Jerusalem (Die Urtheilsfunction, p. 158) says of conditional periods, "Sie
bestehen aus zwei Urtheilen und aus der Behauptung einer Beziehung
zwischen diesen Urtheilen", thus apparently conceiving of the concept-
groups in question as judgments.   But it certainly seems that this name
describes more accurately the conditioned group (excepting those cases,
perhaps, in which there is an element of will or the like) and the act of
intellection which binds the two groups together than it does the conditioning
group.

pose cases of dialogue. Here the words of one person may suggest to another a new idea quite foreign to his present attitude of mind. Thus a new train of thought is started in the mind of the latter, and we can examine at our leisure the intellection that ensues according as this first group suggests another concept-group which it conditions or as it is itself conditioned by a subsequent group.

2.

THE CONSEQUENCE PERIOD (the prior concept-group conditions).

To illustrate this order of conditional thought simply, suppose that A and B are working together; they come to a prop that stands in A's way, and he says to B, "Let us take out this prop". These words suggest to B's mind the concept-group "our taking out the prop"; then, knowing his business better than A, his mind leaps forward to the consequence that will be entailed by the carrying out of A's suggestion—that the roof above will fall; this forms the second concept-group, "the falling of the wall", and the connection of thought between the two is that the realization in fact of the first concept-group *entails* the realization in fact of the other. If B chooses to communicate his thought to A, observing the order in which it occurred to his own mind, the result, expressed in a hypotactic period, is

"If we do that (i. e. take out the prop), the wall will fall".[1]

The intellection here involved may be described as the apprehension that the coming to pass of one event *entails* the coming to pass of another[2]—in this case that the taking out of the prop will result in the fall of the wall; the prior concept-group conditions, i. e. makes the second group dependent on itself.[3]

[1] This, of course, is not the only order or the only way in which B might express his thought. Here the verbal form is chosen to help to a clear understanding of the thought and its order. The other question will be treated later.

[2] To make of this statement a definition that would apply to all Consequence Periods, the term "apprehension" must be taken broadly enough to include those cases that have an element of will or the like in the conditioned group (indicated in speech by e. g. an imperative in apodosis). "Entail" here refers to a literal sequence; in other cases it has to be otherwise interpreted.

[3] It may be interesting to note that this statement just reverses the mechanical nomenclature of formal grammar.

Such intellection, in its lowest forms, is fundamental, and the necessary consequence of rationality. Even the most careless observation of the workings of cause and effect in the happenings of every day life could not fail to place an intellect of the rudest order in a position to forecast the outcome of many a projected action. The veriest savage who saw a child stretching out its hand to the fire, would judge, on the basis of his past observation, that the contact of the hand with the fire entails a burn. He may not, like B in the example above cited, have at his command a hypotactic sentence for the conveyance of his thought and say to the child,

"If you touch that, you will be burned".

But we are not at present concerned with the form of speech used to convey the thought. What I would emphasize is the fact that when the savage realizes that the child is planning to touch the fire, and his thought leaps to the consequence entailed by the projected action, his intellection is identical in kind with that which passes in B's mind when A suggests that they take out the prop. The difference between the two examples is that in the second it takes a more trained observation to arrive at the consequence of the impending action. This being so, the fundamental and essential nature of the Consequence Period must be obvious; the happenings of every day life cannot fail to produce such intellection in us and in all rational creatures when and wherever found—if we would, we could not help forecasting the outcome of many a projected or impending action with which, and with whose consequence, our experience had made us familiar. To the simplicity and ingenuousness of the intellection here involved the Proviso Period affords a sharp contrast.

3.

THE PROVISO PERIOD (the prior concept-group is conditioned).

To illustrate simply, suppose that A says to B, "I want C to come over to my house this afternoon. Do you think he will come?" B, knowing the pleasure this invitation will bring to C, is inclined to accept for him, but a second thought leads him to condition the acceptance of the invitation. If we represent his thought in words with a view to retaining the order in which it stands in his own mind, the result is (e. g.),

"He will come, if it does not rain".

Or, if the second thought does not occur to B's mind instantly, he may begin to speak before the conditional thought-period is formed, thus producing a sort of hybrid expression—an out-and-out acceptance, with a conditioning clause appended; thus,

"He will come—that is, if it does not rain".

B's first concept-group (suggested by A's invitation) is "C's going to A's house this afternoon", and this is conditioned by another group lying further down the stream of consciousness, namely, "its not raining". But (and this fact makes the Proviso Period something more than a Consequence Period reversed) B does not pass *directly* from the prior group to the conditioning group. A closer inspection of his intellection will make this clear. As the concept-group "C's going to A's house this afternoon" rises in B's mind, for one brief instant he perhaps fancies C as actually performing the act in question—he sees nothing to prevent; then the thought of rain—*a possible hindering circumstance*—flashes across his mind. It is on the converse (or, if you will) the non-occurrence of this possible hindering circumstance that B conditions the acceptance. Such an intermediate step as this possible hindering circumstance is absolutely essential to the thinking of every Proviso Period; for without the occurrence to the mind of some reason why the thing in question should or may not come to pass, how would it ever occur to the speaker to condition his prior group? In the present case B would not condition the acceptance were it not for the thought of possible rain.[1]

[1] There is a chance for a little confusion here regarding those cases where a person is casting about for a cause to account for, or a means to produce, a given effect. Thus, suppose A and B enter a building, *looking for a means to bring down its roof*. A first solves the problem and says to B, "It will come down, if we take out that beam". Apparently the conditioned group ("the falling of the roof") is the starting point of the thought, while the conditioning group follows; if this be true, the thought constitutes a Proviso Period according to the terms of my own definition. Yet manifestly the intermediate step above referred to is lacking—it would be absurd to claim that, under the given circumstances, A first is sure that the wall is coming down, and then conditions his statement because the thought flits through his mind that B will be unwilling to take the beam out. The solution of the difficulty is reached by comparing the thought in this example with that which underlies "He will come, if it does not rain". In this latter case the (ultimately) conditioned group is not at first conditioned at all—there is no

The possible hindering circumstance, "its raining", by its very nature involves still another group that has not yet been mentioned, namely, "C's not going to A's house this afternoon"; this group embodies the consequence entailed by the realization in fact of the possible hindering circumstance, and is at the same time the converse (i. e. it deals with the non-realization in fact) of the first group that appears in the speaker's mind, "C's going to A's house this afternoon". We must admit the presence of this new group in the thought complex of the Proviso Period; for, as shown above, the presence of a possible hindering circumstance is essential to that order of conditional thought, and (e. g., in the present case) "its raining" takes on the necessary character of a *hindering* circumstance only as it is felt to entail C's not going. The relations of the four groups concerned in the Proviso Period under discussion may be illustrated as follows :

(1) C's going to A's house this afternoon → (2) its raining.

(3) C's not going to A's house this afternoon　(4) its not raining.
(converse of 1).　　　　　　　　　　　　　(converse of 2).

The two groups that receive full verbal expression are 1 and 4;

"He will come, if it does not rain".

If B were to give full verbal expression to 2 and 3, the result would be;

"(but) if it rains, he will not come".

The thought underlying this last sentence is a Consequence Period; for the prior concept-group conditions, and its realization in fact is felt to entail the realization in fact of the other.[1] This involved

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thought of the act being contingent until the possible hindering circumstance looms up. But when A and B go into the house *looking for a means* to bring down the roof, the coming down of the roof *is already contingent*—contingent upon the working of an (as yet) undiscovered means. If we represent this as yet undiscovered means as x, the attitude of mind of the two searchers is "the coming to pass of x will bring down the roof". When x is solved by A as = the taking out of a given beam, this value takes the place of x in his mind, and his thought now is "the taking out of that beam will bring down the roof". In other words, "the coming to pass of x will bring down the roof" is a skeleton Consequence (not Proviso) Period which is filled out when the value of x is discovered.

[1] In many cases the Consequence Period is of the type described in the preceding footnote. This is true (e. g.) when a person casts around for some reason why the thing suggested should or may not happen (for instance, to find an excuse for not accepting an invitation).

Consequence Period is not only present to the mind of the speaker, but it is conveyed to the hearer "by implication" i. e., by the general circumstances under which the words are spoken, and by the tone and manner of the speaker perhaps.   For when B says to A,

"He will come, if it does not rain",

and he thus finds his invitation accepted with a condition attached, he instantly will infer the possible hindering circumstance "its raining" which causes B to condition the acceptance.   And inasmuch as this is a *hindering* circumstance, it cannot fail to carry with it the suggestion of C's not coming.   Consequently the thought really conveyed to A would find fuller expression in,

"He will come, if it does not rain ; *otherwise not.*"

The last clause in this sentence is a shorthand way of saying,

"(but) if it does, he will not come".

It might be noted in passing that, conversely, it is the suppression or slighting of groups 2 and 3 in the spoken form that causes the "implication" that lurks about the verbal expression of the Proviso Period.[1]

[1] That there is such an implication lurking about the expression of a Proviso Period may be brought out clearly by contrasting with the above sentence the one used as the expression of a Consequence Period, when A suggests to B the taking out of the prop, namely,

"If we do that, the wall will fall".

There is nothing in the thought underlying this sentence to justify adding "otherwise not" to it.   If B should add these words A would think that he was either joking or had lost his senses.   As a matter of fact it does not follow that if the prop is not taken out the wall will not fall—an earthquake might bring it down; but that is not the thing of prime importance for this discussion. The really important thing is that the attention of neither the speaker nor the hearer is centered on what will happen if the prop is *not* taken out—that is not the angle, so to speak, from which they are viewing the situation; their thought is concerned with the projected action and its outcome.   Though Jerusalem does not distinguish between Consequence and Proviso Periods, still (l. c. pp. 160–161) he feels the Proviso implication in one of his random examples. The sentence is "Wenn morgen schönes Wetter ist, werden wir einen Ausflug unternehmen".   Later he adds "In dem Urtheil liegt zugleich der Gedanke, das der Ausflug bei schlechtem Wetter nicht unternommen wird".   Of course the implication is not always "otherwise not"; that phrase is convenient

The fact that a Consequence Period is bound up in the thinking of every Proviso Period justifies the statement that the latter is the more complex form of intellection; I hope to show also that it is less ingenuous. This is a difficult matter to judge of, principally because of our long familiarity with conditional thinking and with conditional speaking of a highly developed type. Off-hand, the thought that underlies

"He will come, if it does not rain"

seems just as ingenuous as that which produces

"If we do that, the roof will fall".

But I have tried to show that the veriest savage cannot help thinking Consequence Periods; the most careless observation of the workings of cause and effect in the happenings of daily life place him in a position to forecast the outcome of many projected and impending actions. The train of thought that passes through his mind when he sees a child stretching out its hand to the fire (namely, the apprehension that the consummation of the impending action will result in a burn) is thoroughly ingenuous; yet it contains all the essentials of a Consequence Period.

On the other hand the intellection involved in the Proviso Period—the apprehension that the coming to pass of one event is dependent on another—appears to be a reflex of language on thought—a result of *hearing* clauses conditioning and conditioned put together in speech. Of course the situations in which we think Proviso Periods (e. g. when we wish to accept an invitation, but are checked by the thought of a possible hindering circumstance) were doubtless paralleled in primitive times; but that they, without any outside influence, would lead to thought in the form of Proviso Periods is not so obvious. This will perhaps be

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for reference, but in practice it has to be varied to suit the apodosis if that chances to contain a negative.

With this implication of the Proviso Period must not be confused concept-groups that *follow* certain Consequence Periods. E. g., in the case supposed above, B, after he apprehends that the taking out of the prop will result in the fall of the wall, may wish the prop not taken out, feel an impulse to stop A, etc. These elements are not a part of the Consequence Period as may be seen by taking a case in which the speaker has no interest in the outcome. For instance, "I think the rock will fall"; "If it does, it will bring down much earth".

made clearer by a reference to the analysis above given of the process of thought which finds expression in the sentence,

<div style="text-align:center">" He will come, if it does not rain ".</div>

The groups and their relations were as follows :

(1) C's going to A's house this afternoon →. (2) its raining.

(3) C's not going to A's house this afternoon (4) its not raining.

The process of thought up to and including 3 is thoroughly ingenuous—B is inclined to accept the invitation for C, then there flashes across his mind a possibility (its raining) with which he had not reckoned and which takes on the character of a possible hindering circumstance, as it suggests the outcome entailed by its realization in fact, namely, C's not coming. A simple form of expression for this intellection would be a sentence of the following type :

<div style="text-align:center">" He will try to come
" He will want to come } (but) it may rain ".</div>

Instead of accepting the invitation outright, the speaker here says, " He will try to come " or " He will want to come ", because he has in mind the possibility of rain and feels it as a possible hindering circumstance; to the first clause he appends a statement of this possible hindering circumstance.

In situations like this I see nothing to force a mind under no outside influence to the thinking of Proviso Periods—nothing that would suggest the trick of bringing to light the converse of group 2, thus producing group 4, and in this way arriving at a conditional thought-period made up of 1 and 4. Nor yet is it clear how the mere *thinking* of the simpler types of the Consequence Period (the apprehension that a projected or impending action entails a certain result) could suggest the wholly different process of intellection involved in the Proviso Period (the apprehension that the coming to pass of one event is dependent on the coming to pass of another). By a process of exclusion, then, we seem forced back to the *hearing* of clauses conditioning and conditioned in actual speech to explain how the thinking of Proviso Periods originated. Whatever the truth of this last consideration, the simple fact that there is nothing in the situations themselves which suggest to us thought on the Proviso form to force such thinking on an unbiased mind, whereas the same

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situations that suggest to us thought in Consequence Periods must necessarily produce a like result in all rational minds everywhere, is enough to substantiate the claim that the Proviso Period is the less ingenuous order of conditional thought.

4.

THE STAGES OF CONDITIONAL SPEAKING.

There are three—perhaps four—distinctly marked stages in the verbal expression of the conditional thought-periods described in the two preceding sections. In casting about for the simplest form of conditional speaking we ought to look first to the Consequence Period perhaps; for it is the simpler and more ingenuous order of conditional thought, and the intellection involved in it—the apprehension that the coming to pass of a projected or impending action entails the coming to pass of another—calls loudly for expression in words, e. g., to warn another of the dangerous outcome of something he seems about to do. Suppose a mother sees her child stretching out its hand toward the fire; her mind will leap to the consequence of the projected action. The simplest clear expression for this intellection is unquestionably a one-clause phrase, e. g.,

"Burn hand".

This scant form of speech, which gives full expression only to the second concept-group, is clear to the hearer because the projected action—the thing which starts the Consequence Period in the mother's mind—is clearly present in the child's mind also. Accordingly the words are felt, not as an assertion that a certain event is coming to pass, but rather as the expression of a conditioned concept-group—the child realizes that he is being told what the result entailed by his projected action is. Doubtless the tone of the speaker (in addition to the general circumstances under which the words are spoken) helps the hearer to an understanding that the mother's words are, grammatically speaking, an apodosis. Such a phrase as "Burn hand" may be called conditional speaking of the one-clause stage. The ingenuousness of the intellection involved, the need for its expression, and the simplicity of the verbal form (which we even now affect in speaking to children) all point to the greatest antiquity for conditional speaking of this type.

In the example just used the mother is of course intensely interested in the outcome of the situation before her eyes, and the Consequence Period in her mind *is followed* by a feeling of will that the child shall not act. I say *followed* because clearly she will not experience this feeling of will until she apprehends that the action is projected and forecasts the harmful outcome entailed, i. e., until the Consequence Period has passed through her mind. Though last in intellection, this added element is apt to be first in speech, if expressed at all; e. g.,

"No, no; burn hand".

Expressions of this kind have caused much confusion to workers in the field of syntax. Take, for instance, a sentence spoken under circumstances that are similar, but with the prohibition more fully expressed:

"Don't do it; you will be hurt".

Prohibitions and exhortations thus placed have generally been regarded as substitutes for conditioning clauses. But the real underlying thought (as just shown) in this particular case would find true expression in

"If you do that, you will be hurt; don't do it".

For it is only because the speaker has passed through the intellection of a Consequence Period that he is moved to interfere. The process of thought may be lightning-like in its rapidity, but there is no mistaking *the order* in which the elements occur to the mind. "Don't do it" is the simple bona fide expression of a prohibition—nothing more, nothing less; "you will be hurt" is a conditional sentence of the one-clause stage. What is true of a prefixed prohibition is true of hortatory and like expressions so placed.

If the conclusion reached in section 3 is sound, to the effect that the thinking of Proviso Periods is a reflex of a stage of conditional speaking in which both conditioning and conditioned clauses appear, there is of course no one-clause stage in the verbal expression of the Proviso Period to correspond to the one-clause stage in the expression of the Consequence Period just described. But, waiving this consideration, there is still a mechanical difficulty that would seem to preclude such a one-clause stage.

It is true that, *after the hypotactic stage* has been reached, it is possible to convey the thought of a Proviso Period by a single clause; but it is because the presence of a subordinating particle then makes the function of the clause clear; e. g., when A says to B, " I want C to come over to my house this afternoon. Do you think he will come?" B may answer merely, "If it does not rain". A will understand his meaning because he has already in mind the starting point of B's thought, and the " if" shows that the clause is the expression of a conditioning concept-group. But if B had at his command no conditional particle, and simply expressed his new thought by " it not rain" or "it does not rain", the hearer might well be at a loss to divine the meaning; these words are not by any means as obviously the expression of a conditioning concept-group, as " Burn hand" (in the example of a Consequence Period above cited) are of a conditioned concept-group. Pronouncing the words with an effort to convey the thought of a conditioning concept-group will demonstrate the difficulty involved and the obscurity of the resultant expression, even to us to whom thinking in Proviso Periods is an old story. We may then fairly assume that one-clause conditional speaking is due originally to the Consequence rather than the Proviso Period.

The advance to the next stage of conditional speaking—the two-clause stage—is perhaps also due to the Consequence Period; certainly so, if the thinking of Proviso Periods is a reflex of conditional speaking more developed than that of the one-clause stage. But in any case the need of communicating certain Consequence Periods is sufficient to account for the advance to two-clause conditional speaking. Such a form is demanded in the interest of clearness when the starting-point of the speaker's thought is not obvious to the hearer. For instance, A asks B for aid; C, a friend standing by, sees what will be the outcome of granting the favor and says in B's ear,

"You give to him, he will come again",

i. e., "If you give to him, he will come again." In a case like this the Consequence Period in B's mind could not be conveyed with any certainty by a one-clause phrase "he will come again." The hearer, not knowing surely what was the beginning of the train of thought in C's mind, might not grasp the fact that the words are intended as the expression of a conditioned concept-

group, and thus quite miss the thought to be conveyed.[1] Wherever this two-clause stage of conditional speaking has become established, it may of course be used in cases where the demands of clearness do not call for it imperatively. Thus in the example above, the mother, instead of saying simply, "Burn hand" might use the fuller form,

"Touch fire, burn hand."[2]

If I now apply the name parataxis to such examples of two-clause conditional speaking as "You give to him, he come again" and "Touch fire, burn hand", the sense in which I use that term will be perhaps clear. Parataxis here means that two clauses stand side by side as the expression of a conditional thought-period, the inner connection of meaning existing between the clauses being indicated by no subordinating conjunction.[3]

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[1] The single clause could be made somewhat clearer to the hearer by the addition of a prohibition, e. g., "Don't do it; he will come again." But even this is ambiguous; the hearer could take it to mean that he was not to give the assistance asked by A because the latter was coming another time, and he would thus have another (and perhaps better) chance to give the desired assistance.

[2] It is quite possible that the thinking of Proviso Periods is a reflex of this stage of conditional speaking. In this stage the conditioning clause naturally precedes, whatever the order of the underlying thought. In the case of the Consequence Period such an arrangement follows the thought order; but it is also required in the case of the Proviso Period as well, in the interest of clearness; for it is much easier to indicate to the hearer that a prepositive clause is conditioning than it is a postpositive clause. E. g., a man comes to a village and says, "All the men come to fight." One, wishing to accept the invitation, but overtaken by the thought that the chief might object, might conceivably say, "We will come, our chief allows." But his meaning would be conveyed more surely by the other order, "Our chief allows, we will come." Pronouncing these sentences will make this point clear to the reader. That the spoken expression of the Proviso Period should stand in this order is all the more natural if, as suggested above, thinking in the Proviso order is a reflex of hearing two-clause expressions used to convey the Consequence Period; for there both the thought order and the demands of clearness tend to bring the conditioning clause into the first place.

[3] This use of the term parataxis will not be acceptable to some; e. g. Bennett (Cornell Studies, IX. p. 66) says "Whatever differences of detail may exist as to the conception of parataxis, all scholars, so far as I am aware, are at least agreed in recognizing its existence only when a sentence is capable of having a value for its own sake as well as for the purpose of determining more fully the meaning of another sentence. In order to exhibit parataxis, the two sentences assumed to have the paratactic relation must each be capable

The third stage of conditional speaking is hypotaxis, a form brought about by the adaptation of a demonstrative or other word to become the bearer of the meaning already existing between the clauses of a conditional sentence in the paratactic stage; e. g. "Touch fire, burn hand" now becomes,

"If you touch the fire, you will burn your hand".

The schemes of thought—the Consequence and Proviso Periods—underlying this type of conditional sentence are identical with those which find expression in the more primitive types of speech above described. Any difference in the intellection that accompanies the paratactic and the hypotactic types of conditional speaking has to do with the process by which thought is rendered into speech, and does not at all affect the closeness of the bond of union that unites the conditioning and the conditioned groups of the thought-period.

Still a fourth stage of conditional speaking should perhaps be recognized. It is conceivable that a hypotactic form of conditional speaking might *be displaced* by a rival form that originally,

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of possessing an independent value. Just as soon as one of the two clauses is not capable of functioning alone, but only in conjunction with its neighbor, we have subordination or hypotaxis". If parataxis be defined in this way, there is no paratactic stage of conditional speaking, and we advance at one stride from the one-clause type "Burn hand" to the hypotaxis "Touch fire, burn hand." For conditional thought is in periods, and consequently the two clauses through which the concept-groups involved in a given conditional thought-period find expression must inevitably be bound together by an inner connection of meaning, and could not conceivably (at least the conditioning clause) function separately. This matter will be discussed more fully in the second paper. The use of the term parataxis in this paper is in harmony with the statement of Morris (On Principles and Methods in Syntax, p. 147), "It (parataxis) covers all that lies between coördination and the suggestion of relation by musical means, as the upper limit, and the expression of relation by subordinating words as the lower limit". Even Bennett, when speaking of the conditional sentence (Lat. Gram. App. § 394) seems to use the term in this sense; "Conditional sentences are the development of an earlier Parataxis. Thus we may assume that the earliest type of *si valet, bene est* was *bene est, valet,* ' it is well; he is well'. The conditional force was purely the result of the context, which indicated that *valet* was something assumed. As language developed, the fact that one clause was related to the other as an assumption or condition *was brought out more definitely*" (italics mine) "by the use of *si*." This statement applies the name parataxis to a pair of clauses mutually dependent and which lose their distinctive meaning the moment they are torn apart; I am using the term above in just this sense.

or perhaps I should say, in its literal meaning, was not the expression of conditional thought at all.   For instance, "grant that" in its literal sense has no conditional meaning, but we use the phrase in certain cases as a substitute for "if".   It is conceivable that, in the course of time, "grant that" might come into greater use and finally supplant "if" altogether.   Therefore when we take up a given hypotactic conditional construction and attempt to reconstruct its earlier history, it should not be assumed off hand that it is a direct outgrowth from parataxis—it may perhaps be that the word we find introducing the protasis has displaced some other (now lost) which really passed through the development of meaning that advanced the form of conditional speaking in the language under discussion from parataxis to hypotaxis.

In this section four types of conditional speaking have been described; the one-clause stage, parataxis, hypotaxis, and substitution.   I have perhaps already indicated clearly enough that these are *types of speech* merely, and that the conditional thought-periods are in all essentials the same whatever the form of verbal expression.   These types of conditional speaking have been enumerated in the order of their complexity, taking the simplest first.   It is not to be supposed that the history that lies back of the various hypotactic periods in existence to-day can be reduced in every (or perhaps any) case to such an orderly progression.   Conditional speaking of the simplest types must be of untold antiquity; since that time language may have supplanted language, conditional speaking may have advanced to a certain point of development and then fallen back again, and one language may have influenced the forms of conditional speech of another.   In view of these possibilities one needs to go very slowly in a reconstruction that professes to go back to origins.

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III.—THE IE. ROOT *SELO-*.

I.

There is a wide-spread root *selo-*, with the by-form *selā-*, which seems to have expressed primarily motion from side to side or in a circle or downward. Most common among the derived meanings are: 'swing, throw; sway, dance; wind, twist; slink, creep; bend, sink; slip, slide'. These meanings are apparently not very closely connected, yet most of them, and others in addition, will be found under the base *sele-qᵘaˣ-* below, and we shall see how easily the various significations are derived from a common center. The root is represented in the following words:—

1. ChSl. *sŭlati* 'schicken', Gk. ἅλλομαι, Lat. *saliō* 'leap, spring', *salebra* 'jolting, rough road' (from which certainly Goth. *saldra* 'possen' need not be separated), Lith. *selù* 'schleiche' (cf. Prellwitz, Et. Wb.; Brugmann, Grd. I², 456), Lith. *sèlà* 'schwachheit, ohnmacht', i. e. 'a slipping, falling away', *selůju* 'zage'. With Lith. *sèlà* compare Lat. **sōlā-* 'weakness, softness, gentleness', whence *sōlā-rĭ* 'lindern, mitigare, soothe, lighten, comfort, console'.

Here also probably ON. *selja* 'treiben; überliefern, abliefern, geben', Goth. *saljan* 'opfern', primarily 'let slip, let go', and hence closely connected in meaning with ChSl. *sŭlati* 'schicken'. Gk. ἐλεῖν 'seize, take' probably comes from the idea of rapid motion. Compare ON. *hreifa* 'stir, move': *hrīfa* 'seize'; MHG. *snaben* 'springen, eilen; stolpern, straucheln', *snappen* 'wanken, straucheln: angreifen, strassenraub treiben'.

From the primary meaning 'fall, befall, happen' may belong here OE. *sǣl* 'occasion, time; opportunity; condition; happiness', *sǣlan* 'happen', *sǣlig* 'happy, prosperous', Goth. *sēls* 'gütig, mild', etc. Such a development of meaning would be perfectly natural. And it is certain that OE. *sǣl* represents this Germ. word in its earliest extant meaning. Not 'happiness' but 'occasion, time' is the earlier signification. But Germ. *sēla-* may go back to a pre-Germ. **sē-lo-* 'a sowing, season, proper time', root *sē-* 'sow' (cf. author, PBB, XXIV, 531), and could, in that case, not be connected with the root *selo-* under discussion.

If, however, we assume that this group is derived from the root *selo-*, we may then separate Germ. *sēla-* into two sub-groups with divergent meanings, the first represented by OE. *sǣl* 'occasion; opportunity; happiness', *sǣlig* 'happy', OHG. *sālīg* 'glücklich', etc. (compare MLG. *slumpen* 'glücken', I, 4 below); the second by Goth. *sēls* 'gütig, mild'. These would represent a pre-Germ. **sēlo-* 'falling, befalling, fortunate: falling away, yielding, mild, soft'. Goth. *sēls* would therefore be most closely related in meaning to Lith. *sėlà* 'schwachheit', Lat. *sōlā-rĭ* 'lindern, mitigare'. Although this brings us to a connection between Goth. *sēls* and Lat. *sōlārĭ* made by Brugmann, Die Ausdrücke für den Begriff der Totalität, 47, the explanation of this connection is entirely different.

Now from the root *selo-* are formed, with the suffixes *-no- (-nā-, -ni-, -nu-)*, *-mo-, -to-, -bo-*, etc., the derived bases *sele-no- (sel-no-, slĕ-no-, sḷ-no-)*, *sele-mo-*, etc.; and, with the suffixes *-i̯o-, -u̯o-*, the bases *sele-i̯o-, (slei̯o-, slĭ-)* and *sele-u̯o- (sleu̯o-, slŭ-)*, whence the derivatives *slei-mo-, -bo-, -po-*, etc. and *sleu-mo-, -bo-, -po-*, etc. (cf. Persson, Wz. 189 f.).

2. Base *sele-na²-*: Gk. ἐλένη 'wicker basket' < **selenā-* 'a twisting, twining', Skt. *sṛṇí* 'sichel', *sṛṇi* 'haken zum antreiben des elefanten', Lith. *sėlinu* 'schleiche, lauere', ON. *slen* 'trägheit', *slinni* 'schwerfälliger mensch, lout', Lat. *lēnis* 'soft, mild', *lēniter* 'slowly, indolently', perhaps from **slē-ni-* 'bending, weak, soft'.

3. Base *sele-ma²-*: Skt. *srāmá* 'hinkend, lahm', *sráma* 'verrenkung des fusses, lahmheit, siechtum', MHG. *slemen* 'umkehren, stürzen, wenden', ON. *sløma* 'swing, brandish', *slamra* 'beat', Norw. *slamre* 'lärmen, toben', Sw. *slamra* 'klappen, klirren', E. *slam* 'zuschmeissen'.

4. Base *sele-ba²-*: Lat. *labō* 'totter, waver, sink', *lābor* 'slip, fall; go to ruin, perish', Skt. *lámbate* 'hängt herab', ON. *slapa* 'los hangen', *slápr* 'schlaffer mensch', OHG. *slaf* 'schlaff', *slāf* 'schläfe', i. e. 'thin, sunken-place', Goth. *slēpan* 'sleep', Lith. *slābnas*, ChSl. *slabŭ* 'schwach', OHG. *slēffar* 'lubricus', ON. *slepja* 'schleimen', *sleppa* 'entschlüpfen', MHG. *slampen* 'schlaff herabhangen', *slump* 'schlumpig', NHG. *schlamp, schlempe, schlump, schlumpe, schlumpen*, etc., Sw. *slumpa* 'schleudern, schlaudern', *slump*, Dan. *slump* 'zufall', *slumpe* 'etwas zufällig bekommen; über etwas fallen', MLG. *slumpen* 'glücken', E. *slump, slumpy*, Gk. λαμβάνω 'fall upon, seize, grasp, take', λάβρος 'furious, violent', λαβίς 'forceps, buckle, clasp', NHG. *schlimpe*

'catch'. Or *schlimpe* may be compared with Lat. *limbus* 'noose; band' (cf. II, 5).

5. Base *sele-pa*-: ON. *slafask* 'sagtnes, aftage, nachlassen', *slefa* 'slobber', *slafr* 'babbling, gewäsch', NHG. *schlabbern*, Lith. *sùlpnas* 'schwach, kraftlos', *sùlpti* 'schwach werden', *slepiu* 'verberge, verstecke', *slapùs* 'wer sehr heimlich thut, schleicher', Lett. *slēpt* 'verheimlichen', MHG. *slimp*, -*bes* 'schief, schräge; nicht richtig, verkehrt', NHG. *schlimm*, Gk. λαπαρός 'slack, loose', λαπάρα 'flank, loins', Lith *slépsna* 'dünnung, weichen'.

Gk. λαπαρός may come from the base *seleqᵘo-* and be cognate with Lat. *lacūna* (v. infra). Some of the Germ. words may be from the base *sele-bho-*. So we may compare ON. *slefa* 'slobber', G. *schlabbern*, MHG. *slam*, -*mes* 'schlamm' (for older **slamp*, -*bes*), *slemmen* 'prassen, schlemmen' with Gk. λέμφος 'schleim, rotz' (cf. Prellwitz, Et. Wb. s. v.). For the development of the meaning 'slime' see below.

6. Base *sele-ga*-: MHG. *slenken* 'schwingen, schleudern', *slanc* 'schlank, mager', Du. *slank* 'dünn, behende', ON. *slakke* 'slope', E. *slink* 'creep away, sneak', *slinky* 'thin, lank', *slink* 'produced prematurely', as, a *slink* calf, Dan. *slunken* 'schlaff, schlotterig, leer', Sw. *slinka* 'schlüpfen, schleichen', *slankig* 'schlotterig, nachlässig', OE. *slincan* 'creep, slink', OHG. *slinc* 'left' (hand), Gk. λήγω 'cease', λαγαρός 'slack, hollow; pliant', λαγών 'empty space, cleft, cave; flank', Lat. *langueō* 'be languid', OHG. *slah*, ON. *slakr slækinn*, OE. *slæc* 'slack' (cf. Schade, Wb. s. v. *slac*; Uhlenbeck, Ai. Wb. s. v. *lágati*), to which add OE. *ā-seolcan* 'become languid', *ā-solcen* 'slothful, remiss', *ā-solcennes* 'torpor, sloth', Lith. *slégiu* 'bedrücke, presse', *slogus* 'beschwerlich, schwierig'.

7. Base *sele-qᵘa*-: Lith. *slenkù* 'schleiche', *slìnka* 'faulenzer, schleicher', *slankè* 'bergrutsch; erdfall', ChSl. *slǫkŭ* 'krumm', OHG. *slango* 'schlange', *slingan* 'winden, flechten, hin- und herziehend schwingen', OE. *slingan* 'schleichen', Du. *slingeren* 'schwingen, schleudern', ON. *slyngva* 'werfen', *slyngr* 'flink, rasch, keck', *slunginn* 'umgeschlungen; schlau, listig', Sw. *slängd* 'geschickt, durchtrieben', *slyngel* 'schlingel, flegel, strick', i. e. 'a slinger, word-slinger, a forward, bold, impudent fellow' (so that ON. *slyngr* 'rasch, keck': Sw. *slyngel* shows a development similar to MHG. *quec*, *kec*: NHG. *keck*), Norw. *slengja kjeften* 'sling the jaw, use insulting language', *slengjeord* 'insulting word, sling', E. *slang* 'insult with vulgar language',

Dan. *slænge* 'schleudern, werfen; umhertreiben', *slæng* 'ge-schlepp, gefolge, anhang, sippschaft'. Similarly developed is per-haps OHG. *slahta* 'geschlecht', Norw. *slægt* 'verwandt', Dan. *slægt* 'verwandschaft, familie'. Compare ON. *slŏđi* 'schleppe': Sw. *slödder* 'anhang, gesindel, bande'.

8. With *schlingen, schlinge* we may also compare Lat. *laqueus* 'noose, snare', *lacūna* 'hollow, opening, cleft', *lacūnar, laquear* 'a fretted or paneled ceiling', and perhaps Gk. λαπαρός 'slack, loose', though this may belong to the base *sele-po-.* (Compare Gk. λαγαρός 'slack, hollow, sunken', λαγών 'empty space, cleft, cave', Dan. *slunken* 'schlaff, schlotterig, leer'.)

Here also belongs Lat. *loquor* 'talk', primarily 'flap, clack, chatter'. Compare ON. *slǿđa* 'schleppen', Sw. *sladdra* 'hin und her schwatzen', Dan. *sladre*, LG. *schladdern* 'schwatzen, plaudern'; ON. *slođra* 'sich hinschleppen', MHG. *sloten* 'zittern, klopfen', *slotern* 'schlottern, zittern; klappern, schwatzen', Dan. *sludre* 'schwatzen, faseln, schnattern'; ON. *slōra* 'dally, dawdle', Gk. λῆρος 'idle talk, nonsense'. For many other examples of the same development see author's Color-Names and their Congeners, XVI, 51 ff.

9. Base *sele-qo-*: OE. *sealh*, OHG. *salaha* 'willow', primarily 'bending, pliant', Gk. ἕλκω 'draw, drag, trail', ὁλκός 'attractive; grasping, greedy; trailing, slow' (notice the widely divergent yet quite natural development in meaning: 'attractive': 'greedy': 'slow'), ὁλκαῖος 'drawn, towed; trailing, creeping', ὁλκός 'a drawing, dragging; track, furrow', Lat. *sulcus* 'furrow', OE. *sulh* 'furrow; plow': Av. *harecayeiti* 'schleudert, wirft', Skt. *sṛkd* 'lanze', Goth. *slahan* 'schlagen'.

This is the same change in meaning as seen in Lith. *slenkù* 'schleiche', OHG. *slingan* 'winden, flechten, schwingen, schlei-chen', Sw. *slinga* 'schlingen', *slänga* 'schleudern, werfen', *släng* 'schlag, streich, hieb'. That *slahan* meant primarily 'swing, sway' is evident from the derivatives of this base. If the primary mean-ing were 'cut', 'thrust', 'pierce' or 'hammer', 'pound', NHG. *schlag* would not be used in some of its significations nor should we expect such compounds as *umschlag, einschlag*, etc. Compare also Sw. *slag* 'schlag; umdrehung', *slå* 'querholz, riegel', ON. *slaga* 'kreuzen, schief gehen', *slǿgr* 'schlau, listig', Dan. *for-slagen*, NHG. *verschlagen*; and Du. *sluw*, Sw. *slug* 'schlau', in which *slu-* may possibly come from *sḷ-*, as also *la-* in Lat. *lax* 'fraus', *lacit* 'in fraudem inducit', *lactō* 'allure, dupe'. Here

we evidently have the primary meaning 'turning quickly, geschickt, gewandt, wily' as in Sw. *slängd* 'geschickt, durchtrieben', ON. *slunginn* 'wound up: sly, artful'. Compare the same development in Lith. *vejù* 'turn, twist', *vēlà* 'wire': OE. *wīl* 'wile' (cf. author, Mod. Lang. Notes, XVI, 22 f); OE. *wrencan* 'twist': 'play tricks', *wrenc* 'artifice, trick', Skt. *vṛjinà* 'krumm, falsch, ränkevoll'; Lith. *verpiù* 'spin', i. e. 'twist', Skt. *várpa* 'list, kunstgriff' (cf. Uhlenbeck, Ai. Wb. s. v.).

10. Bases *sele-to-, -do-, -dho-*: Lith. *slatau* 'sich vor etwas ducken, drücken', Lat. *lateō* 'lurk, skulk, lie hid', *latus* 'side, flank', OSw. *slind* 'seite', early LRh. *slenden* 'gleiten', early Du. *slinderen* 'gleiten, ausschlüpfen', MHG. *slint* 'schlund; schlinger', *slunt* 'schlund, kehle, hals; kluft, abgrund; schluck; schlemmer', Goth. *fraslindan* 'verschlingen', LG. *slendern* 'schlendern', Sw. *slända* 'spindle', ODu. *slinder* 'thin, slender'; ON. *slōð* 'spurweg', *slǫða* 'über die erde hinschleppen'; E. *slatter, slattern*, Dan. *slat, slatten* 'schlaff, lose, schlotternd', *slentre* 'schlendern', *slunte* 'schlendern, treiben', Sw. *slinta* 'gleiten, ausgleiten, abgleiten', E. *slant* 'slope', MHG. *slenzic* 'träge, müssig', NHG. *schlenzen, schlunzen;* Lith. *slėdnas* 'abschüssig, OE. *slæd* 'dell'; Gk. λανθάνω, λήθω 'escape notice, entschlüpfe, entgehe', base *slǎ-dho-*, perhaps also in ON. *slōð* 'track'.

11. Base *sele-saⁱ-*: Skt. *srámsatē* 'fällt ab, senkt sich, erschlafft, schwindet hin, zerfällt', ON. *slas* 'a coming to harm', *slys* 'misfortune', *slasask* 'come to harm', Sw. *slask* 'geschlampe; schlackwetter; schmutz', *slaskig* 'schlackerig', *slaska* 'sudeln; schlackern', *slusk*, 'unsauberer mensch', E. *slash, slush*. Compare Sw. *slumpa* 'schleudern', MHG. *slampen* 'schlaff herabhangen', *slump* 'schlumpig', NHG. *schlempe*, etc.

12. Base *sele-raⁱ-*: ON. *slōra* 'dally, dawdle', Gk. λῆρος 'idle talk, nonsense' < *slēro-s* 'schlotternd', ληρέω 'talk or act foolishly', λαρύνω 'coo', Lith. *slardau* 'murmelnd antworten'; Dan. *slark* 'taugenichts' < *slorgo-* 'drooping, slack', *slarke* 'die zeit verträumen', Lat. *largus* 'abundant, copious' < *slr̥go-* 'loose, wide, large' like *laxus*, ON. *slark* 'noise', MHG. *slurc* 'schlund' < *slr̥go-* 'fallen away, sunken, hollow', *slurken* 'schlucken', Dan. *slurk* 'schluck', *slurke* 'trinken', Gk. λάρυγξ 'schlund, kehle', Lat. *lurcō* 'glutton' (cf. Prellwitz, Et. Wb.); Sw. *slarfva* 'nachlässig sein', Dan. *slarve, slurve* 'unordentlich sein', MHG. *slerfen* 'die füsse schleppend einhergehen, schlarfen', *slarfe* 'abgetretener schuh, schlarfe, pantoffel', *ge-slerfe* 'schleppe', Du. *slurpen* 'schlürfen', Scotch *slorp* 'snivel; slobber; slump'.

II.

With the suffix -*i̯o*- the base *sele-i̯o-, slei-, slī-* is formed, from which many derived bases. For this formation compare Skt. *dhūnóti* 'schüttelt, bewegt hin und her, entfernt, beseitigt', *dhū-yá-tē* 'wird geschüttelt', Lat. *suf-fio, suf-fītus, suf-fīmen* (cf. Brugmann, Grd. I², 323), OE. *dwīnan* 'waste away, dwindle', *dwimor* 'specter, delusion' (cf. author, Color-Names, X, 1 g). So from *selo-* in Lith. *selù* 'schleiche' comes the base *slei̯aᵉ-* as in Pruss. *sloyo* 'unschlitt', whence the bases *slei-maᵉ-, -baᵉ-, -paᵉ-*, etc. Similarly with -*uo*- is formed a new base *sele-u̯o-, sleu-, slū-* as in Skt. *sisarti, sárati: srá-va-ti; drāti: drá-va-ti; tárati:* Gk. τέρυς, τρύω, and many others (cf. Persson, Wz. 100 ff.).

1. Base *sele-i̯aᵉ-, slei-*: Gk. ἑλί-τροχος 'whirling the wheel', ἑλί-χρυσος 'creeping plant with yellow flower', Pruss. *sloyo* 'unschlitt'.

2. Base *slei-naᵉ-*: Gk. ἕλινος 'tendril', ἑλινύω 'slack from work, be slack, lazy; rest, sleep; enjoy leisure, keep peace, keep holiday', ἑλινύες 'days of rest, holidays'.

3. Base *slei-maᵉ-*: Lith. *selejimas* 'das schleichen', Lat. *līma* 'file', *līmō* 'rub, schleifen, file, polish', *līmus* 'slanting, sidelong' (compare Sw. *slinta* 'slide': E. *slant*), Lat. *līmen* 'threshold, lintel, barrier', primarily 'thwart, cross-piece', *līmes* 'cross-path', Skt. *srēman* 'fehler', Lat. *līmus*, OE. *slīm* 'slime', Gk. λείμαξ 'shell-less snail', λειμών 'moist place, meadow', OIr. *slemain* 'lubricus' (cf. Persson Wz. 110). Some of these may belong to the root *lei-*, which is confused with *slei-* in some forms.

4. Base *slei-u̯aᵉ-*: Skt. *srívyati* 'missrät', *srēváyati* 'lenkt aus der bahn', Gk. λαιός, Lat. *laevus* 'link' <*slₐiu̯ó- 'slipping, slanting', OHG. *slēo* 'kraftlos, träge, matt, stumpf, welk', OE. *slāw* 'sluggish, slow'; Lith. *slývas*, ChSl. *sliva* 'plum', OHG. *slīo* 'schleie', Lat. *salīva* 'slime, spittle'. The 'plum-tree' was the 'gummy, sticky tree'; the *schleie* 'the slimy fish' (cf. Kluge, Et. Wb. s. v.).

5. Base *slei-baᵉ-*: OHG. *slīfan* 'gleiten, ausgleiten, gleitend sinken; schleifen, glätten, schärfen', MHG. *sleif* 'schlüpfrig', E. *slope* 'schräge, abhang', *slope* 'neigen, senken; schief sein', OE. *slipig* 'slimy', NHG. *schlimpe* 'schliesskrampe', Lat. *limbus* 'noose, snare; fillet, band; belt, girdle; welt, border' (compare MHG. *sliefen* 'schliefen, schlüpfen': *sloufe* 'öffnung, kreis; bekleidung' (eines säuglings), NHG. *schleife*), *lībō* 'pour out, offer;

take away, diminish, impair', Gk. λείβω 'pour forth', mid. 'flow, trickle, melt away', Lat. *līber* 'loose, free, bold'.

6. Base *slei-pǎ²-*: Lith. *nù-slimpa* 'entschlüpft', Lett. *slipt* (*slīpu*) 'gleiten, schief werden', Lat. *lippus* 'dropping; blear-eyed, dim-sighted', ChSl. *slěpŭ* 'blind', i. e. 'triefäugig', OE. *tō-slīfan* 'split' (compare Lat. *lībō* 'pour out: take away, crop' <*sleibō* 'cause to slip or run out: cause to fall away'), E. *sliver* 'a long piece cut or rent off, splinter', ON. *sleif*, Dan. *slev* 'rührlöffel', Sw. *slef* 'kelle' (compare OHG. *spān* 'spahn'; E. *spoon*), prov. E. *slive* 'sneak, schleichen', *slive* 'split'.

7. Base *slei-dhǎ²-*: Skt. *srēdhati* 'strauchelt, geht fehl, macht falsch', Lith. *slidùs* 'glatt', *slýstu* 'gleite', Lett. *slaids* 'abschüssig', OE. *slīdan* 'slide, glide' *slidrian* 'slip' (cf. Uhlenbeck, Ai. Wb.)' Lat. *lībra* 'pound' <*slīdhrā* 'a hanging down, weight, pondus'.

8. Base *slei-dǎ²-*: MHG. *slīzen* 'abstreifen, abschälen; abnutzen, zerreissen, aufbrauchen, hinbringen', refl. 'zerreissen, sich lösen, abstreifen', intr. 'spalten, reissen, zerreisen', *sleizen* 'zerreissen, spalten; die rinde abstreifen; zerstören', refl. 'zu grunde gehen, verfallen', ON. *slīta* 'abnutzen, zerreissen', *sleita* 'streit; arglistig-keit, ränke; schlaffheit, trägheit', OE. *slītan* 'tear, rend, destroy, irritate, slander', Dan. *slide* 'zerren, reissen; schleissen, abnutzen', *slid* 'abnutzung: anstrengung, mühe', Lat. *laedō* 'strike, damage, vex, annoy', Gk. λαιδρός 'bold, impudent', λοίδορος 'abusive, reviling'. Compare OHG. *slīfan* 'gleiten; schleifen': Lat. *lībō* 'diminish, impair, take away'; Lett. *slīpt* 'gleiten', Lith. *nù-slimpa* 'entschlüpft': OE. *tō-slīfan* 'split', E. *sliver;* Goth. *sliupan* 'schleichen': *afslaupjan* 'abstreifen'.

9. Base *slei-tǎ²-*: OE. *slīpe* 'painful, severe, dangerous', *slīpan* 'injure', Goth. *sleips* 'schädlich, schlimm', *ga-sleipjan* 'schädigen', *sleipa* 'detrimentum', *sleipei* 'gefahr', etc. These evidently come from the primary meaning 'slip off, strip off, wear away' as in Lat. *lībō*; OE. *tō-slīfan; slītan;* Goth. *slaupjan.* ᵃCompare also Lat. *terō, trīvī* 'rub, rub to pieces, wear out', *dē-trimentum* 'a rubbing off: loss, damage'; *mordeō* 'bite', primarily 'rub off, gnaw', OE. *smeart* 'causing pain', Gk. σμερδαλέος 'dreadful, fearful', root *smer-* 'rub', from which also OHG. *smero* 'schmeer, fett' <*smerq̑-ó-*, with which compare NHG. *schmirgel* 'schlei-miger absatz im pfeifenrohr', Ch.Sl. *smrŭkŭ* 'rotz', Lith. *smarkata* 'schleim, rotz', and also *smarkùs* 'heftig, grausam', *smer̃kti* 'in not zu versetzen suchen', NHG. dial. *schmorgen* 'darben, not leiden' (cf. Zupitza, Germ. Gutt. 137).

10. Base *slei-ĝa²-*: ChSl. *lězq* 'schreite', Lat. *ligō* 'umschlingen, umwinden, bind up, bandage, bind', OHG. *slīhhan* 'schleichen', MHG. *slīch* 'schlamm, schlick', *slich* 'leise gleitender gang; spur; list', OE. *slīc* 'cunning', MHG. *slichen, slicken* 'schlingen, schlucken', ON. *sleikja* 'lick', Gk. λίγδην 'scraping, grazing', Lat. *ligō* 'hoe, grub-ax', i. e. 'scraper', OE. *slicc* 'hammer', LG. *slīken* 'schleichen, (v. monde) abnehmen', Dan. *slik* 'kleinigkeit', Gk. λιγύς 'thin, sharp, shrill' (sound), λιγυρός 'pliant, flexible; sharp, shrill'.

11. Base *slei-q̇²a²-*: Lith. *slēkas* 'regenwurm', OE. *slā-wyrm* 'blind-schleiche', OHG. *slēha* 'schlehe', primarily 'gummy tree' (cf. *slei-ua²-* above), Lat. *ob-līquus* 'slanting, awry', *liqueō* 'be fluid', *liquor* 'flow, dissolve.'

12. Base *slei-ka²-*: Lat. *licium* 'leash, thread', *licinus* 'bent upward', Gk. λικμός 'winnowing fan', λίκνον 'wicker fan; basket; cradle', λικριφίς 'cross-wise', λεικνίζω 'swing, rock; winnow', λαικάς 'prostitute', ἕλιξ 'twisted, bent, winding'; 'a twist, whirl, eddy; tendril; curl; bowels; spiral line', ἑλικός 'eddying', ἑλίκη 'a winding, twisting; willow, ἑλίσσω 'turn, roll, wind, wrap, bend, twist, twine; whirl, spin, move quickly, run to and fro', ἕλιγμα 'fold of a garment, wrapping; curl, ringlet', Lat. *salix* 'willow'.

13. Base *slei-gha²-*: Gk. λειχήν 'flechte an bäumen und auf der haut', ON. *sliga* 'overburden', i. e. 'cause to bend', *sligask* 'bend under burden', Lith. *slykstu (slygau)* 'schlummere'.

14. Base *slei-ra²-*: Dan. *slire* 'gleiten', Norw. *slire* 'scheide' (compare OE. *slīdan* 'gleiten': ON. *slīðr* 'scheide'), Gk. λιρός 'bold, shameless'.

III.

1. Base *sele-uo-, sole-uo-, sleu-*: Lat. *solvō* 'loose, loosen, separate, relax, release', Lith. *sèlavà, salavà* 'muräne' (compare Gk. μύρον 'salbe': μύραινα 'muräne'), E. *slue* 'twist, turn', perhaps from OE. **slēowian*, Goth. *slawan* 'schweigen', OE. *slūma* 'slumber', ON. *sleyma* 'dummkopf', Sw. dial. *slummen* 'sehr mager, schwach', Norw. dial. *sløyma* 'dünn werden' (cf. Persson Bezz. Beitr. XIX, 262). These are all from the underlying meaning 'fall away, slip away', also in MHG. *slūn* 'das faulenzen', Sw. *slynig* 'flegelhaft', *slyna* 'dumme Liese'. Here belongs Germ. *salwa-* 'faded': OE. *salo* 'dark-colored', E. *sallow* 'bleich, fahl', etc., with which compare Gk. ἐλειός (<**seleuio-s*?) 'kind of mouse; kind of falcon'.

2. Base *sleu-ra*-: E. *slur* 'slide over', Du. *sleuren, sloren* 'schleppen', MHG. *slūr* 'das schleudern, der stoss; das herum- streifen, faulenzen; faulenzer', *slier* 'lehm, schlamm', *sliere* 'geschwür, beule', perhaps Gk. λαύρα 'narrow passage, lane, defile', Lat. *lūra* 'mouth of a skin or leathern bag' (cf. MHG. *sloufe*), though these may be from the root *leu-*.

3. Base *sleu-ba*-: Lat. *lūbricus* 'slippery', Lith. *slubnas* 'schwach, matt', Goth. *sliupan* 'schlüpfen, schleichen', *afslaupjan* 'abstreifen', OHG. *sloufen* 'schlüpfen lassen; einhüllen, kleiden in', *sliofan* 'schliefen, schlüpfen', MHG. *sloufe* 'öffnung, kreis; bekleidung', OE. *ofer-slop* 'surplice', *slūpan* 'glide', *slyppe* 'slime, paste', ON. *slupra* 'schlürfen', MHG. *slüpfen* 'schlüpfen; schlürfen,' E. *slop* 'überlaufen; besudeln'.

4. Base *sleu-pa*-: Lett. *schlāups* 'schräg', *schlāupstīt* 'ab- schrägen', OE. *slīefan* 'slip on' (dress), *slīefe-scōh* 'slipper', *slīefe* 'sleeve', ODu. *slōve* 'velum, tegmen, folliculus', LG. *slūve* 'hülse, schote', NHG. *schlaube* 'hülse', *schlofen* 'twist slightly', (wool), E. *slub* 'draw out and twist slightly', *sloven* 'ein schlot- teriger, schlumpiger mensch', Lat. *lupa* 'prostitute'.

5. Base *sleu-g̃a*-,-*ga*-: Lith. *slaužiu* 'krieche auf der erde': *slúkstu (slúgau)* 'nehme ab, werde kleiner' (von einer geschwulst), MHG. (LRh.) *sliechen* 'schleichen', *slūch* 'abgestreifte haut; schlauch; schlund', *slücke* 'öffnung, lücke', *slucken* 'schlucken; sluchzen', *slūchen,* 'schlucken', *sluhtisch* 'träge, faul', late MHG. *slucke* 'faltenrock der weiber', E. *slouch* 'schlaff niederhangen; sich schwerfällig vorwärts bewegen' <OE. *slūcian,* ON. *slauka* 'slump through', *slok* 'gutter', *sloka* 'swallow', Sw. *sloka* 'schlaff hangen', LG. *slukk* 'low-spirited, sad'. Here also may belong Gk. λευγαλέος 'traurig', Lat. *lūgeō* 'traure', though another ex- planation is possible (cf. Prellwitz, Et. Wb.).

6. Base *sleu-qa*-: Lith. *slúkau* 'schleiche, faulenze', Lett. *schlúkt* 'glitschen', *nŭ-slauka* 'woran man etwas abwischt', *pa- slauka* 'abschaum', Gk. λαυκανίη 'schlund, kehle', E. *slough* 'abgestreifte haut', *slug, sluggish,* ON. *slý* 'slimy water-plant.'

6a. Here probably, rather than to *sele-qa-*, belong ME. *sli, sly* (from OE. *slȳh*), E. *sly* 'nimble, skillful, dexterous; artful, cunning, wily', Sw. *slug* 'schlau, klug', Dan. *slu (slug)* 'ver- schmitzt, verschlagen, listig', Du. *sluw,* LG. *slū* 'schlau', NHG. *schlau,* Bav. *schlauch* 'schlau'. The last forms point to a MHG. **slūch, *slūher,* OHG. **slūh,* from which come the double forms *schlau, schlauch* corresponding to *rauh, rauch* from MHG. *rūch, rūher.*

The meaning 'sly' probably developed the same as in ON. *sløgr* and *slunginn* (see I, 7). Or it may come from the closely allied signification 'moving secretly', as in MHG. *slich* 'leise gleitender gang, schleichweg: list', OE. *slic* 'cunning'. Compare Czech. *lisati* 'streicheln', MHG. *leise* 'spur, geleise', *lise* 'leise, langsam', i. e. 'schleichend', OE. *ge-lisian* 'slip, glide': *list*, Goth. *lists* 'list.'

7. Base *sleu-ta²-*: ON. *slodra* 'sich hinschleppen', *slydra* 'mattigkeit, unthätigkeit', Sw. *sludder* 'nachlässigkeit', *sluddra* 'nachlässig sein', Dan. *sludder* 'gewäsch', *sludre* 'schwatzen, faseln', MHG. *sluder-affe* 'müssiggänger' (not the same as *slur-affe* but formed with a synonymous *sluder*), *sluder* 'schleuder', *sludern* 'schleudern, schlenkern', NHG. *schleudern* 'move irregularly, shamble, swing; sling, throw, toss, hurl' (cf. MHG. *slenkern* 'schwingen, schleudern', NHG. *schlenkern* 'swing, dangle, roll: fling, toss'), MHG. *slotern* 'schlottern, zittern; klappern; schwatzen', *sloten* 'zittern, klappern', *slote* 'schlamm', Scotch *slud* 'schmutz', Lat. *lutum* 'mire, mud', *lustrum* 'swamp, bog', MHG. *sliude* 'schwertscheide' (cf. OE. *slidan* 'slide': ON. *slidr* 'scheide'; Dan. *slire* 'gleiten': Norw. *slire* 'scheide').

Here belong, as was long ago recognized, Goth. *afslaupjan* 'in bestürzung versetzen, ängstigen', *afslaupnan* 'in bestürzung geraten, staunen' (cf. Schade, Wb.). These are from an adj. **slaups* 'slipping, falling; fallen, cast down, distressed, bestürzt'. Compare OE. *slincan* 'creep, slink', *slacian* 'relax efforts, slacken': Lith. *slegiu* 'bedrücke', *slogus* 'beschwerlich, schwierig'; Lith. *pri-slaudziu* 'krieche heran': *slaudziu* 'drücke, dränge, belästige', ON. *sluta* 'herabhangen'.

8. Base *sleu-da²-*: ChSl. *sludy* 'abhang', *sludinu* 'abhängig', Lith. *pri-slaudziu* 'krieche heran', *slaudziu* 'drücke, dränge, belästige', ON. *sluta* 'hang down, slouch', *slota* 'hang down, be limp; slacken, become calm, still', *slot* 'calm', *slytti* 'anything limp', *slyttinn* 'weak, indolent, lazy', Sw. *slutta* 'schief sein, sich neigen, sich senken, abfallen, sich abdachen', E. *slot* 'the track of a deer, track; a narrow depression or aperture, esp., one for the reception of a piece fitting or sliding in it', *slut* 'an untidy woman, slattern', *sleet* 'hail or snow, mingled with rain', Dan. *slud* 'regen und schnee, nasskalte witterung', *slud-fuld* 'regnicht, nasskalt', MHG. *sloz*, *sloze* 'hagelkorn, schlosse'. Compare MHG. *slach* 'schlaff, welk': NHG. *schlack* 'mischung von regen und schnee'; ON. *slasask* 'come to harm': Sw. *slask*

4

'geschlampe, schmutz', E. *slush*; MHG. *slampen* 'schlaff herab-hangen': *slump* 'schlumpig', etc.

Here also belong MHG. *slŏz* 'band, fessel, riegel, schloss, burg', OHG. *sloz* 'riegel, schloss', MHG. *sliezen* 'fügen, zusam-menfügen, an einander befestigen; umfassen, begreifen; schliessen, verschliessen', OHG. *sliozan*, OLG. *bi-sliotan* 'schliessen, ver-schliessen', OFries. *slūta*, MLG., MDu. *slūten* 'schliessen', Sw. *slūta* 'zuthun, schliessen; beendigen, vollenden; schliessen, en-den', prov. E. *slot* 'zuschmeissen'. The primary meaning of Germ. *slūtan, sleutan* is 'zufallen lassen, zudrücken, zusammen-fügen, befestigen', etc., which is the causative use of ON. *slūta* 'herabhangen', and but slightly different in meaning from Lith. *slaudžiu* 'drücke, dränge'. Compare MHG. *slampen* 'schlaff herabhangen', Sw. *slumpa* 'schleudern': NHG. *schlimpe* 'schliesskrampe', Gk. λαβίς 'schnalle, haken'.

IV.

The growth of the root *selo-* through the addition of suffixes may be illustrated as follows:

1. *Selo+*: Lith. *selù, seléti* 'schleichen', *sėlà* 'schwachheit'; Gk. ἐλένη 'wicker basket' < *selenā* 'a twisting, twining', ON. *slen* 'trägheit', Lith. *selomis eiti* 'schleichen', Skt. *srāmá* 'hink-end'; Lat. *lābor* 'slip', *labō* 'totter, sink', ON. *slapa*, MHG. *slampen* 'los hangen'; ON. *slafask* 'nachlassen', Lith. *silpnas* 'schwach', *slepiu* 'verberge'; OE. *slæc* 'schlaff', *ā-seolcan* 'languescere', *slincan* 'schleichen, langsam vergehen'; Lith. *slenkù*, OE. *slingan* 'schleichen', OHG. *slingan* 'winden, flechten, schwingen'; Gk. ἕλκω 'schleppe', ON. *slaga* 'schief gehen', Goth. *slahan* 'schlagen'; early LRh. *slenden* 'gleiten', Lith. *slatau* 'ducke mich'; Lith. *slėdnas* 'abschüssig', Dan. *slat* 'schlaff, lose, schlotternd', Sw. *slinta* 'gleiten, ausgleiten'; Skt. *srámsatē* 'fällt ab, erschlafft', ON. *slasask* 'zu schaden kom-men'; ON. *slōra* 'dawdle', Sw. *slarfva* 'nachlässig sein', MHG. *slerfen* 'die füsse schleppend einhergehen'.

2. *Sele-io+*: Gk. ἐλί-τροχος 'whirling the wheel'; ἕλινος 'tendril'; Lith. *selejimas* 'das schleichen', OHG. *slīm* 'schleim'; Skt. *srēváyati* 'lenkt aus der bahn', OHG. *slēo* 'kraftlos, träge'; *slīfan* 'gleiten, ausgleiten', Gk. λείβω 'pour forth'; Lett. *slīpt* 'gleiten, schief werden', prov. E. *slive* 'schleichen'; Lith. *slidùs* 'glatt', OE. *slīdan* 'gleiten'; ON. *sleita* 'ränke, arglistigkeit; schlaffheit, trägheit', MHG. *slīzen* 'abstreifen; zerreissen'; Goth.

sleipa 'detrimentum'; OHG. *slihhan* 'schleichen', ChSl. *lězǫ*
'schreite', Lat. *ligō* 'umschlinge, umwinde, binde'; Lett. *slaika*
'art schlitten', Lith. *slēkas* 'regenwurm'; Gk. ἕλιξ 'twisted,
winding; twist, whirl', ἑλίσσω 'turn, roll, wind, wrap'; ON. *sliga*
'überlasten', Lith. *slykstu* (*slygau*) 'schlummere'; Dan. *slire*
'gleiten', Norw. *slire* 'scheide'.

3. *Sele-ųo+*: Lat. *solvō* 'loose, loosen, relax', E. *slue* 'wenden',
Goth. *slawan* 'schweigen'; ON. *sleyma* 'dummkopf', Sw. dial.
slummen 'sehr mager, schwach'; *slyna* 'dumme Liese', MHG.
slūn 'das faulenzen'; *slūr* 'das faulenzen', Du. *sleuren* 'schleppen';
Lith. *slubnas* 'schwach', Goth. *sliupan* 'schlüpfen, schleichen';
Lett. *schláups* 'schräg', OE. *slīefan* 'slip on'; Lith. *slaužiu*
'krieche', ON. *slauka* 'slump through'; Lith. *slūkstu* (*slúgau*)
'werde kleiner'; *slūkau* 'schleiche, faulenze', E. *slug*; ON.
slodra 'sich hinschleppen', *slydra* 'mattigkeit', MHG. *slotern*
'schlottern'; ON. *slūta* 'herabhangen', Sw. *slutta* 'schief sein,
sich neigen', ChSl. *sludy* 'abhang'.

4. Throughout the group of words coming from the root *selo-*
we find such terms as 'slime, slop, slaver, slush', etc. In some
cases the underlying idea is 'slippery' or 'sliding, gliding'; in
others, 'slack, loose, dripping'.

Lith. *selù* 'schleiche': Skt. *salilá* 'fliessend', Lith. *selė* 'holz-
floss', *salà* 'insel', Lat. *in-sula* (compare Goth. *ahwa* 'wasser',
MHG. *ouwe* 'wasser, strom: wasserland, insel', OE. *īeg* 'island';
Skt. *srāva* 'fluss': ChSl. *o-strovŭ* 'insel').—MHG. *slampen*
'schlaff herabhangen': *slump* 'schlumpig', NHG. *schlempe* 'slop',
prov. E. *slump* 'boggy place'.—Lith. *sìlpnas* 'schwach', ON.
slefa 'geifern', E. *slaver*, NHG. *schlabbern*, Gk. λάπη 'phlegm,
filth', λάμπη 'scum', ChSl. *slěpati* 'sprudeln' (or this to Lith.
szlápias 'nass'), Skt. *sarpi* 'schmalz', OHG. *salba* 'salbe'; Gk.
λέμφος 'schleim, rotz', MHG. *slam(m)* 'schlamm'.—MHG. *slach*
'schlaff, welk': NHG. *schlack* 'slush', *schlacker* 'slushy or
sloppy weather', *schlackern* 'rain heavily'; OE. *ā-seolcan*
'become languid, droop': Sw. *solk* 'schmutz', MHG. *selken*
'tröpfelnd niederfallen, sich niedersenken' (von wolken).—Gk.
ἕλκω 'schleppe', ON. *slaga* 'schiefgehen', *slagna* 'niederfallen:
feucht werden', Dan. *slagne* 'feucht werden', OE. *slagu* 'slag,
dross', *slōh* 'slough, mire'.—Early LRh. *slenden* 'gleiten', ON.
slōd 'spurweg', *slōdi* 'schleppe': MHG. *sluot* 'schlamm', Lat.
latex 'liquid, fluid'.—Skt. *srámsate* 'fällt ab, senkt sich, erschlafft,
zerfällt', ON. *slasask* 'come to harm': Gk. ἕλος 'niederung,

sumpf', Skt. *sáras* 'teich, see ', Sw. *slask* 'geschlampe, schmutz',
slaska 'sudeln, manschen; schlackern ', *slusk* 'unsauberer mensch',
E. *slush.*—MHG. *slerfen* 'die füsse schleppend einhergehen',
NHG. *schlarfen, schlürfen, schlürpfen*: Scotch *slorp* 'snivel;
slobber; slump', Du. *slurpen* 'schlürfen, sip'.—Lat. *līma* 'file':
līmus, OHG. *slīm* 'slime'.—OHG. *slīfan* 'gleiten', MHG. *sleif*
'schlüpfrig, glatt': NHG. Swab. *schleif* 'schleimig', OE. *slīpig*
'slimy', Gk. λείβω 'drip', λιβρός 'dripping, wet; dark, gloomy'.—
Prov. E. *slive* 'schleichen', Lett. *slīpt* 'gleiten, schief werden':
Lat. *lippus* 'dropping; blear-eyed, dim-sighted', ChSl. *slěpŭ*
'blind'.—OHG. *slēo* 'kraftlos, matt, welk': Lat. *salīva* 'slime,
spittle'.—OHG. *slīhhan* 'schleichen': MHG. *slīch* 'schlamm,
schlick', MLFr. *slijc* 'sumpf, schlamm '.—Lett. *slaiks* 'gefügig',
slaika 'art schlitten', Lith. *slěkas* 'regenwurm': Lat. *liqueō* 'be
fluid', *liquor* 'flow, dissolve'.—Du. *sleuren, sloren* 'schleppen',
MHG. *slūr* 'das faulenzen': *slier* 'lehm, schlamm', ON. *slor*
'slim af fisk'.—ON. *slođra* 'sich hinschleppen': MHG. *slote*
'schlamm', Lat. *lutum* 'mud, mire', *lustrum* 'slough, bog'.
—ChSl. *sludy* 'abhang', Lith. *pri-slaudžiu* 'krieche heran',
ON. *slūta* 'herabhangen', E. *slut* 'schmutziges frauenzimmer,
schlumpe', *sleet* 'regen und schnee untereinander', Dan. *slud*
'regen und schnee; nasskalte witterung', MHG. *slōz, slōze*
'hagelkorn, schlosse'.—OE. *slūpan* 'glide': *sliepa, slyppe* 'paste,
slime', ON. *slupra*, Dan. *slubre* 'schlürfen', MHG. *slüpfen*
'schlüpfen: schlürfen', E. *slop.*—Lith. *slaužiu* 'krieche auf der
erde', ON. *slauka* 'sich hinüberschleppen' (bog, swamp): *slok*
'rinne', *slokr* 'skum fra munden paa dyr', Gk. λυγαῖος 'dark,
gloomy', primarily 'dripping' as in λιβρός 'dripping: dark,
gloomy'.

4*a*. Compare the similar development in meaning in the fol-
lowing:

Lith. *subóju* 'schaukele, wiege mich ', *svambalas* 'was hangend
baumelt, bleilot', NHG. *schwappen* 'sich zitternd hin- und herbe-
wegen' (von flüssigkeiten und weichen massen), E. *swap* 'fall
suddenly, flap', *swoop* 'fall upon, seize', OE. **swōpian*, ON. *sōpa*
'sweep' from **swōp-* (cf. Noreen, Urg. Lautlehre, 212): MHG.
sumpf, E. *swamp* 'sumpf', Sw. *svamp* 'pilz'.—MHG. *swanken*
'schwanken', Scotch *swank* 'schwank, behende: sumpf', *swanky*
'sumpfig'.—Goth. *sigqan* 'sinken', ON. *søkk* 'sinken, höhle', E.
sink 'drain; low place in land, where waters sink and are lost':
Sw. *sank* 'sumpfig'.—Skt. *lōlati* 'bewegt sich hin und her'

Lith. *liuleti* 'sich geleerartig bewegen': *liulýnas* 'moorgrund'.—
Dan. *logre*, Lith. *liunginti* 'mit dem schwanze wedeln: *liũgas*
'morast', *liũgùs* 'sumpfig, kotig'.

5. From 'sway, totter, slip; slip away, fall away' come words
for 'slack, loose, lazy, weak, sick' and 'thin, slender, hollow,
empty: cleft, cavern, abyss, gorge, gullet, throat'. These ideas
are so closely connected that they will be given under one head.

Lith. *sèlà* 'schwachheit, ohnmacht'; ON. *slen* 'trägheit'; Skt.
srăma 'lahmheit, siechtum'; ChSl. *slabŭ*, Lith. *slābnas* 'schwach',
OHG. *slaf* 'schlaff, träge', *slāf* 'schläfe', ON. *slāpr* 'schlaffer
mensch'; Lith. *sìlpnas* 'schwach', *slėpsna*, Gk. λαπάρα 'dünnung,
weichen', λαπαρός 'slack, loose', E. *slab* 'thin piece'; MHG. *slanc*
'schlank, mager', E. *slinky* 'thin, lank', Dan. *slunken* 'schlaff,
schlotterig, leer', OE. *slæc* 'slack', Gk. λαγαρός 'slack, hollow,
sunken', λαγών 'empty space, cleft, cave: flank'; Lat. *lacūna*
'hollow, opening, cleft,' *lacūnar*, *laquear* 'fretted or paneled ceil-
ing', MHG. *slinc*, *slunc*, *-ges* 'schlund', *slinc-vahs* 'mit losen,
sich slängelnden haaren versehen'; ODu. *slinder*, E. *slender*
'schlank', OSw. *slind* 'seite', Lat. *latus* 'side, flank', MHG.
slunt 'kluft, abgrund, schlund, kehle, hals', *slint* 'schlund'; Lith.
slėdnas 'steep', OE. *slæd* 'dell', MHG. *slāt*, *slōt* 'ofenloch, schlot';
Dan. *slat*, *slatten*, E. *slattern* 'schlaff, schlotternd', MHG. *slenzic*
'träge, müssig'; Dan. *slark* 'taugenichts', MHG. *slurc*, Gk. λάρυγξ
'schlund'; Sw. *slarf* 'nachlässigkeit'.—OHG. *slēo* 'kraftlos, träge,
matt'; ON. *sleita* 'schlaffheit, trägheit'; LG. *slīken* 'schleichen;
(vom monde) abnehmen', Dan. *slik* 'kleinigkeit', Gk. λιγύς 'thin,
sharp, shrill' (sound).—ON. *sleyma* 'dummkopf', Sw. *slummen*
'sehr mager, schwach'; MHG. *slūn* 'das faulenzen', Sw. *slyna*
'dumme Liese', MHG. *slūr* 'das faulenzen', Gk. λαύρα 'narrow
passage, defile', Lat. *lūra* 'mouth of a leathern bag'; Lith. *slubnas*
'schwach, matt', MHG. *sloufe* 'öffnung'; E. *sloven* 'schlotteriger,
schlumpiger mensch'; MHG. *slūch* 'schlund', *slücke* 'öffnung,
lücke', *sluhtisch* 'träge, faul', NHG. *schlucht* 'chasm', E. *slouch*
'schlotteriger mensch, tölpel'; Gk. λαυκανίη 'schlund, kehle', E.
sluggish 'träge, faul'; ON. *slydra* 'mattigkeit,' Sw. *sludder*
'nachlässigkeit', MHG. *slūder-affe* 'müssiggänger'; ON. *slyttinn*
'träge, faul', E. *slut* 'schlumpe', *slot* 'narrow aperture'.

5a. In the above are several words for 'flank, side' from
'bending; sunken; hollow', etc. Compare the following: MHG.
weich 'weich, biegsam, schwach': NHG. *die weichen.*—MHG.
dünne 'dünn': *daz dünne* 'die weiche', NHG. *dünnung.*—MHG.

linc 'link', OE. *hlinc* 'slope, hill', *hlanc* 'lank, lean': OHG. *hlanca* 'hüfte, lende'.—OE. *hlinian* 'lean, recline', *hlip* 'slope, hill': ON. *hlid* 'side'.—Lith. *lendù* 'krieche', *lìndynè* 'versteck', Pruss. *lindan* 'thal'; Lat. *lumbus*, OHG. *lentin* 'lende'.—Gk. πλάγιος 'quer, schief': τὰ πλάγια 'seiten, flanken'. Here perhaps also Germ. **flanka* 'flank'.

6. Closely allied to these are words denoting that which may be slipped off or on or into, hence 'hull, shell; slough, skin; garment; hiding-place', etc.

Lith. *sèlenà* 'schlaube, schale'; Sw. *slang* 'schlauch'; MHG. *slieme* 'dünne haut'; OE. *ofer-slop* 'surplice', MHG. *sloufe* 'bekleidung', *sluf, slupf-loch* 'schlupfwinkel'; OE. *slieve* 'sleeve', ODu. *slōve* 'velum, tegmen, folliculus', LG. *slûve* 'hülse, schote', NHG. *schlaube* 'hülse'; MHG. *slûch* 'abgestreifte haut, schlauch'; ME. *slogh, slouh*, E. *slough* 'abgestreifte haut, schorf', OE. **slûh* (: Lett. *schlûkt* 'glitschen'); MHG. *sliude, slûde* 'schwertscheide'; ON. *slîdr* 'scheide'; Norw. *slire* 'scheide'.

7. Of similar development are words for 'slip off, peel off, scrape (make smooth, whet), slit, sliver'.

Lat. *līma* 'file', *līmō* 'rub, file, polish'; OHG. *slîfan* 'gleiten: schleifen, glätten, schärfen', Lat. *lībō* 'take away, diminish, impair', OE. *tō-slîfan* 'split' E. *sliver* 'splinter'; MHG. *slîzen* 'abstreifen, abschälen, zerreissen', OE. *slîtan* 'tear, rend', Lat. *laedō* 'damage, injure'; OE. *slîpan* 'injure', Goth. *ga-sleipjan* 'schädigen'; ON. *slîkr* 'glatt', OHG. *slihten* 'glatt machen, glätten', Lat. *ligō* 'hoe'; Goth. *afslaupjan* 'abstreifen'.

8. From the derived meaning 'gorge, gullet, throat' come several words for 'swallow'.

MHG. *slint* 'schlund: schlinger', *slunt* 'kluft, abgrund, schlund, kehle: schluck, schwelgerei, trunkenheit; schwelger, schlemmer', *slinden* 'schlucken, schlingen', Goth. *fra-slindan* 'verschlingen'. —MHG. *slinc, slunc, -ges* 'schlund': NHG. *schlingen.* This implies a MHG. **slingen* 'swallow' which must have existed by the side of *slinden*, corresponding to *slint, slunt: slinc, slunc.*— Gk. λάρυγξ 'gullet, throat', MHG. *slurc* 'schlund': *slurc-hart* 'schlemmer', *slurken* 'schlucken'.—MHG. *slûch* 'schlund, kehle, gurgel: schwelger, säufer, fresser', *slûchen, slucken* 'schlingen, schlucken', ON. *sloka* 'drikke i store drag, nedsvælge', Sw. *sluka*, Dan. *sluge* 'verschlingen', *slugen* 'gefrässig, gierig'.

Compare MHG. *swalch* 'schlund': OHG. *swelgan* 'verschlucken, saufen'.

9. In other cases words for 'swallow' imply a careless eating or drinking, a slopping, slobbering.

MHG. *slampen* 'schlaff herabhangen', *slump* 'schlumpig': *slamp* 'gelage', *slampieren* 'unmässig essen', NHG. *schlampen*, *-pfen* 'schlemmen'.—Lith. *sùlpnas* 'schwach': ON. *slefa* 'geifern', E. *slaver* 'drivel', *slabber*, NHG. *schlabbern* 'schlürfen, so dass das eingeschlürfte zum teil wieder herausfällt'.—MHG. *slam* 'schlamm': *slemmen* 'schlemmen, prassen', i. e. 'slop, slobber'.— Sw. *slarfva* 'nachlässig sein': Du. *slurpen*, Dan. *slurpe* 'schlürfen', Scotch *slorp* 'auf unsaubere art, mit schnüffeln und schluchzen weinen; in unreinlicher weise mit patschen und schmatzen essen'.—ON. *slodra* 'sich hinschleppen', Sw. *sluddra* 'nachlässig sein': Scotch *sludder* 'unreinlich essen'.—ON. *slota* 'hang down, be limp', E. *slut* 'schlampe': OE. *slota* 'morsel', Scotch *slutter* 'beim essen patschen, sabbern'.—OE. *slūpan* 'gleiten', *slyppe* 'schleim': ON. *slupra*, Dan. *slubre* 'schlürfen', MHG. *slüpfen* 'schlüpfen: schlürfen', E. *slop* 'begiessen, beschütten, besudeln: hastig, gierig trinken'.

10. In a few instances words for 'taste, lick' come from 'scrape, graze, touch', a signification that is derived from 'slide over'. But in no case, so far as I have found in this group of words, does 'swallow, slobber, sip' come directly from 'slide, slip' but from some intermediate idea.

OHG. *slīfan* 'gleiten; schleifen', Lat. *lībō* 'touch, lessen, diminish (i. e. 'scrape off'): 'taste, sip, crop'.—OHG. *slīhhan* 'schleichen': ON. *sleikja*, Sw. *slicka* 'lecken', MHG. *slichen*, *slicken* 'zupfen: schlucken, schlingen', *slic* 'bissen, trunk, schluck; fresser.'

Sanskrit.

lámbatē I, 4	*sr̥ní* I, 2
ī́blati IV, 4*a*	*srámsatē* I, 11; IV, 1, 4
sáras IV, 4	*srāmá* I, 3; IV, 1, 5
sarpí IV, 4	*srédhati* II, 7
salilá IV, 4	*srēman* II, 3
sr̥ká I, 9	*srēváyati* II, 4; IV, 2

Greek.

ἅλλομαι I, 1	ἑλένη I, 2; IV, 1
ἑλεῖν I, 1	ἑλίκη II, 12
ἑλεός III, 1	ἑλινος II, 2; IV, 2

ἕλιξ II, 12; IV, 2

ἑλίσσω II, 12; IV, 2

ἑλίτροχος II, 1; IV, 2

ἕλκω I, 9; IV, 1, 4

ἕλος IV, 4

λαβίς I, 4

λάβρος I, 4

λαγαρός I, 6; IV, 5

λαγών I, 6; IV, 5

λαιδρός II, 8

λαικάς II, 12

λαιός II, 4

λαμβάνω I, 4

λάμπη IV, 4

λανθάνω I, 10

λαπάρα I, 5; IV, 5

λαπαρός I, 5, 8; IV, 5

λάπη IV, 4

λάρυγξ I, 12; IV, 5, 8

λαρύνω I, 12

λαυκανίη IV, 5

λαύρα III, 2; IV, 5

λείβω II, 5; IV, 2, 4

λεικνίζω II, 12

λειμών II, 3

λειχήν II, 13

λέμφος I, 5; IV, 4

λήγω I, 6

λῆρος I, 12

λίγδην II, 10

λιγυρός II, 10

λιγύς II, 10; IV, 5

λικμός II, 12

λικριφίς II, 12

λτρός II, 14

λοίδορος II, 8

λῦγαῖος IV, 4

ὁλκός I, 9

Latin.

insula IV, 4

labo I, 4; IV, 1

labor I, 4; IV, 1

lacit I, 9

lacuna I, 8; IV, 5

lacunar I, 8; IV, 5

laedo II, 8; IV, 7

laevus II, 4

langueo I, 6

largus I, 12

lateo I, 10; IV, 5

latex IV, 4

latus I, 10

laquear I, 8; IV, 5

laqueus I, 8

lax I, 9

lenis I, 2

liber II, 5

libo II, 5; IV, 7, 10

libra II, 7

licinus II, 12

licium II, 12

ligo 'bind' II, 10; IV, 2

ligo 'hoe' II, 10; IV, 7

lima II, 3; IV, 4, 7

limen II, 3

limes II, 3

limus II, 3; IV, 4

lippus II, 6; IV, 4

liqueo II, 11; IV, 4

lubricus III, 3

lugeo III, 5

lumbus IV, 5a

lupa III, 4

lura IV, 5

lurco I, 12

lustrum III, 7; IV, 4

lutum III, 7; IV, 4

obliquus II, 11

salebra I, 1

salio I, 1
saliva II, 4; IV, 4
salix II, 12

solari I, 1
solvo III, 1; IV, 3
sulcus I, 9

Gothic.

lists III, 6*a*
saljan I, 1
saldra I, 1
sēls I, 1
slahan I, 9; IV, 1
-slaupjan III, 3; IV, 7
-slaupjan III, 7

slawan III, 1; IV, 3
sleipa II, 9; IV, 2
-sleipjan II, 9; IV, 7
slēpan I, 4
-slindan I, 10; IV, 8
sliupan III, 3; IV, 3

Old, Middle and New High German.

hlanca IV, 5*a*
lentin IV, 5*a*
linc IV, 5*a*
salaha I, 9
salba IV, 4
sālīg I, 1
selken IV, 4
schlabbern I, 5; IV, 4, 9
schlack IV, 4
schlackern IV, 4
slaf I, 4; IV, 5
slāf I, 4; IV, 5
slah I, 6; IV, 4
slahta I, 7
slam I, 5; IV, 4, 9
slamp IV, 9
slampen I, 4; IV, 1, 4, 9
schlampen, -pfen IV, 9
slampieren IV, 9
slanc I, 6; IV, 5
slango I, 7
slarfe I, 12
slāt, slōt IV, 5
schlau III, 6*a*
schlaube III, 4; IV, 6
slēha II, 11

sleif II, 5; IV, 4
schleif IV, 4
slemen I, 3
slemmen IV, 9
slenken I, 6
schlenzen I, 10
slenzic I, 10; IV, 5
slēo II, 4; IV, 2, 4, 5
slerfen I, 12; IV, 1, 4
slich II, 10; IV, 4
slicken II, 10; IV, 10
sliechen III, 5
slieme IV, 6
slier III, 2; IV, 4
slīfan II, 5; IV, 2, 4, 7
slīhhan II, 10; IV, 2
slihten IV, 7
slīm IV, 2, 4
slimp I, 5
schlimpe II, 5
slinc I, 6; IV, 5, 8
slingan I, 6; IV, 1
schlingen IV, 8
slint I, 10; IV, 5, 8
slīo II, 4
sliofan III, 3

sliozan III, 8
sliude III, 7; IV, 6
slīzen II, 8; IV, 2, 7
schlofen III, 4
sloufe III, 3; IV, 5, 6
sloufen III, 3
slote III, 7; IV, 4
sloten III, 7
slotern III, 7; IV, 3
slōze III, 8; IV, 4
slūch III, 5; IV, 5, 8
slūchen III, 5; IV, 8
slucken III, 5; IV, 8
slūder III, 7
slūder-affe III, 7; IV, 5
sluf IV, 6
sluhtisch III, 5; IV, 5

slump I, 4; IV, 4, 9
slūn III, 1; IV, 3, 5
slunt I, 10; IV, 5, 8
schlunzen I, 10
sluot IV, 4
slüpfen III, 3; IV, 4, 9
slupfloch IV, 6
slūr III, 2; IV, 3, 4, 5
slurc I, 12; IV, 5, 8
schlürfen IV, 4
slurken I, 12; IV, 8
sumpf IV, 4a
swalch IV, 8
schwappen IV, 4a
swelgan IV, 8
verschlagen I, 9

Old and New Dutch.

sleuren III, 2; IV, 3, 4
slinder I, 10; IV, 5
slinderen I, 10

slōve III, 4; IV, 6
slurpen I, 12; IV, 49

Old English.

hlanc IV, 5a
hlinc IV, 5a
-līsian III, 6a
list III, 6a
ofer-slop IV, 6
sǣl I, 1
salo III, 1
-seolcan I, 6; IV, 1, 4
slæc I, 6; IV, 1, 5
slæd I, 10; IV, 5
slagu IV, 4
slā-wyrm II, 11
slīc II, 10
slicc II, 10

slīdan II, 7; IV, 2
slīefan III, 4; IV, 3
slīefe III, 4; IV, 6
slīepa IV, 4
-slīfan II, 6; IV, 7
slīm II, 3
slincan I, 6; IV, 1
slipig IV, 4
slōh IV, 4
slota IV, 9
slūma III, 1
slūpan III, 3; IV, 4, 9
sulh I, 9

Mod. English and Dialects.

sallow III, 1
slab IV, 5
slant I, 10
slash I, 11
slattern I, 10; IV, 5
slaver IV, 4, 9
sleet III, 8; IV, 4
slive II, 6; IV, 2, 4
sliver II, 6; IV, 7
slop IV, 4, 9
slot III, 8; IV, 5
slouch III, 5; IV, 5
slough III, 6; IV, 6
sloven III, 4; IV, 5
slub III, 4

sludder IV, 9
slue III, 1; IV, 3
slug III, 6; IV, 3
slump I, 4; IV, 4
slur III, 2
slush I, 11; IV, 4
slut III, 8; IV, 4, 5, 9
slutter IV, 9
sly III, 6a
swamp IV, 4a
swank IV, 4a
swanky IV, 4a
swap IV, 4a
swoop IV, 4a

Old Norse.

slafask I, 5; IV, 1
slafr I, 5
slaga I, 9; IV, 1, 4
slagna IV, 4
slamra I, 3
slapa I, 4; IV, 1
slápr I, 4; IV, 5
slasask I, 11; IV, 1, 4
slauka III, 5; IV, 3, 4
slefa I, 5; IV, 4, 9
sleif II, 6
sleikja II, 10; IV, 10
sleita II, 8; IV, 2, 5
slen I, 2; IV, 1, 5
slepja I, 4
sleppa I, 4
sleyma III, 1; IV, 3, 5
sliðr IV, 6
sliga II, 13; IV, 2
slikr IV, 7
slinni I, 2

slíta II, 8
slóð I, 10; IV, 4
sloðra III, 7; IV, 3, 4, 9
slok III, 5; IV, 4
sloka III, 5; IV, 8
slokr IV, 4
slor IV, 4
slóra I, 12; IV, 1
slota III, 8; IV, 9
slunginn I, 7
slupra III, 3; IV, 4, 9
slúta III, 8; IV, 3, 4
slý III, 6
slyðra III, 7; IV, 3
slyngr I, 7
slyngva I, 7
slyttinn III, 8, IV, 5
sløða I, 10
sløgr I, 9
sløma I, 3

Dano-Norwegian.

logre IV, 4a

slark I, 12; IV, 5

slarke I, 12

slat I, 10; IV, 1, 5

slire II, 14; IV, 2, 6

slud III, 8; IV, 4

slunken I, 6

slurk I, 12

slægt I, 7

slæng I, 7

Swedish.

sank IV, 4a

slang IV, 6

slankig I, 6

slarf IV, 5

slarfva I, 12; IV, 1, 9

slask I, 11; IV, 4

slind OSw. I, 10; IV, 5

slinka I, 6

slinta I, 10; IV, 1

sloka III, 5

sluddra III, 7; IV, 9

slug I, 9; III, 6a

slummen III, 1; IV, 3, 5

slump I, 4

slumpa I, 4

slusk I, 11; IV, 4

sluta III, 8

slutta III, 8; IV, 3

slyna III, 1; IV, 3, 5

slyngel I, 7

slå I, 9

slända I, 10

slängd I, 7

solk IV, 4

svamp IV, 4a

Lithuanian.

lendù IV, 5a

lìndynė IV, 5a

liūgas IV, 4a

liulēti IV, 4a

liulýnas IV, 4a

liunginti IV, 4a

sala IV, 4

sèlà I, 1; IV, 1, 5

sèlava III, 1

sélė IV, 4

sèlenà IV, 6

selejimas II, 3; IV, 2

sèlinu I, 2

selù I, 1; IV, 1, 4

sèlùju I, 1

sìlpnas I, 5; IV, 1, 4, 5

sùlpti I, 5

slābnas I, 4; IV, 5

slankė I, 7

slapùs I, 5

slardau I, 12

slatau I, 10; IV, 1

slaudžiu III, 8; IV, 4

slaužiu III, 5; IV, 3, 4

slėdnas I, 10; IV, 1, 5

slėgiu I, 6

slenkù I, 7; IV, 1

slepiu I, 5; IV, 1

slėpsna I, 5; IV, 5

slėkas II, 10; IV, 2, 4

slidus II, 7; IV, 2

slykstu II, 13; IV, 2

-slimpa II, 6

slýstu II, 7

slývas II, 4

slogus I, 6

slubnas III, 3; IV, 3, 5

slukau III, 6

slúkstu III, 5; IV, 3

Lettic.

slaids II, 7
slaika IV, 2, 4
slaiks IV, 4
slēpt I, 5

slĭpt II, 6; IV, 2, 4
schl'aups III, 4; IV, 3
schl'ukt III, 6

Church Slavonic.

lĕzą II, 10; IV, 2
sląkŭ I, 6
slĕpati IV, 4
slĕpŭ II, 6; IV, 4

sliva II, 4
sludy III, 8; IV, 3, 4
sŭlati I, 1

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IV.—LATIN ETYMOLOGIES.

I Vestibulum.

Testimonia.

a) Plautus, Most. 817: uiden uestibulum ante aedis hoc?

b) Varro, L. L. 7. 81: dicitur qui exit in vestibulum, quod est ante domum, prodire et procedere.

c) Vergil, Aen. 2. 469, sq.: vestibulum ante ipsum primoque in limine Pyrrhus exultat ... limina perrumpit ... apparet domus intus et atria longa patescunt. *ib.* 7. 180: Saturnusque senex Ianique bifrontis imago vestibulo adstabant.

d) Livy, 5. 41. 2: curules magistratus ... quae augustissima vestis est ... ea vestiti medio aedium eburneis sellis sedere [vestibulum = quasi 'vestitorum locus'].

— — 8: adeo haud secus quam venerabundi intuebantur (sc. Galli) in aedium vestibulis sedentes viros (i. e. curules magistratus) praeter ornatum habitumque humano augustiorem, maiestate etiam ... simillimos dis.

e) *ib.* 2. 48. 10: consul e curia egressus comitante Fabiorum agmine, qui in vestibulo curiae ... expectantes steterant, domum redit. *ib.* 2. 49. 3: consul paludatus egrediens in vestibulo gentem omnem suam ... videt.

f) Ovid, Fasti, 6. 301, sq.:

> At focus a flammis et quod fovet omnia dictus;
> Qui tamen in primis aedibus ante fuit.
> Hinc quoque vestibulum dici reor: inde precando
> Praefamur Vestam, quae loca prima tenet
> [vestibulum: quasi 'Vesta-stabulum'].

g) Tacitus, Ann. 11. 35: patefieri domum ... atqui illuc deduci imperatorem iubet; ac primum in vestibulo effigiem patris Silii consulto senatus abolitam demonstrat, tum quidquid avitum Neronibus et Drusis in pretium probri cessisse.

h) Gellius 16. 5. 2: animadverti enim, quosdam hautquaquam indoctos viros opinari vestibulum esse partem domus primorem quam vulgus atrium vocat.

i) *ib.* 3: Aelius Gallus 'vestibulum' esse dicit non in ipsis aedibus neque partem aedium sed locum ante ianuam domus vacuum, per quem a via aditus accessusque ad aedis est [quasi 'viā stabulum remotum'].

j) *ib.* 5: 5 Sulpicium autem Apollinarem memini dicere ... 'Ve' particula sicuti quaedam alia, tum intentionem significat, tum minutionem. Nam 'vetus' et 'vehemens', alterum ab aetatis magnitudine compositum elisumque est [quasi vetus from 've-aetas'], alterum a mentis vi atque impetu [quasi 'vi-mens'] dicitur ... 10. ab illa ergo grandis loci consistione et quasi quadam

stabulatione vestibula appellata sunt spatia ... grandia ante fores aedium relicta [quasi 'lata stabulatio'].

k) Nonius Marcellus, p. 53: vestibula quidam putant sub ea proprietate distincta quod in primis ingressibus et in spatiis domorum Vestae hoc est arae ac foci soleant haberi.

l) Servius ad Aen. 2. 469: dictum autem vestibulum, vel quod ianuam vestiat, ut videmus cameram duabus sustentatam columnis, vel quoniam Vestae consecratum est.

m) Ancient gloss (Goetz): vestibulum ante ostium ubi velum ponitur [quasi, 'vestis (awning) stabulum'].

General Modern References: Göll, in Becker's Gallus, II, p. 224 sq.; Marquardt-Mau's Privatleben der Römer, p. 224 sq.

The more comprehensive modern discussions of the *vestibulum* have located it solely in front of the house, before the entrance-door. To do so they have made the testimony of Gellius (h), echoed by Nonius (k), refer to a late period, and have accordingly so interpreted Livy's testimony (d)—in which they are followed by the great edition of Weissenborn—as to call in question the natural interpretation that *medio aedium sedere* is repeated by *in aedium vestibulis sedentes*. But not only does Livy seem to confirm the statement of Gellius that *vestibulum = atrium*, but so does Tacitus (g), as Nipperdey thinks. Ladewig interprets also two passages of the Aeneid (c) by locating the *vestibulum* behind the entrance-door, though the passages do not seem to me to prove this past doubt. The bulk of the evidence certainly goes to show that the *vestibulum* was before the door, a πρόθυρον. Cicero used *vestibulum* in the metaphorical sense of 'entrance, beginning', and therefore it can hardly be questioned that a sporadic usage of *vestibulum = atrium* has the advantages of a *lectio difficilior*. The authorities cited by Gellius for *vestibulum = atrium* were so full of the notion of 'entrance' as to commit themselves to the implicit assertion that the *atrium* was the *pars primoris* of the house. But the difficulty here is perhaps chiefly verbal: what if the signification of *vestibulum* became fixed as 'entrance' or 'lobby' when the *atrium* of the ancient Roman house had but the entrance-door between it and the street? It must have been a mere matter of subsequent adaptation whether the term 'entrance' (*vestibulum*) was applied to the rear of the door (entrance-hall or court), or to the front (porch).

In the testimonia above cited the following etymologies stand expressed or lie implicit.

1) Livy (d), Servius (l), and a glossist (m) connect *vestibulum* with *vestis* or *vestire*.

2) Ovid (f) and Nonius (k) explain *vestibulum* as 'Vestae locus', quasi 'Vesta-stabulum'.

3) Aelius Gallus (i) explains *vestibulum* as '(a) viā locus (= stabulum) remotus'.

4) Sulpicius Apollinaris (j) explained *vestibulum* as 'lata stabulatio'.

Nearly all of these ancient explanations recur, in one authority or another, in modern phonetic transcription.

Among others, Stowasser follows Aelius Gallus (i) and defines *vestibulum* (printed with a gratuitous *ē*) by 'Strassenplatz' deriving it from *vē-* (contracted from *vea = via*) + *stabulum*.

Marquardt interprets *vestibulum* as originally the 'farm yard', thus echoing, with a difference, Sulpicius (j).

Other modern scholars, e. g. Goell, still explain *vestibulum* from *vē + stabulum*, but they define *vē-* as 'outside of', and not in the sense of Sulpicius. This doctrine of the prefix *ve-*, adequately represented in a somewhat old fashioned way, is found set forth in Harpers' Latin Dictionary. In Wharton, the particle *ve-* is given the diminishing force noted by Sulpicius, wherefore *vestibulum* appears as an 'inferior building'. This sense will reappear in the testimonium from Ovid cited on p. 67. But the prefix *ve-* has lately been called in question by Niedermann,[1] and I cheerfully endorse his contention that from *vē-mens*, the 'allegro' form of *vehemens*, a prefix *vē*, was abstracted, then made use of in *vecors* and *vesanus*, nearly synonymous with *vemens*, and afterwards extended to one or two words—not including Veiovis—less obviously related with this semantic group, e. g. *vegrandis*.[1]

Ovid's explanation of *vestibulum* as quasi *Vesta-stabulum* seems to have met with no great favor among the moderns, though there is much to content oneself with in this etymology. The testimony of Nonius can hardly seem a mere attempt to back up an etymological theory like Ovid's. Pindar locates the Greek household gods in the πρόθυρον, and if the *Vestibulum* did not get its name from the sacred fire, it may have done so from the placing of an *aedicula* of Vesta in proximity, whether behind or before, to the entrance-door. In at least one Pompeian house, behind the door,

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[1] Apropos of Niedermann's definition of *vegrandis* 'very big' (and 'very small') by 'abnorm in Bezug auf seine Grösse', I permit myself to observe that the semantic bridge between *vē-sanus* and *vē-grandis* may be found in *insanus : insanus* is a synonym of *vesanus* 'male sanus', and *insanus* means 'crazily big' (see my note on Plautus' Mostellaria, 761).

but in the entrance-hall, I have seen a small *aedicula* of stucco. In others such *aediculae* are found in the *atrium*, or in rooms surrounding the peristyle.

Purely modern is the derivation of *vestibulum*, defined by 'dwelling', from WES (: Skr. *vasati* 'dwells'), and this derivation finds the approval of nearly all the general works on etymology. Demonstrably false it is not, but the vagueness of the definition is not to its advantage.

Mommsen, whose astonishing etymological ingenuity—though one may wonder if he had not unconsciously absorbed the suggestion in this case from Livy (d)—is often as instructive semantically as it is likely to be, judged by the subsequent phonetic standards of to-day, phonetically faulty, derived *vestibulum* from *vestire* 'to clothe' and pictured the primitive Roman as cloaking himself before the door of his hut.

I recognize the phonetic difficulty arising from the variant quantity of the *i*'s, but it does not seem to me, as it has seemed to some others, insuperable, inasmuch as *vestibulum* quasi 'cloak room', may have replaced in consciousness **vestibulum*, quasi 'cloaking room'; to say nothing of the possible effect of *prostibulum* on **vestibulum*.

We can not render a decisive verdict against this etymology. The custom assumed for primitive times is certainly plausible.

None of these explanations, whether ancient or modern, can be regarded as entirely satisfactory,—in this statement I but echo Schrader—and I may therefore be permitted to add a different and perhaps, to those not satisfied by one of the existing etymologies, a more convincing explanation of *vestibulum* that suggested itself to me as I stood in a Pompeian door-way during the past summer. The house in which I stood had possessed a door-way abutting on the street, with wings opening into the house. Behind this door-way, some four or five feet, a second door-way had stood, the wings of which had opened toward the street. On the right wall between the two large and heavy door-ways had stood a small door. Professor Mau's interpretation of the facts was as follows: 'the inner of the two large door-ways, opening outwards, was the original state entrance to the house; the small door in the side wall was the easy every day entrance; the foremost door, opening inwards, was of subsequent construction in response to a police regulation that front doors should not open toward the street'.

5

Now it is obvious that the space between the two door-ways was the place in which the heavy wings of the doors stood. The suggestion that came to me was this: to derive *vestibulum* from **verstabulum* 'the standing-place of the (open) doors, door-stead'.

The applicability of this definition does not depend on any temporal accident that might affect the Pompeian door-way. On the contrary, if the *vestibulum* is the space through which the door swung in opening and shutting, we can explain how it was now in the *atrium;* now in the *fauces,* but behind the door; now before the door, but still in the *fauces;* and lastly in the open air, i. e. a part of the entrance-porch. The first and last of these positions got their name of *vestibulum* according as the door swung in or out prior to the development of the *fauces* as an architectural motif in the Roman house; the other positions bore the name *vestibulum* in the period subsequent to the development of the *fauces.*

As to the form, I would derive *vestibulum* from **verstabulum,* earlier **vero-stabulum.* The stem *vero-* 'door, gate' is well known in the Italic dialects, but has hitherto not been found in Latin save in the compound verbs *aperit* 'opens the door', and *operit* 'closes the door'.

As thus interpreted, *vestibulum,* a derivative (= compound) of **vero-* 'door', has had much the same development as *porticus* 'porch' (: *porta* 'door').

We may further note from the law of the Twelve Tables: forum, id est vestibulum sepulchri, inferring for *vestibulum* a semantic development corresponding to that of *forum* (: *foris* 'door').

Special References: Fay, The Mostellaria of Plautus; Goetz, Thesaurus Glossarum Emendatarum; Harpers' Latin Dictionary; Mommsen, Römische Geschichte I, 327; Niedermann in Indogerm. Forschungen, 10, 247 sq.; Pindar, Pyth., 3, 139; Schrader, Reallexikon der Indogerm. Altertumskunde, 341; Stowasser, Lateinisch-Deutsches Schulwörterbuch; Wharton, Etyma Latina.

II VEIOVIS.

Testimonia.

(a) Cicero, Nat. Deor. 3, 62: in enodandis autem nominibus, quod miserandum sit, laboratis. Saturnus, quia se saturat annis: Mavors, quia magna vertit: Minerva, quia minuit, aut quia minatur: Venus,[1] quia venit ad omnia: Ceres, a gerendo. Quam periculosa consuetudo! In multis enim nominibus haerebitis. Quid Veiovi facies? quid Vulcano? Quamquam quoniam Neptunum a nando appellatum putas, nullum erit nomen, quod non possis una littera explicare, unde ductum sit. In quo quidem magis tu mihi natare visus es, quam ipse Neptunus.

(b) Ovid, Fasti, 3, 445:

> nunc vocor ad nomen. vegrandia farra colonae
> quae male creverunt, vescaque parva vocant.
> vis ea si verbi est, cur non ego Vediovis aedem
> aedem non magni suspicer esse Iovis?

(c) *ib.* 430: templa ... lucos Vediovis ante duos.

(d) Gellius, 5. 12: in antiquis precationibus nomina haec deorum inesse animadvertimus: 'Diovis' et 'Vediovis', ... cum Iovem igitur et Diovem a iuvando nominassent ... 'Vediovem' appellaverunt, dempta atque detracta iuvandi facultate, 'Ve' enim particula ... et augendae rei et minuendae valet ... veluti 'vescum', 'vemens' et 'vegrande'..... 'vesani' autem et 'vecordes' una tantum parte dicti, quae privativa est.

(e) Gellius, 16. 5. 5 = (j) on p. 62.

(f) Ancient gloss: (Goetz) Vidius Ἀπόλλων νόμιος.

General Reference: Preller, Römische Mythologie, I, 262, sq.; 306.

In a consideration of the word *Veiovis* the skeptical etymologist must note that Cicero either did not know, or passed over with the silence of contempt, the definition of *Veiovis* as a 'parvus Juppiter' (Ovid), or as an 'anti-Jove', a 'malus Juppiter' (Gellius). The skeptical etymologist can not away with a particle *ve-* 'little' abstracted from *vesca*, or *ve-* 'great' abstracted from *vetus;* and, on observing the narrow range of use of this prefix he will call in question whether the *Ve-* of *Veiovis* has any connection with the *vē-* of *vē-mens* and its synonyms (see above p. 64). The assumption of an anti-Jove foists a dualistic religious conception on the Romans that is not in general well authenticated, and this should give the careful etymologist pause in his consideration of *Veiovis*.

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[1] Curiously enough Browning apostrophizes love with the words "come then, complete incompletion, O comer" etc. (Jocoseria): cf. also from Meredith's The Tragic Comedians, ch. 1: dressed, to delight him, in Prince Marko's colors, the care she bestowed on her dressing was for the one absent, the shrouded comer (= lover yet to come).

There must also be some hesitation in respect of the two spellings, *Vediovis* and *Veiovis*. The former spelling is probably genuinely the older, but it may be only an archaizing spelling. If *Vediovis* is the older spelling, literary usage can not determine the length of the *e*, and almost any conceivable epigraphic usage, in view of the obvious interest felt by the Romans in the etymology of the word, would be liable to impeachment as of conscious etymological purport.

If suspicion attach to the interpretation of the name as *Ve-Diovis*, the sanguine modern etymologist might venture on an interpretation as *Ved-iovis*. Appealing to the Umbrian appellatives of deities, transcribed in Latin as *Grabovius* and *Fisovius*, but also, in some of their case-forms, subject to transcription as *Grabovis* and *Fisovis*[4], he would interpret the -(*i*)*ovis* of *Vediovis* as suffixal, and undertake to explain *Vediovis* as an original appellative raised, by virtue of being an apparent compound of *Ve+Diovis*, to rank as an independent deity, an Anti-Jove.

Let us suppose the sanguine modern. etymologist further to map out the various phonetic sources from which *Ved-* might have arisen, viz.: *v* from w or ⑨, and *d* from D or DH, while *e* may be either long or short.

Before proceeding to search for extra Italic cognates it were well to state what is known of *Vediovis* from evidence purely literary and archaeological, as interpreted by Preller.

1) *Vediovis* was judged by the Romans to have Apolline characteristics, and his worship was crowded out by Apollo's: cf. also the gloss (f) above, *Vidius*, interpreted by Buecheler as *Vediovis*.

2) The statue of *Vediovis* represented him as a youthful Jupiter, with a bundle of arrows. The arrows are interpreted as sunrays, particularly of sunrays as breeders of pestilence.

3) A temple of *Vediovis* stood in the shallow depression between the two crests of the Capitoline, and perhaps a second temple on the island in the Tiber.

Supposing the sanguine etymologist to limit his search for cognates to Sanskrit, and there, to the very carefully sifted material registered by Uhlenbeck, the following words might attract his attention:

1) a) *vádati* 'sings'; b) *gádati* 'speaks'. If cognate with either of these, *Ved-iovis* has a general sense like 'oracular', suitable to the Apolline character of the deity.

2) a) *vadh-* 'to strike, beat', cf. *vádhar* 'weapon', *vádha-s* 'slayer'; b) *gadá* 'club'; c) *gada-s* 'sickness'. If cognate with any of this group, *Vediovis* means 'weapon-bearer' or 'pestilence-breeder', and this accords with the bundle of arrows with which his statue was provided.

3) *gādhá-s* 'shallow', *gādhá-m* 'a ford, a shallow'. If *Vediovis* is cognate with these words, we must think of the location of his temples, the one in the shallow depression between two crests of a hill, and the other at the end of a ford across the Tiber.

The skeptical etymologist, Cicero, supposing him to comprehend these attempts at explanation, might still retort: quid mihi, malum, explicationum offers? Multae pro nullis sint explicationibus. Quid Veiovi facies?

But the skeptical etymologist may himself have gone too far in rejecting the Ovidian division into Ve + Diovis. Therefore, the sanguine etymologist might reply, still rejecting the notion of an anti-Jove, as follows:

(1) *Veiovis* might come from *Veio-iovis*, a Jupiter brought from Veii, and Pliny tells us that a Veian made the first statue of Jupiter for the Capitolium. Livy records that the goddess Juno was solemnly transferred from Veii to Rome. But there is no literary evidence to confirm any such notion of a Veian Jove, and probably no Latin compound of this sort; though it might be possible to regard *Veiovis* as a derivative of *Veii* rather than a compound.

(2) Possibly *Ve-* may be a 'prefix' of a 'ghost-word' sort. Gellius (d) tells us that *Diovis* and *Vediovis* were names found in ancient prayers—alas, without recording the formulae. If we bear in mind that the Romans were exceedingly anxious to utter the names of their deities in correct ritual form, and to give to each his proper appellatives (cf. Smith's note to Horace's *Carm. Saec.* 15), we might permit ourselves to surmise that, at a time when *Iovis* had nearly ousted the older form *Diovis*, a (spoken) formula ran *Iovisvediovisve*, and was ultimately misdivided *Iovis Vediovisve*. More than a surmise this suggestion could never be, unless indeed such a formula might one day turn up. Meantime, we may compare the inscription "to an unknown God": SEI · DEO · SEI · DEIVAE · SAC(rum), etc., and the further citations of Middleton. [See postscript on p. 74].

In submitting these explanations I beg to make none of them my own, but rather still to say with Cicero: quid Veiovi facies?

Query: Ought not the passage about to be cited to be added to the ancient testimonia for Veiovis? It is not cited by Preller, nor does Ladewig explain its bearings in his notes to the Aeneid. The ancient commentators, Macrobius and Servius, are also silent as to its interpretation. The passage occurs in the Aeneid, where Evander is explaining to Aeneas the ancient religious rites and places, and describes a sacred grove upon the Capitoline (Aen. 8, 351):

> 'hoc nemus, hunc', inquit, 'frondoso vertice collem,
> quis deus incertum est, habitat deus; Arcades ipsum
> credunt se vidisse Iovem, cum saepe nigrantem
> aegida concuteret dextra nimbosque cieret'.

The applicability of this description to what we know of *Veiovis* is obvious.

Special References: Goetz, see reference on p. 66. Livy, 5. 22; Middleton, The Remains of Ancient Rome, I, pp. 174–5, footnotes. *Von Planta, Grammatik der Oskisch-Umbrisch. Dialekte II, § 275; Pliny, N. H. 35, 157; Smith, The Odes and Epodes of Horace.

III VADA 'SHALLOWS'; VĀDIT 'GOES'.

It is customary to connect these words with English *wade*. But *vādo* looks very much like *vā-* extended by the *d* or *dh* suffix common in verb formations. It is therefore possible to find in *vado* the same root ꬶA recognized for Gr. *ῑ-βα*, Skr. *a-gā-t*. As for *vạda*, its cognation with Skr. *gādhám* 'ford', mentioned above presents no difficulties. The difference in vowel quantities is a thing to note, but it does not invalidate the cognation. Of course, if *vada* and *gādhám* are cognate, the suggestion (p. 69) that *gādhám* is phonetically reconcilable with *Vediovis* falls under great suspicion.

English *wade* cannot, to the best of my knowledge, be a cognate of Skr. *gā-dhám*—whose derivation from ꬶĀ I cannot doubt—but if *wade* and *vādo* are cognates, the Aryan base was WĂDH-. The question suggests itself what we are to do with pairs like the following:

(1) Skr. *gad-* 'speak': *vad-* 'speak'.

(2) Skr. *gadā* 'club': *vádhar, vadhánā* 'weapon' (with a variation of *d* and *dh*).

(3) Skr. *gādhám* 'ford': Lat. *vada* 'shallows' if *vada* belongs with Eng. *wade*.

These pairs can be resolved by supposing a dialect variation in the primitive period, by which ᵹ was labialized to w. A vastly greater quantity of evidence than is here put together would be needed, however, before any such supposition might be proved.

IV Vemens and Clemens.

In agreeing (p. 64) with Niedermann's explanation of *vemens*, as the allegro form of *vehemens*, I would not be understood as accepting the derivation of *vehemens* from a participle **vehemenos*. Terence, if we may trust the Westerhov index, uses *vehemens* and *vehementer* only of the emotions or what rouses the emotions. Plautus, who uses the adjective but twice (Rud. 70–71 : nam Arcturus signum sum omnium acerrimum ; vehemens sum exoriens, cum occidor vehementior) uses it as explanatory of *acerrimus*, and the sense is certainly not more definite than our 'violent'. He uses more frequently the adverb *vehementer*, and I herewith submit the examples in the order of semantic extension as I conceive it :

Merc. 923 : mater irata est patri vehementer.
Truc. 545 : vehementer nunc mi est irata.
Epid. 276 : quasique ames vehementer tu illam.
Curc. 724 : ego te vehementer perire cupio.
Curc. 568 : vapulare ego te vehementer iubeo.
Capt. 667 : adstringite isti sultis vehementer manus.
Bacch. 1158 : tactus sum vehementer visco.
Mil. 205 : ita vehementer icit (sc. femur).
Rud. 903 : ita fluctuare video vehementer mare.

In these passages the sense is 'violently', 'mightily', not 'speedily, quickly'.

The evidence submitted to explain *-mens* as syncopated from *-menos* is extremely weak, viz.: the two adjectives *vehemens* and *clemens*, which have gone entirely over to the inflexional type of *mens* and must undoubtedly have been, to the Romans, compounds of *mens*.

Not to find compounds of *mens* in Latin would be surprising. In the Rig-Veda twelve compounds of *mati-s* 'mind' are indexed by Grassmann and eleven of *mánas* 'mind, thought'. To the latter correspond perfectly the Greek compounds εὐμενής, δυσμενής. Generally cognate with the Sanskrit *-mati-* compounds is αὐτόματος, and perhaps πολύμητις. Other synonyms of 'mind' occur in

ταλαί-φρων, with the contrasting meanings 'patient of mind' and 'daring', τλή-θυμος 'stout-hearted'.

Similar compounds I find in Latin *vehemens* and *clemens*. The formative type that occurs in *vehemens* is the type of Greek μενε-δήιος 'awaiting the enemy', 'brave'; μενε-πτόλεμος 'persistent in battle'; μενε-χάρμης 'staunch in battle'; δακέ-θυμος 'eating the heart'; ταλα-πενθής 'enduring woe'. So I would define *vehemens* as 'moving (rousing) the mind', though *mens* may have a force in this compound like Greek μένος 'might, rage', compared with Skr. *mánas* 'mind, will'. This type of compound is occasionally found in Latin, e. g. in *Verti-cordia, flexanimus, posci-nummius*, etc., but the type is rare: it is the more noteworthy that two of the examples contain synonyms of *mens* in their final member.

As to *clemens*, Osthoff's derivation from Skr. *çrayamānas* 'leaning', supporting Bréal's derivation from *clivus* 'slope', *inclinat* 'leans', seems to me utterly without cogency on the semantic side, to say nothing of the general objections already made to throwing over the apparent cognation of *clemens* with *mens*. There can hardly be any question but that *clemens* means 'gentle', and Bréal's argument that Tacitus writes collis clementer assurgens and iuga clementius adirentur can mean nothing to an American who talks of 'gentle' slopes and 'easy' approaches.

To explain *clemens*, I resort to Greek ταλαί-φρων and τλή-θυμος, cited already (cf. also ταλα-πενθής, ταλα-εργός ταλα-κάρδιος, ταλα-πείριος, etc.), and derive *clemens* from *tlē-mens* 'patient of mind, gentle'; *tlē*- is a reduced form to a 'base' TELĒ 'bear': at least this, and not TELĀ, is the 'base' recognized by Hirt (Indogerm. Ablaut, 279). It may well be that *tle*- would normally yield *le*- in Latin (cf. *latus* from *tlatus*), but in the compound, *inclementer*, -*cle* is normal.

Query: In view of the well-known Romance adverbial suffix derived from Latin *mente*, and foreshadowed by *furiata mente* 'full of fury' (Aeneid, 2. 407, 588), *memori mente* 'mindful' (Horace, Serm. 2. 6. 31); in view of the Greek compound αὐτόματος 'self-willed'—or should we explain as αὐτό-ματ-ος 'of self will', gen.-ablv., raised to a nominative, as Latin *penitus* 'from within' becomes *penitus* 'inner'?—; may we not seek for the Sanskrit possessive compounds in -*mat*- a derivation from the stem *man-t*-? Cf. *manyu-mát*- 'furious-minded, full of fury' *mantu-mat*- 'counsel-minded, full of counsel'.

The development of the sense of numerousness in the Skr. suffix -*mant*- 'rich in' may be illustrated by the signification of Gr. μένος 'force' (:Skr. *mánas* 'mind, will'), for the notion 'force' suggests that of number very naturally, as we may see from Latin *vis* = *multitudo*, and English *force* 'a troop of soldiers'.

V QUINTUS: QUINCTUS.

The issue whether -*nct*- is the normal or an analogical form in these words has long since been joined, and the handbooks adequately represent the discussion. The whole issue seems to me to have been created by the old over-insistence on the blindness of the phonetic laws. Now that the blindness is a little less of a shibboleth, methodologically considered, it may well be that the phonetic questions touching the greater or less compression of awkward consonant groups may be left to settlement by the principle of relative speed of utterance in the *allegro* and *lento* dialects,—which hardly differs in this problem from saying the relative distinctness of utterance in individuals.

My present purpose, however, is not to go into deep questions of method in phonetics, but humbly to call attention to the Plautine passages:

and
> quincto quoque sulco (Trin. 524, *A*)
>
> quincto anno quoque (Merc. 66, *B*. quicto, *alii* quinto)

in contrast with *quinto*- in all the other Plautine passages, so far as Leo's apparatus and the Lemaire index furnish a means of control. Is it not likely that *quincto quoque* owes its phonetic peculiarity to an alliterative or rhythmic impulse?

The common occurrence of the name-forms of which Quinctius may be taken as the sample may suggest another, and now a social, impulse to preserve the group -*nct*-, viz., the conservative spelling of proper names; cf. the names *Johnston* and *Campbell*, sometimes pronounced (chiefly by persons enjoying these names) in accordance with the orthography.

VI CULPA, CULTER.

I propose to connect *culpa* with the verbs *scalpit, sculpat* 'scratches, marks, cuts', and to define by 'blemish', 'stigma'; cf. *nota* 'mark', 'reproach', 'disgrace'.

The explanation of *culter* from a stem **certro-* (:κείρει 'shears') is an excellent suggestion of Skutsch's. Another admissible explanation may, however, be presented, viz.: from a stem **sculptro-*, with loss of *p* in the heavy consonant group.

It can hardly be decided from Capt. 266, ad cultros adtinet 'he's reaching for the shears', that 'shears' was the original sense of *culter;* rather is it a special sense of the plural of *culter* 'knife' (six times in Plautus), cf. *habenae* 'reins': *habena* 'strap'.

VIII POPULUS, POPULARI.

The following suggestion as to the etymology of *populus* and *populari* will perhaps satisfy those who do not feel attracted by the 'dialectic' explanation that derives *populus* from **quoqlo-:* Sk. *cakrá-* 'wheel', a wheel-shaped formation of the army: cf., for the signification only, *corona* 'audience', but also a circular military formation.

Altogether the safest definition to adopt for *populus* seems to me to be 'army' (cf. *magister populi*), but 'army' as a 'fighting division', a 'detachment'. So the German word *Schar*, originally a division of an army, has come to mean in general 'multitudo'. I would therefore derive *populus* from *po-* (cf. *pono, po-lio*) and *pello* 'drive', whence *populus* = 'driving off',—a raiding party: cf. *populari* 'to raid'. For *populus* as a subdivision of *gens* cf. Livy, 6. 12. 4: simile veri est . . . aut non ex iisdem semper populis exercitus scriptos, quanquam eadem semper gens bellum intulerit, aut etc.; cf. also Aen. 10. 200 sq.

POSTSCRIPT: The Editor of this Journal calls my attention to the British giant pair, Gog and Magog, which seems to have geminated from Gogmagog. Statues in Guildhall, known as Gog and Magog, are now understood to be statues of Gogmagog and Corineus. The name, Gogmagog, in turn, seems to owe its origin to " Gog of the land of Magog " (Ezekiel, 38. 2).

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REVIEWS AND BOOK NOTICES.

Religion und Kultus der Römer, von GEORG WISSOWA, Ord. Professor an der Universität Halle. Pp. xii, 534. München, 1902. Beck.

In a field of study in which there has been manifested for the past century a constantly increasing interest, and which has been, especially of late years (for it is only within comparatively recent years that the spirit of scholarship has with any measure of success searched the deep things of the Roman gods) the subject of so rapid a development, it is only natural that no work can long remain authority. Marquardt's Religion der Römer, first published in 1878, had been in use but a scant half dozen years when a revision became necessary; and the second edition of that work had hardly appeared when it became manifest that a new statement of the whole subject would soon be demanded. August Reifferscheid was looked to for the performance of the task, but his death occurring before the work had been begun, Georg Wissowa, who had been the reviser of Marquardt's work, and who had since 1882 shown a brilliant and productive activity in the field of Roman religion, entered in 1887 upon the preparation of the desired work, which has at length appeared, after a space of fifteen years, as Vol. V 4 of Müllers Handbuch der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft, under the title of Die Religion und Kultus der Römer.

The knowledge that so long a period of time has been devoted to one work by a scholar who, even at the beginning of his undertaking, was already *spectatissimus*, justly arouses great expectations. It is sufficient praise for the author to say that these expectations are met by his work and that the conviction that the work was needed has been fully justified. Wissowa has brought to the performance of his task a thorough command of ancient sources, both literary, epigraphic, and monumental, as thorough a familiarity with the results of modern scholarship, and, above all, a measure of enthusiasm and devotion which has made it impossible for him to slight any part of his arduous undertaking; and the result is a work which is clear, comprehensive, and conservative, which is as nearly up-to-date as it is possible for a work to be in this field, and which shows a degree of scholarly ability of which even a nation of scholars may be proud.

In the arrangement of his matter, Wissowa is not only logical and orderly, but original. After an introduction, in which he touches on (1) the difficulties of investigation in the field of

Roman religion, obscured as it is not only by lack of positive evidence, but much more by the superimposed strata of foreign religions, (2) the ancient sources, and (3) the history of modern investigation in the subject, he enters upon the body of his work. He devotes Part I to an Ueberblick über den Entwicklungsgang der römischen Religion, dividing it into four sections, each treating a single well-defined period: (1) the most ancient time, extending up to the construction of the Capitoline temple; (2) to the second Punic war; (3) to the end of the Republic; (4) the Empire.

Part II, Die Götter der römischen Staatsreligion, is divided into sections on (1) *Di indigetes*, (2) *Di novensides* of Italian origin, (3) *Di novensides* of Greek origin, (4) Neugeschaffene Gottheiten, and (5) *Sacra peregrina*. If we find grouped under *Di novensides* of Italian provenience such deities as Castor and Pollux and Hercules, it is because the author makes his basis of division not the original home of the cult, but the language and geographic identity of the city whence it is brought to Rome. Under Neugeschaffene Gottheiten are included such peculiarly Roman creations as Honos, Fides, and other personifications of abstract ideas, Dea Roma, and the Divi Imperatores. In the section on *Sacra peregrina*, it is to be noted that The Great Mother of the Gods is excluded from the list of Oriental divinities because of her having been adopted by the State immediately upon her arrival in 204.

Part III, Die Formen der Götterverehrung, is in ten subdivisions: (1) Sacralrechtliche Grundlagen, treating of the relations between deity and man and the forms by which these relations were to be kept in proper balance; (2) Die gottesdienstlichen Handlungen: the sacrifice and attendant ceremonies, the *lectisternium*, the *supplicatio*, the procession, the *saeculum* and its festivities; (3) Die Festzeiten: the *feriae* and their dates, *dies nefasti, fasti, religiosi*, anniversaries of days important in the lives of Julius and Augustus; (4) Die Spiele; (5) Die Oertlichkeiten des Kultus: *fana, profana*; (6) Die Priesterordnung; (7) Das Pontificalcollegium; (8) Die Augures; (9) Die *Quindecimviri sacris faciundis* und die Haruspices; (10) Die priesterlichen Sodalitäten.

Appended is a table giving the Roman Festkalender, another giving a list of the Roman State temples, an index of names and subject matter, and finally an index of passages and inscriptions to which the author has called special attention by emendation or explanation.

The most striking difference between the plan adopted by Wissowa and that employed in the work of Marquardt lies in the former's treatment of individual deities. Instead of presenting them briefly and more or less imperfectly in the course of his narrative, Wissowa has given a special place to each deity, devoting over two-fifths of his whole work to this phase of the

subject. More than this, by his grouping of deities according to their provenience, he has distinguished clearly between those features native to Rome and those which were the effect of outside influence.

Apart from the matter of arrangement, there is naturally a second difference lying in the greater completeness with which the whole subject is presented. By reason of the great advance in the knowledge of Roman religion in recent years, it has been made possible for Wissowa not only to present with great fullness of detail the deities and their worship, but to set forth with the greatest clearness the steps in the historic process of their rise, development, and decay.

Clearness is the distinctive feature of Wissowa's presentation, both in whole and in part. By treating the deities of the Roman world separately under *di indigetes* and *di novensides*, and by still further dividing the latter into gods of Italian, Greek, late-Roman, and Oriental provenience, he has given us a presentation in which the deities representing the various elements in Roman religion stand out in bold and clear relief. For the first time [1] we see set forth in all distinctness the native divinities of the old-Roman world before outside influence made them unrecognizable. The exceeding Romanness of Roman gods is made plain to him that runs.

It is above all in his Ueberblick über den Entwicklungsgang der römischen Religion (Part I) that Wissowa displays his ability to present his material in clear, logical, and orderly succession. To the student interested in the development of human ideas the following of this narrative as it conducts us by consecutive and clearly defined steps from the earliest known beginnings, mingled with the mists of prehistoric times, down through the whole religious history of Rome, cannot be other than fascinating; while to the specialist it affords a solid, up-to-date foundation on which to base his work of research. While but few years since it seemed impossible to see a regular process in the history of the Roman religion, it is now possible to trace its development without missing a link in the chain. A brief abstract will show the excellence of this part of the work, both as to the method of the author and the results now at our disposal in this field of study :

I. Aelteste Zeit. 3. Die *di indigetes*. The *di indigetes* formed at the beginning of history a definite and unalterable circle of native divinities, as to whose identity we are only partially able to inform ourselves by using with circumspectness as aids fragments of ancient ritual, the names of priesthoods descended from prehistoric times, and, most important of all, the *Fasti anni Romani.* An incomplete circle of thirty-two native deities can be reconstructed in this manner. Several characteristics may be deter-

[1] The less ambitious but excellent work of Emil Aust, Münster i. W. 1899, was inspired by Wissowa, and owes its method to him.

mined: grouping by pairs, such as Consus and Ops, Janus and Vesta; the subordination of certain gods, *famuli divi*; the existence of rank among the chief deities.

4. Allgemeiner Charakter der alt-römischen Religion. The native Roman deities were worshipped by a simple, hard-working, agricultural and pastoral people who saw in the objects of their reverence neither the direct forces of nature nor the embodiment of ethical ideals. No traces existed as yet of the personification of abstract ideas. The old-Roman deities were practical beings who presided over every act of the daily life of every member of the community—his life at his hearth and in his field, in peace and in war, his going forth and his coming in, his downsitting and his uprising. The tendency to specialization already existed: Jupiter's province was especially the heavens, Tellus was embodied in the earth tilled by the farmer, war fell to Mars, Janus was guardian of the door, Vesta of the hearth and home. So minute became the division of activities that the number of gods was as great as the number of acts of daily life. Hence the *indigitamenta*. There were no genealogies, as among the Greek gods; rank depended only upon the time of creation or the greatness of service. Neither were there marriages among the gods. They were not represented in human form. Agriculture, cattle-raising, and war were the occupations of their subjects. Portunus shows that the Tiber was used, but neither the sea, nor commerce, nor politics had yet entered into the life of the people.

5. Alter und Entstehung der ältesten Götterordnung. Simple and primitive as was the religion of that time, it was the result of a long historic process whose earliest stages will forever remain unknown to us, since even the most authoritative of ancient writers are as lacking in trustworthiness in their accounts of religious as of political history. Nor is it less difficult to determine what deities were of purely Roman or Latin origin and what were of Italic origin. The original *Fasti*, however, must have come into existence sometime after the Romans became distinct from the Latin tribes, for those festivals which are peculiarly Roman occupy the most prominent positions. The growth of the city can also be followed in such ceremonies as the Lupercalia and the Septimontium. The *terminus post quem* of the *Fasti* is indicated by the absence of Diana and the Capitoline Trinity. For the sake of something formal, then, we may follow ancient writers and take the name of Numa as representing the origin of the system in the *Fasti*.

6. Die Formen der ältesten Götterverehrung. The oft-quoted statement that for over one hundred and seventy years the Romans possessed no cult-statues is confirmed by the character of the deities themselves, who were inseparable from those objects in which they manifested their activities. None but those deities who were less easily comprehended ever had even a symbol to denote them, as, e. g., the flint for Jupiter, the spear for Mars;

and these symbols were of the nature of priestly equipment, and not objects in which the gods were worshipped. But few of these ancient deities were represented in human form even at a later period, and that only under Greek influence. The temple, too, in the form of human habitation, came only in the train of the deity in human guise; for the grove and the cave were the Roman god's first temples. Private worship was but a simpler form of public worship, performed for the most part without priestly intervention. All forms of worship were characterized by extreme simplicity as far as equipment was concerned. Bloodless offerings, especially cakes, were the most prominent at first, though animals were sacrificed as early as Numa's time. The ritualistic dance, the sacred race, and the procession were frequent accompaniments of the sacrifice. But together with extreme simplicity of equipment went extreme complexity and difficulty of ceremonial. The Roman god was a jealous god, and the slightest error in ritual, even a mispronounced word, vitiated the whole, and necessitated the repetition of the entire ceremony. The ritual as it existed was in its final form and remained the same *per omnia saecula saeculorum;* hence it was that formulae in use at a late period, notably those of the Salii and Fratres Arvales, had become so antiquated as to be incomprehensible even to men of learning. The same effort at accuracy is to be seen in such phrases as *sive deus sive dea, di deaeque omnes,* etc.

II. Bis zum zweiten punischen Kriege. 7. Die Gründung des capitolinischen Heiligtumes und die gleichzeitigen Neuerungen. The growth of Rome in size and importance and her altered political relations are clearly to be seen in the religious field. The establishment of the Diana cult on the Aventine as a worship common to all Latins, the creation or renewal of the festival on the Alban Mount and the building in the same place of the temple of Jupiter Latiaris, the displacement of the ancient trinity of Jupiter, Mars, and Quirinus by the Capitoline trinity, the construction of the Capitoline temple, the introduction of the Sibylline Books, the institution of the *duumviri sacris faciundis* are all manifestations of a great change. The absolute sway of the *di indigetes* has been broken; deities from non-Roman parts of the peninsula have found their way into the Roman system, and even the period of the *di novensides* of extra-Italian provenience has begun. Hellenic influence is beginning to operate strongly. The time of this movement corresponds roughly with the time indicated by tradition, which vaguely places a great religious change at the end of the regal period—during the reign of the Tarquinii.

8. Die Erweiterung des Kreises der römischen Staatsgötter. In proportion as Rome extended her territory and influence she increased the number of her gods. Through conquest, *evocatio,* trade-relations, and adoption of cults already existing in strength among foreign communities within the city, the roll of her deities rapidly increased. Foreign gods of Italian provenience were

admitted to the State system with facility, well known and under-
stood as they were; but with deities from without the borders of
Italy the practice was different. Recognizing the danger arising
from the admission of cults representing morals and practices
differing from her own, the State gave the matter into the charge
of a special commission, and such cults as were admitted to the
State religion were kept under priests native to the cult itself,
which was denied admission to the area within the pomerium,
at least to the end of this period. But the multiplication of deities
was the result not only of admission from without; it was also the
result of increase from within. The tendency to specialization in
divine functions resulted in such multiplications as Jupiter Stator,
Jupiter Feretrius, Juno Lucina, Juno Moneta, etc. Abstractions
began to be deified, as Fides, Bellona. The large list of temples
founded from the beginning of the Republic on is evidence of the
throng of new deities arising, and at the same time of the dying
out of many of the old cults; for but few of the ancient native
deities who had possessed merely shrines now received temples,
and the ignorance of them displayed by Roman authorities shows
plainly that they sank fromsight in remote antiquity.

9. Die Aufnahme italischer und griechischer Gottheiten. The
reception of Diana from Aricia was the forerunner of many sim-
ilar admissions of Italian cults: the Dioscuri from Tusculum,
Hercules from Tibur, etc. The numerous admissions of Greek
deities during the first decades of the Republic indicate a strong
tide of Hellenic influence at the period of the transition from the
regal to the Republican form of government. After this period
it is not until 300 that other Greek deities gain admission. The
influence exercised by them is shown by the fact that they are
known by double names, after the style of Mercurius-Hermes, or
are actually identified with the native deities.

10. Vermehrung der Götter durch Spaltung und durch Ver-
göttlichung abstrakter Begriffe. The multiplication of deities
through specialization of their activities had its origin partly in
the fact that they were susceptible of being regarded in many
different aspects and partly in the fact that many a deity who
existed in various neighboring communities under the same name
but with widely different character found a home at Rome and
was worshipped there under each aspect. Juno, for example,
was Quiritis at Falerii, Lucina in Latium, Moneta on the Arx,
and Regina at Veii. The rise of abstract deities is accounted for
by the fact that many deities possessed strong virtues and activi-
ties which were regarded as worthy of embodiment as deities
themselves. As a consequence independent virtues which were
highly prized were treated in the same way, and there arose
Spes, Concordia, Pudicitia, Pietas, etc. Occasionally cults arose
as a consequence of vows made in critical moments, as those of
Febris and Tempestas, or from thankfulness for warning and
danger averted, as that of Aius Locutius or Deus Rediculus.

11. Die äusseren Formen des Staatskultus. The change in the outward forms of religion is great. Temples, with cult statues, take the place of unpretentious shrines and altars. Many cults begin to play a political role: the temple of Saturn contains the treasury, the temples of Ceres and Castor and Pollux stand for the plebs and the equites respectively, the guild of merchants has Mercury as its patron. Public daily life thus becomes closely connected with the public religion. Public participation in the forms of religion is also greater. The games, the ceremonies of the *sellisternia, lectisternia,* and *supplicatio* are shared by the body of the citizens either as spectators or as actual participants. The State itself even orders participation on the part of the public on occasions, as in the decreeing of fasts. Of necessity the religious morale of the people is weakened. Games and sacred processions become secularized in the minds of the populace, who look upon them as merely entertainment. At the end of this period, too, the consulting of Etruscan haruspices regarding prodigies and expiatory offerings occurs with increasing frequency. The sacrifice of human beings—*Gallus et Galla, Graecus et Graeca, Argei*—is first performed during this period, in obedience to Greek oracular direction, and Greek mysteries find their way to Rome.

III. Bis zum Ausgange der Republik. 12. Die Hellenisierung des Kultus. The year 217 marks an epoch: Hellenic influence, at work for centuries, at last becomes supreme. In the lectisternium of this year Jupiter and Juno, Neptune and Minerva, Mars and Venus, Apollo and Diana, Vulcan and Vesta, Mercury and Ceres are the deities honored—a twelve corresponding to the Greek twelve, forming a new Roman circle grouped not with reference to origin but according to Greek myth and Greek cult relations. The line between *di indigetes* and *di novensides* is no longer drawn, and these twelve deities are given official recognition and receive the name of *di consentes.* In the same year Venus Erycina and Mars are admitted to the Capitol, and the line of the pomerium is thus crossed for the first time by deities of foreign origin. Accompanying Greek deities came Greek literature and philosophy, Greek morals and Greek art. Whenever possible, Greek cult statues were used to represent Hellenized Roman deities, often with the result of confusing the identity of their gods in the mind of the Romans; for though statues of Hermes and Zeus might represent with reasonable accuracy Mercury and Jupiter, the representation of Dius Fidius by a statue of Apollo or of the Penates by the statues of the Dioscuri could result only in confusion. The results of Hellenic influence began to be manifest in the general decrease in importance and the falling away of the ancient deities and their simple and unexciting rites. The gaudy and emotional rites of the new régime took their place. But elements other than Hellenic find their way to Rome. The Great Mother of the Gods is admitted

6

in 204, uniting in her cult the sensuality of the Greek with the orgiastic tendencies of the Orient. The danger threatened by her worship was not less because it was admitted as a Greek cult, established on the Palatine, within the pomerium, as a State cult, and favored by patrician and plebeian alike. In her wake came other Eastern deities of the same nature. The suppression of the Bacchanalia and the banishment of the Chaldaei are indications as to the tendencies of the time. So familiar had the people become with the strangely attractive rites and doctrines of the East that Mithras, Ma, and Isis could find ready entrance in their time.

13. Litteratur und Wissenschaft. Yet the Hellenization of Roman religion would be incomprehensible did we not take into account the part played by Greek literature and science. The poet, historian, and antiquary transfer Greek names to Roman deities, and Greek myths are naturalized on Latin soil. Very slight resemblances sufficed for the identification of Greek and Roman deities, and Varro, who finally embodied in his Antiquitates Rerum Divinarum the results of the science of religion, was apparently successful in making clear to the Roman mind the identity of the gods of the two nations.

After literature came philosophy to rob the gods of Rome of their title to reverence. Besides the names, genealogies, and myths which he learned from the Greek, the Roman also learned from the same source how to conceive of natural forces behind the forms of his gods. The danger felt from this source is indicated by the suppression in 181 of the so-called books of Numa, probably Pythagorean, and the banishment of philosophers in 173, 161, and 155. But the tide could not be stemmed, and cosmic philosophy, Euhemerism, Epicureanism, and especially Stoicism entered into a rich inheritance among the Romans.

14. Verfall der Staatsreligion. The inevitable result followed: the transfer of Hellenic names and qualities to the impersonal and abstract native Roman gods confused the vision and corrupted the faith of the masses; while science and philosophy undermined the belief of the cultured classes, with the result that the incumbents of the priestly offices approached the performance of their duties with anything but the proper spirit. From the Gracchi on the whole national cult, public and private, rapidly decays. The reform of Augustus might better be called an actual construction at first hand than a restoration.

IV. Die Religion der Kaiserzeit. 15. Die religiösen Reformen des Augustus. Vigorous and far-reaching as the reforms of Augustus were, they nevertheless resulted in the establishment of worship on Greek rather than Roman lines. The most significant of his reforms were the taking to himself of the office of Pontifex Maximus, the restoration of Vesta and the Lares to a high place, and the grouping of the public worship about the Genius Augusti in like manner as private worship centered about the Genius of the master of the house. The most important cults

in his eyes were those of Apollo, Vesta Augusta, Mars Ultor, and the imperial cult in the Aedes Divi Iulii.

16. Die religiösen Verhältnisse in den beiden ersten Jahrhunderten der Kaiserzeit. Two distinct movements characterized the Roman religion in this period. First, the elaboration of the imperial cult as it had begun in the cult of Julius and of the Genius Augusti. The number of State deities was increased by a long list of Divi Imperatores, and the State religion developed into something like a court religion. Second, as a result of military and commercial life, the gods of Rome find their way into all parts of the world. But it is to be noted that the gods of the provinces were not fully identical with the gods at Rome; for the Roman, willingly seeing in the barbarous gods of the provinces his own gods, combined them with his own, with the result that though the same deity might be known under one name and worship throughout the Roman world, he might nevertheless vary widely in character. A national religion therefore existed only in form.

17. Die Zeit der Auflösung seit der Antoninen. The beginning of the final downfall was occasioned by the entrance of the Egyptian and Oriental religions. Existing at first as private, and excluded from the pomerium, they nevertheless developed such strength as to be prominent objects of either love or hatred to different Emperors. Caracalla finally admitted Isis within the walls and made her a State deity. And then came the deluge. It now became possible to say in all truth that other peoples had their own gods, but that the Roman people worshipped the gods of all the world. Ma-Bellona, Dolichenus, Atargatis, Deus Sol Elagabal, Sol Invictus, and especially Mithras, with a host of less important deities from the East, spring into prominence. All have in common the tendency to mysticism, and all insist that the truth is theirs alone, and that all other religions are included in their own. The old gods of the State are submerged, and even the deification of Emperors is so common as to be no longer of great importance. Emperors began to associate themselves with particular deities, and the claim of actual divinity by living Emperors would have resulted had not the struggle with Christianity interfered.

18. Das Ende der römischen Religion. The claim of infallibility and completeness on the part of every one of the Eastern religions was incompatible with the existence of the State system. Christianity, however, opposing them both, forced both to unite in a deadly struggle with itself. Three generations from the edict of 311 sufficed for the downfall of Paganism. Rome was its strongest fortress. The refusal of Gratian in 375 to accept the time-honored title of Pontifex Maximus; the confiscation of temple property in 382; the heroic opposition of the Roman nobility; the restoration and final overthrow under Eugenius—are all steps in the gallant but unsuccessful contest. The opening of

the fifth century found it possible for Stilicho to burn the Sibylline Books. The remnants of the old régime still existed, but only in private worship and in out of the way places. Certain ceremonies lingered on in Spain up to the end of the sixth century, but the last example of Pagan rites in Italy was the worship of Apollo at Casinum, which in 529 met a violent end at the hands of Saint Benedict.

The clearness and orderliness of Wissowa's presentation will appeal to everyone. This is of course not the first time that the progress of Roman religion has been sketched; but it is the first time it has been set forth with such admirable precision and completeness. The clearness with which each set of conditions in the progression is seen to emerge from the complexity of preceding conditions and to lose itself in the shifting which brings in the succeeding set is unparalleled in the treatment of this subject. So closely related are the various movements seen to be that any division of the religious history of Rome into epochs seems arbitrary.

It is inevitable, in a work of such dimensions, and in one which embodies the results of so many detailed investigations, that some conclusions will be disputed. The statement (p. 354) that human sacrifice first made its appearance as a result of Greek influence will not be accepted by everyone. Mommsen regards the introduction of the Magna Mater in 204 as an event "making in fact an epoch in the world's history," while Wissowa makes the *lectisternium* of 217 the beginning of an epoch. Cumont is now of the opinion that the *taurobolium* was primitively connected with the cult of Bellona in Asia (Revue d'Histoire et de Littérature religieuses VI, 2 (1901)), while he is quoted by Wissowa as conjecturing in 1888 that its origin lay in the worship of Persian Anahîta.

Wissowa, however, foresees that criticism of his work will be rather the consequence of what he has omitted than of what he has said: "Viele werden enttäuscht sein wenn sie in diesem Buche so manches nicht finden was sie erwarteten." He is thinking especially of the study of religion by the comparative method, from which he refrains throughout, on the ground that it is a dangerous method to employ in dealing with so complex a phenomenon as Roman religion, and that, while it has proven effective in master hands, in the majority of cases it has only led to error, because the time for its use was not yet ripe. Wissowa's aim has been to supply the need of a solid foundation on which to base all special attempts to illuminate the religious history of Rome, and it is in this spirit that we must take his work. Some will miss the fullness of citation from ancient authors which characterizes Marquardt. Many would have been glad to find a fuller treatment of the period of transition from Hellenic to Oriental predominance, and from Paganism to Christianity. Others would have liked more emphasis on the part of the Oriental religions in making straight the way for Christianity. It would have

been interesting to be told of the survival of Pagan elements in the new religion; but Dr. Wissowa has consistently withheld his hand and has not allowed himself to be tempted to seek after strange gods. He has kept constantly in view the character of his work, excluded whatever was unessential, and left it for its own proper time and place. He displays a well-balanced conservatism.

We suspect that what we have said regarding clearness will be appreciated less by the ordinary American reader than by those to whom Wissowa's tongue is native. The learned author has taken advantage of the genius of his language to compress his ideas and present them tightly packed together in the most concentrated form, and most of our countrymen who attempt to dash across a page of his work will find themselves inclined to agree at first sight with the sentiment of Lowell: "Aber potztausend Donnerwetter! What a language it is! With sentences in which one sets sail like an admiral with sealed orders, not knowing where the devil he is going to till he is in mid-ocean!" or with another American gentleman who declares that "the Germans dive down deeper, stay under longer, and come up muddier" than any other nationality in the world. But it is true, nevertheless, that Wissowa's work is a model of orderly, clear, and unequivocal presentation to the nationality for which it is intended. Such harmony is in immortal souls.

The outlook for the study of Roman religion has been made distinctly brighter by Wissowa's work. By so effectively separating the native Roman from the Hellenic element he has brought into relief the individuality of the Roman religion. The Roman is coming into his own. Wissowa's work will prove one of the most powerful factors in correcting the shallow view according to which Roman religion, literature, and art were all only "pale reflexes" of the religion, literature, and art of Greece, with no individuality of their own.

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A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles. Edited by J. A. H. MURRAY and HENRY BRADLEY. Vol. III, Letter D, Vol. IV, Letters F and G, Vol. V, Letters H, I, J, K and Vol. VI, L-Lock. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, 1894–1903.

The recent receipt of Parts 1–4 of Volume VI, L-Lock, the fourth dated January 1, 1903, of Part 1, Vol. VII, O-Onomastic, and Part 1, Vol. VIII, all of Q, dated July 1 and Oct. 1, 1902, of the New English Dictionary, reminds me that some years have elapsed since this great work was noticed in the Journal. The Part Crouchmas-Czech, completing Vol. II, was noticed in Vol. XV, pp. 82–85, 1894, and the Part Everybody-Ezod, completing the letter E, in Vol. XVI, pp. 97–99, 1895. The letter D was

subsequently issued, the Parts extending from Oct. 1, 1894 to July 1, 1897, and with E forming Vol. III; the Parts of the letter F extended from Jan. 1, 1895 to Jan. 1, 1898, and of the letter G from Jan. 1, 1898 to Jan. 1, 1901, together forming Vol. IV; the Parts comprising the letters H, I, J and K extended from April 1, 1898 to Oct. 1, 1901, and form Vol. V, and four Parts, L-Lock, April 1, 1901 to January 1, 1903, of Vol. VI, which will comprise L-N, have also appeared. Two other Parts, 1 of Vol. VII, and 1 of Vol. VIII, have recently been received, as mentioned above.

By some unfortunate mishap, doubtless chargeable to the mails, the Part of the letter G from Germanizing to Glass-Coach, and that of the letter H from Hod to Horizontality, which should have come to hand in 1899, have never reached the Journal, hence our copy is incomplete to that extent.

The enlisting of Mr. Henry Bradley as active editor has hastened the completion of the letters, and we are informed that "the remainder of the work, to the end of the alphabet, is in an advanced state of preparation." This is good news, and as the rate of issue of the several Parts has been accelerated, we trust that a kind Providence may spare us to see the end of the work, which has now been in course of publication since 1884.

The plan of the work is familiar to all readers of this Journal. As an illustration of the encyclopaedic character of the volumes, we find it stated in a prefatory note to the Part L to Lap that in this thin Part of 64 pages 2160 words are recorded, whereas Johnson has but 176, Cassell, 959, the Century, 1169, and the Standard, 1323; 1783 of these words are illustrated by 7576 quotations, whereas Richardson has but 411.

The historical character of the work leads us to look for the oldest use of a word in the first quotations. It is therefore surprising to find under 'Dyspepsia' 1657 as the first date, and that from a Dictionary, whereas Phillips, 1701, is the first writer that appears to have used the word. Even the alternative 'Dyspepsy' is not traced further back than 1656. Is it possible that our Elizabethan ancestors were strangers to this common ill to which flesh is heir in these modern days? If not so, what did they call it? Even 'Disury' ('Disuria') is traced back to Trevisa, 1398. We might have expected to find both words in Chaucer, but Professor Skeat's Glossary fails to substantiate our expectations, and even Stratmann deserts us also, as does Macaulay's Glossary to Gower. The common derivation of *dig* from O. E. *dician* is rejected on account both of the quantity of the root-vowel and the final consonant of the root. It is probably from Old French *diguer*, and both may go back to the same Teutonic root. It is not traced beyond the early 14th century. No earlier example of 'Diphtheria' is given than 1857, French *diphthérie*, substituted by Bretonneau for his earlier term *diphthérite*, first used by him in 1821 in a paper before the French Academy, and taken into English and German medical literature.

It is gratifying to know that nearly six volumes have been completed, extending almost through L, and a beginning made of volumes VII and VIII, O and Q, although we have not received any Part of the letters M and N, which have been entrusted to Mr. Bradley, nor of the letter P, which will be treated by Dr. Murray. A third collaborator has been enlisted, Mr. W. A. Craigie, M. A., who has completed Q in the last Part received of Vol. VIII and will treat R and S, also included in Vol. VIII. "Volumes IX and X will contain the later portion of the letter S, and the letters T-Z," so we can at last see daylight.

The space to which this long-delayed notice must be limited will permit but few illustrations. There are examples of the use of *Kaiser (Keiser)* from the late Old English (Hatton Gospels, 1160) on, but the modern form is directly adopted from the German, where it represents "the normal *Keiser* of the 17th century." Carlyle's influence is distinctly seen in the common use of this word. His erroneous etymology of *King* as the "able-man" is not, however, endorsed, even though it has been perpetuated in a book on Rhetoric to illustrate "how important or significant the origin and history of a word may become in the writer's usage." Carlyle was not an etymologist and writers on Rhetoric should recognize that fact. *King* (O. E. *cyning*) is from 'Kin' (O. E. *cynn*), and = "scion of the kin, race, or tribe," or, as some prefer, "son or descendant of one of (noble) birth," Hence it should no longer do duty as the "able-man," however *able* a king may be. Examples of the use of *King* extend from A. D. 855 on; it was already shortened from *cyning* in Old English times, A. D. 971. 'Kickshaw(s)' (French *quelque chose*) is not traced back earlier than Shakspere. We find its original sense, "A fancy dish in cookery," in 2 Henry IV, vi, 1, 29, and its more general use, "a toy, trifle," in Twelfth Night, i, 3, 122; Florio (1598) uses the form *quelque chose*, and Cotgrave (1611) *quelkchoses*, which distinctly show its etymology, and prove that Shakspere picked up this new word "to adorn a tale," as did Fletcher also. *Lie*, substantive and verb, with its affixes fills sixteen columns, and furnishes an excellent example of the thoroughness of Mr. Bradley's work, from Beowulf—as to the date of which poem he does not risk a conjecture, although he gives several examples from it—to 1899, quoting from The Nation: "If McKinley would *lie off* for the next four years, he might make a very good free-trade candidate for the Presidency in 1904."

It is very interesting to trace the forms and uses of *Lief*, especially in its two main idiomatic uses, the impersonal with *be* and the personal with *have*, from Aelfric (A. D. 1000) to William Browne (1614), although I doubt not that the idiom with *be* may be traced later. Aelfric has "*Leofre me is þaet*," etc., and Browne "*Lever me were be slaine*, etc." Mr. Bradley says: "In *I'd, you'd, he'd* (etc.) *as lief*, the ambiguous contraction is probably taken to represent *would* rather than *had*. ... Actual instances with *had*

might still occur, but only as archaic or dialectic." This seems to me questionable, for we find several examples with *have* and none with *will*, so that analogy is against this view. The South English Legendary (1290) has "ich habbe leouere þat" and "hadde ich leouere" etc. So King Alexander, "hadde lever," and William of Palerne (1350), "I have lever;" Scottish Legends of Saints (1375) "He had als lef be ded" etc. Examples from Chaucer and Gower occur, as (1386) Chaucer, Merchant's Tale, "Leuere ich hadde to dyen etc.," and Monk's Prologue "I hadde leuere than a barel ale that etc."; the idiom with *have* has survived to the present day. Examples of the use of *would* are found under the adverb *Lief*. Mr. Bradley says: "The adverb use originated chiefly from the misinterpretation of phrases like "I had as lief, I had liever, in which *would* appears instead of *had* as early as the 13th century." One of the earliest examples is from the Mirrour of our Ladye 29 (1450–1530): "They that wolde leuer be in the quier;" so 1598, R. Bernard, tr. Terence 213: "Now see whether of these two conditions you would leaver have;" 1814, Jefferson, Writings (1830) IV, 223: I would as lieve not have to encounter." Here the proximity of *have* might have influenced the change to *would*, but we find in 1766, Mrs. F. Sheridan, Sidney Biddulph, IV, 311: "I had as lief have let it alone." Thackeray has, 1852, Esmond, i, vi, "I would as lief go there as anywhere," but Tennyson, 1876, Queen Mary, iii, 1; "Far liefer had I in my country hall been reading some old book," perhaps in imitation of Elizabethan diction. The last example we have is from the Pall Mall Magazine, 1898, June, 220 ... "than which she would liefer have died;" here again the proximity of *have* may have influenced the usage. When we find 'I'd,' 'I had liefer' explain it as 'I had;' if it is 'I'ld,' 'I would liefer' resolve it into the later 'I would,' so, as both are used, we may take our choice.

In the first Part of Vol. VII, O-Onomastic, the remarks on the pronunciation of O deserve attention. No less than eight variations of O are noted. Dr. Murray says that M. E. close *ō* (O. E. *ó*) "about the end of the M. E., or beginning of the Mod. Eng., period passed into the sound of (*ū*), usually with the spelling *oo*, though sometimes with the simple *o* spelling, as in the words *do, to, lose;*" so .Dr. Murray agrees with some other orthoepists in pronouncing *to* as *do*, but shorter, phonetically "*tu dū*," but in this country, especially in the South, "the normal sound of long *ō*, as in *no, toe, bone*," is given to *to* also; this must have been the sound of O. E. *tō*—not *tó*. This long sound of *ō* after *r* "in London and the South of England ... is usually identified with *ọ̄*,"—"not, however, in the educated speech of the country as a whole, *nor in America*," italics mine. In a review of Storm's Englische Philologie in this Journal (II 488) some years ago, I had occasion to comment on this difference of pronunciation, *vs.* Sweet, for here 'mourn' is never confounded with 'morn,' and I am glad to be sustained by Dr. Murray's authority. Under *One*

(O. E. *án*) we find that this sound "became in south. and midl. dial. *ŏn*, exemplified before 1200. By 15th c. *ŏn*, *oon*, in s. w. and west., had developed an initial *w*, which only occasionally appears in the spelling, but is now the standard pronunciation. The first orthoepist to refer to it was apparently Jones, 1701: earlier grammarians, down to Cooper, 1685, give to 'one' the sound that it has in 'alone', 'atone,' and 'only'; Dyche in 1710 has *ǫn* beside *wǫn*." Therefore, we have been writing *one* and saying *wun* for only two hundred years, according to the orthoepists, but the examples of the spelling 'won' go back to 1420, the time at which Dr. Murray says that the initial *w* was developed—another illustration of a blunder that has established itself in pronunciation in our phonetically irregular speech. It deserves remark in passing that we find no notice taken of the pronunciation 'ǫnly,' as in *on* (for *ō²nly*, as in *atone*), heard so often nowadays, hence it must be relegated to incorrect speech. We note that in this Part there are 3565 words to 2086 in the "Standard" and 1965 in the "Century", of which number 2911 are illustrated by quotations to 181 in the "Standard" and 621 in the "Century," the quotations numbering in all 14,276 to 244 only in the "Standard" and 1938 in the "Century," so the New English Dictionary continues to maintain its preëminence as a thesaurus of the language.

The whole of the letter Q is comprised in Part 1, Vol. VIII, prepared by Mr. Craigie, and it comprises 2729 words to 971 in the "Standard" and 1058 in the "Century;" 2253 are illustrated by quotations, which number 9480 in all. Nearly all of these are of foreign origin, but there are some notable exceptions, as Queen, O. E. *cwēn*, Quick, O. E. *cwic(u)* and some others. Mr. Craigie tells us that "by the end of the 13th century *cw-* was entirely discontinued, and *qu* (or its variants *qv-*, *qw-*) was the established spelling for all cases of the sound (kw), whether of English, French or Latin origin." Examples however, of *quen*, *quene*, are given from Layamon, 1205, alongside of *cweane*, 1275. From the earliest times the word denoted "a king's wife or consort." From the sense of *living*, *Quick* seems to have been applied to the qualities of living things, and especially to the energy and activity, the speed and rapidity, characteristic of them. The adjective and adverb are treated at length in nine columns. The college use of 'Quiz' as a noun is traced back only to 1891 in the Century Dictionary, and as a verb to 1886, and both are marked "U. S.," but almost any American college student can supply earlier dates than these.

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REPORTS.

I, pp. 1–8. F. Skutsch. Der Prolog zum Hautontimorumenos des Terenz. In vs. 6 *duplex* goes with the relative clause. Ter. then states that the play was 'contaminated.' But traces of it do not appear in the play.

II, pp. 9–20. A. Müller. Scenisches zur römischen Komödie. 1. Right and left. Against the view of Reisch (Reisch-Dörpfeld, Gr. Theat. p. 256) M. argues that in the plays of Plautus, with the exception of the Rudens, the city and the harbor are always thought of as on the same side of the scene. As this in the Rudens is quite different from the usual city street of the New Comedy, the exception does not impair the rule. 2. Angiportus. This term sometimes refers to alley-ways between houses, sometimes to passages opening on the stage and giving access to the garden (Merc. 1009, Persa 440 ff.). The various dramatic uses, for concealment etc., are discussed.

III, pp. 21–41. W. H. Roscher. Die Bedeutung des E zu Delphi und die übrigen γράμματα Δελφικά. The sayings are reconstructed (p. 38) as follows in hexameters:

$$\text{Εἰ. Θεῷ ἦρα. Νόμοις πείθευ. Φείδευ τε χρόνοιο.}$$
$$\text{Γνῶθι σεαυτόν. Μηδὲν ἄγαν. 'Εγγύα, πάρα δ' ἄτη.}$$

I. The first word is taken to be the imperative of εἶμι = ἴθι (p. 25) = come here, welcome. II. Reconstruction of the verses.

IV, pp. 42–45. O. Hoffmann. Zum äolischen Dialekt. 1. Alkaios 5 and the dative in -αις. p. 44 "of two datives in -αισι standing in juxtaposition one could be shortened." 2. τέρρητον = trireme (sc. πλοῖον). Note on a gloss of Hesychius.

V, pp. 46–57. W. Nestle. Anklänge an Euripides in der Apostelgeschichte. Echoes of the Bacchae are found in Acts 5, 39 (B. 45 et passim), 26, 14 (B. 795), 9, 3; 22, 6 (B. 1078-85), 16, 23 ff.; 12, 7 (B. 447-450, 585 ff.) 17, 16 ff. (B. 216, 219, 256, 272, 467, 650) 17, 22-24 (Eurip. fr. 1116 N.). Other apparent reminiscences of Greek writers are quoted and proposed.

VI, pp. 58–63. S. Eitrem. De Ovidio Nicandri imitatore. The myths in the Ovidian Metamorphoses cannot be referred to the sources from which those of Antoninus Liberalis were taken and Antoninus himself did not copy Nicander of Colophon.

VII, pp. 64–89. J. Zahlfleisch. Variae Lectiones zur Physik
E-Z des Aristoteles bei Simplikios.

VIII, pp. 90–135. L. Gurlitt. Exegetisches und Kritisches
zu Ciceros Briefen ad Atticum. Discussion of 23 passages
enumerated on p. 135.

IX, pp. 136–147. J. Dietze. Zum Märchen von Amor und
Psyche. The tale, originally localized in Miletus, was later at the
end of the first century B. C. combined with allegory and assumed
the style of the love-story of the Hellenistic erotic type. Apuleius
is responsible for certain Roman allusions.

Miscellen.—1. pp. 148-151. Fr. Susemihl. Die Aspasia des
Antisthenes. Antisthenes seems to have held up the relation
of Pericles and Aspasia as a warning against the evil consequences
of a too ardent and dominating passion.

2. pp. 151–153. T. Büttner-Wobst. Polybios als Astronom.
Although his method (IX 15) would lead to great error, we
cannot say that he had "only a superficial knowledge of the
subject." His knowledge, such as it was, was the best to be had
at that time.

3. pp. 153–154. M. Petschenig. Zu Maximian und Ammian.
Three conjectures.

4. pp. 154–155. K. Ohlert. Petroniana. Notes on Nos. 101,
112, 126, 130, 137.

5. pp. 155–158. A. Frederking. Zu Ciceros Briefen. 11
critical notes.

6. pp. 158–160. W. Heraeus. Zur Kritik und Erklärung von
Porfyrios Horazscholien. Cont'd pp. 317, 477, 630.

7. p. 160. H. Weber. Aristoteles Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία VII 4
suggests that ἵππος ἐκ μαρμάρου τυκτή, ὡς would heal the text.

X, pp. 161–185. L. Radermacher. Analecta. (1) The first
verse of the couplet cited by Suidas v. εὐφημία from Aelian is
assigned to Ariston the Stoic. (2) On a rhetorical fr. in Cramer
IV, Anecdota Oxon. p. 153- a product of the Byz. period con-
sisting of corrupted excerpts and based on Ps. Dionys. p. 24, 15
ff. Us. (3) On the book of Henoch. (4) Achil. Tatius and Dio
Chrys. (5) Dion. of H. in de Demosth. cites Dem. from an
abbreviated text. The testimony of his readings is to be taken
as against S. (Parisinus). In de Thuc. his method of citation is
different. Perhaps he quoted brief passages from memory, (6)
Dio Cass. XXXVI, 20, 1.

XI, pp. 186–200. K. Lincke. Miscellanea. In Aesch. Prom.
801 reads φροίμιον. Notes on Herod. I 138, VII 104; Thuc. III

38, 5; IV 23, 2; VII 39, 2; Xen. Anab. I 7, 10–12; Hellen. V
38; Mem. I 1, 2; 6; Plato Phaedr. 251 C; Phaed. 59 A; Crito 53
E; Aristot. poet. c. 11 p. 1452 a 24; Cic. Rosc. 34, 96.   Caes. b.
G. I 16; 47; IV 33.   Sen. de const. sap. 12. 1 and 3.   Evang.
Marc. 4. 10; I 23–27, Origen contra Cels. IV 83; VI 51.

XII, pp. 201–205.   O. Hoffmann.   Zwei neue arkadische In-
schriften.   No. 21 and 22 of the new Attic imprecatory tablets in
the Nat'l Mus. at Athens publ. by Ziebart in Nachr. d. Gött.
Gesell. d. Wiss. 1899, p. 105 ff.

XIII, pp. 206–237.   M. Groeger.   Die Kirke-Dichtung in der
Odyssee.   Conclusions summarized on p. 237 that in form and
content it is later than Ω, δ, ε, ι, and the beginning of κ; perhaps
also later than the Θρινακίη scene of μ.   On the other hand the
prooemium, η 246–255, and the greatest part of μ should be later,
as they presuppose a previous divine admonition.   The condensed
survey ψ 300 ff. is also later, but that does not mean by another
writer.

XIV, pp. 238–255.   P. Egenolff.   Zu Lentz' Herodian.   In the
καθολικὴ προσῳδία Lentz relied on the MS basis laid by his prede-
cessors, and that was inadequate.   Some results of a collation
of the Dindorf text with the Vienna MS are given.   II. Supple-
mentary notes on things omitted by Lentz, etc.

XV, pp. 256–271.   Eb. Nestle.   Zur neuen Philo-Ausgabe.
Criticism of the method, and notes on the biblical quotations.

XVI, pp. 272–304.   W. Sternkopf.   Ueber die "Verbesserung"
des Clodianischen Gesetzentwurfes de exilio Ciceronis.   The
correctio consisted in setting the same penalty as Cicero's on any
one receiving him inside the limits set.   The 500 miles was
reckoned from the Italian frontier, not from Rome.   The text of ad
Att. III 4 should be changed to quingenta to agree with Dio
Cass. XXXVIII 17, 7 and Plut. Cic. 32 (p. 304) Clodius' lex
provocationis was passed March 20, 58 B. C.   About March 25,
the tribune promulgated the rogatio de exilio Ciceronis.   About
April 3, he introduced the proposition in changed form, which
was accepted about April 24 (Cf. L. Gurlitt, p. 478 *infra.*).

XVII, pp. 305–311.   J. Ziehen.   Archäologisch-Textkritische
Bemerkungen zur Salmasianusanthologie.   Continuation of an
article in the Festschrift für Otto Benndorf S. 49 ff.   A contri-
bution towards a much-needed annotated edition of the Salmasian
Anthology.   11 Notes.

Miscellen.—8. p. 312.   Eb. Nestle.   Ein moabitischer Stadt-
name in den griechischen Wörterbüchern.   κειράς in Passow, Pape
and others should be Κειράδας or better Κειρ-Ἀδας (קיר חרש).   Cf.
Καρχηδών Carthago, "New City."

9. pp. 313–315. H. Jurenka. Der Mythus in Pindars erster olympischer Ode und Bakchylides III. While the court-poets would not refer to the death of their patron, and so could not say that after death he would attain to the honors of a hero, still he and the public would surely understand this from the myth.

10. pp. 315–316. O. Cr. Com. adesp. 410 p. 485 Kock. Not a comic fragment at all.

11. pp. 316–317. G. Helmreich. Zu Galen Περὶ τῶν ἑαυτῷ δοκούντων. Frag. from cod. Paris. 634 suppl. gr. containing some Byz. scholia quoting the work.

12. pp. 317–320. W. Heraeus. Zur Kritik und Erklärung von Porfyrios Horazscholien; II. Zu den Episteln; III. Zu den Satiren.
P. 320 Fr. Studniczka. Petron. 126, Suppl. to p. 155. The conjecture Dionam (-em) can be found in Bücheler's ed. maj.

XVIII, pp. 321–328. K. Wernicke. Apollon Stroganoff und Apollon vom Belvedere. W. agrees with G. Kieseritzky (Athen. Mitth. XXIV (1899) S. 468 ff.) that the Stroganoff Apollo is of ancient origin; but he holds that as the left arm is an addition from some statue of Mercury it does not help us in the interpretation of the Ap. Belvedere. The latter is to be thought of as in the moment of triumph, having just hit some opponent with an arrow.

XIX, pp. 329–343. A. Müller. Noch einmal die Sehverhältnisse im Dionysostheater. Continuation of the subject from Philol. Suppl. Bd. VII pp. 108–112 that the later high stage described by Vitruvius was introduced so as to enable some of the spectators more easily to see the actors. To this Doerpfeld (Athen. Mitth. 1899, S. 310 ff. had protested that the assumed difficulty to which certain spectators were liable, did not actually occur. Müller still maintains (p. 342–3) that for many spectators in the third story a high stage would give a better view without seriously encroaching on the occupants of the proedriae.

XX, pp. 344–361. R. Holland. Mythographische Beiträge. 1. Der Typhoeuskampf. H. compares Antonin. Lib. 28 and Nonnus I–II as illustrating Robert's assumption of a poem as the basis of Apollod. I 39 ff. Typhoeus may be regarded as the winter-giant, the going of the gods to the south as the migration of the birds. Other metamorphoses of the gods are given. 2. Hermochares and Ktesylla. The tale (Antonin. Lib. I after Nicand. III) has been put in the background by the similar romance of Akontios and Kydippe, by Kallimachos. The throwing of the apple is necessary to the plot and not borrowed from the latter. 3. The burial of Alkmene. In Anton. Lib. 33 by putting in parenthesis ᾤκουν—Ἡρακλῆς and ending the sentence with <θάψοντες> topographical difficulties are removed.

XXI, pp. 362–399. H. Steiger. Warum schrieb Euripides seine Troerinnen? Summary on p. 398–399. Eurip. intended to warn his countrymen against undertaking a war against Syracuse for conquest, by showing up the war against Ilion, stripped of all poetic ornament.

XXII, pp. 400–405. R. Foerster. Eine Fälschung in Libanios. The entire close of the speech περὶ δουλείας is, in the Paris ed. of Morel (1627, Tom. II, p. 659, 19 f.) a forgery. Perhaps the original ending had been lost on the way to the printer's; the beginning he restored by means of his own Latin translation. As this was badly written, and as he took too little time and also knew too little Greek, the attempt was very imperfect. The last part for some reason he failed to complete.

XXIII, pp. 406–415. Fr. Reuss. Zu Valerius Flaccus, Argon. V–VIII. Emendations.

XXIV, pp. 416–440. W. Heraeus. Neue Beiträge zur Kritik des Valerius Maximus und Nepotianus.

XXV, pp. 441–465. M. Rothstein. Nachträgliches zu Properz. A spirited reply to Fr. Leo's review of R.'s Propertius (Gött. G. Anz. 1898, 722–750) which criticized his method of treating the Greek originals.

Miscellen.—13. pp. 466–469. H. Lucas. Die Neunzahl bei Horaz und Verwandtes. *Nono mense* Sat. I 6, 61 is to be understood as a round-number, a popular expression for 'some months'.

14. pp. 469–471. Fr. Susemihl. Noch einmal die Aspasia des Antisthenes. Continued from p. 148. Though the chief support of his argument falls, as Athen. XIII 589 e is not to be assigned to Antisthenes, still S. does not give up his former view.

15. pp. 471–473. R. Ellis. Ad Ciceronis Epistulas, quae in Tyrrello-Purserianae ed. vol. VI continentur.

16. pp. 474–476. F. Münzer. Eine Pliniusvita von 1496. This life published in the Brescia and Venice edd. of the N. H. in 1496 is really of modern origin, based on Pliny and other writers and a Veronese inscription which has nothing to do with Pliny.

17. pp. 476–477. Eb. Nestle. Zu den griechischen Namen der Buchstaben. A book of 1538 shows that even then the theory that the names of the Greek alphabet came from the Aramaic, as they end in *a*, had been advocated.

18. pp. 477–480. W. Heraeus. Zur Kritik und Erklärung von Porfyrios Horazscholien.

XXVI, pp. 481–504. F. Skutsch. Zur lateinischen Wortgeschichte und plautinischen Versmessung. Among other things

concludes that *em* is from *eme* (emo) p. 498 ff. The *-ius* of the pron. gen. can be one syllable. II. For *iurgium* in Persa. 797 read *iurigium;* for *audax* in Amph. 985 read avidax; for *olfactare* in Men. 167 read *olēfactare*

XXVII, pp. 505–520. J. Jessen. Zu Juvenal. Critical and exegetical notes.

XXVIII, pp. 521–531. L. Cohn. Zur neuen Philo-Ausgabe. Reply to Nestle (p. 256 ff.). Pp. 532–536 Paul Wendland replies to Nestle's criticism of his share of the joint work.

XXIX, pp. 537–544. Fr. Susemihl. Die Zeit des Historikers Kratippos. He lived between Polemon and Zopyros on the one hand and Dionysios on the other, and is not the peripatetic of Cicero's time.

XXIX, (sic) pp. 545–559. H. Weber. Zu der Schrift περὶ διαίτης ὀξέων (MSS. MV.-A).

XXX, pp. 560–573. T. Büttner-Wobst. Studien zu Polybios. (1) Arrangement of some excerpts of Book 21.

XXXI, pp. 574–577. G. Lehnert. Eine rhetorische Quelle für Boetius' Commentare zu Aristoteles περὶ ἑρμηνείας. The choice of Ter. Cic. and Verg. and the use to enliven the commentary of citations from these school favorites point to some one original grammatical work, showing peripatetic influence.

XXXII, pp. 578–583. L. Gurlitt. Lex Clodia de exilio Ciceronis. Continues Sternkopf's discussion (Philol. LIX (1900) 272 ff.). G. compares Buning's conclusions (Prg. Cösfeld 1894). G. believes the *correctio* (1) meant a lightening of Cicero's punishment. (2) In the first form Cic. was banished from the whole Rom. empire. This was afterwards changed to 400 miles from Italy. As the Rom. wrote D for 500, Sternkopf's emendation CCCC to CCCCC in ad Att. III 4 is wrong.

XXXIII, pp. 584–591. H. Blümner. Neue Fragmente des Edictum Diocletiani. Discussion of the fragments found on the site of ancient Aigeira in Achaia and publ. by Stais in Ἐφημ. ἀρχαιολ. 1899, 147 ff.

XXXIV, pp. 592–597. L. Radermacher. Griechischer Sprachgebrauch. ὡς οὐδέν in Aristoph. Frogs 738 ff. and Ps.-Aristeas § 211, p. 58 Wendl. is compared with German 'das ist mir wie Nichts', and is a popular idiom. Notes on αὖ; πάλιν; τίς ἰδών = a man; οὐδὲν οὐδενί (Isaeus XIII 8), also a colloquial idiom and hence rare in literature; πάναλκις for πανάλκης Sophronius Mir. Cyr. et Joannis I 3425 C / D.

XXXV, pp. 598–604. R. Helm. De Prooemio Apuleianae, quae est de deo Socratis orationis. H. thinks that Apuleius being

compelled to speak extempore began with a Gr. exordium but when objections were made by some in the audience, he gave a new beginning which has been preserved. Both fragments are genuine and to be accepted as belonging to the speech.

XXXVI, pp. 605–609. M. Maas. Zur heronischen Frage. M. places Heron of Alexandreia in the time of Ptolemaeus IX Euergetes II.

XXXVII, pp. 610–614. A. Dyroff. Abaris. Supplemental to Bethe's article in the Pauly-Wissowa Realencycl. The idealizing of Abaris took place in the pre-stoic times.

Miscellen.—19. pp. 615–618. Fr. Susemihl. Epikritisches zu Heliodoros dem Periegeten. Caecilius is the medium through which the decrees in the Ps. Plut. lives of the ten orators were directly obtained.

20. pp. 618–620. P. Egenolff. Zu Anakreon. In fr. 49 B[4] read ὡρικήν for Θρηικίην.

21. pp. 620–621. J. Koehm. Soph. Elekt. 47 reads ὄγκῳ for ὅρκῳ.

22. pp. 621–622. G. Helmreich. Zu Oreibasios emendations to II 28, II 32, III 1, p. 187, 4.

23. pp. 622–625. L. Gurlitt. Cic. ep. ad fam. IX 10, 2, read: oblitusne es igitur fungorum illorum, quos apud Niciam et ingentium cum σοφίας epitome (or ἐπιτομῇ)?

24. pp. 625–627. R. Ehwald. Tacitus ab excessu d. Aug. I 10, reads: nec domesticis abstinebatur: abducta Neroni uxor et consulti . . . pontifices, an . . . nuberet; Q. Ventidii et Vedii Pollionis luxus; postremo Livia . . . noverca.

25. pp. 627–630. R. Ehwald. Eutropius. The Gotha MS (saec. IX), cod. membr. I 101 contains the first half of a Murbach codex which passed into the possession of Maugérard.

26. pp. 630–633. W. Heraeus. Zur Kritik und Erklärung von Porfyrios Horazscholien.
　Indices.

Yale University.　　　　　GEORGE DWIGHT KELLOGG.

BEITRÄGE ZUR ASSYRIOLOGIE UND SEMITISCHEN SPRACHWIS-
　SENSCHAFT, herausgegeben von FRIEDRICH DELITZSCH
　und PAUL HAUPT. Vierter Band. Heft 4, pp. 423-587.
　Leipzig, J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1902.[1]

The fourth and last Heft of the fourth volume of the Beiträge contains nine articles.

[1] For review of BA. IV. Heft 3, see A. J. P. XXII 461 foll.

J. Kohler, who collaborated with Peiser in "Aus dem babylon-
ischen Rechtsleben," Teile i-iv, comments on a number of
interesting points connected with the later Babylonian law
(pp. 423 430). For example, he shows that the brother of the
founder of the well known business house of Egibi in Babylon
was still living in Cyrus's sixth reign-year. Kohler shows also
that the last trace of the ancient custom of wife purchase appears
in the days of Nebuchadnezzar. After that king's time the
practice died out entirely. On the other hand, the father had
absolute control over the marriages of such of his daughters as
were living in the paternal home. Kohler's allusions to Babylon-
ian mortgages are highly interesting (p. 427). It seems that the
interest on a mortgage might be guaranteed by presenting to the
money-lender a slave or slaves whose work should be regarded
as equivalent to the payment of interest. Thus, in one case a
mother and daughter were given, both as security for the entire
loan, in this instance 1 mina, 10 shekels, and as interest payers
on the loan. We have, moreover, a record which proves the
legality of *a purchase on trial.* A rich man bought in this way
a valuable jug and bowl for four minas and nine shekels, but
he stipulated that before payment he should have the opportunity
to judge whether the ornament harmonized with his apartments!
He accordingly contracted either to pay for or to return the piece
by a certain date. These legal records are very valuable as an
evidence of the extensive compass of the later Babylonian trans-
actions. As Kohler remarks, they shed a flood of light on the
management of affairs, which, although they are twenty-five
hundred years old, bear the closest resemblance to modern
banking operations. The Babylonians were really the founders
of the world's business methods which have been transmitted to
us through Greece and Rome. The history of human commerce
can certainly not be written without extensive mention of ancient
Babylonia.

Ferdinand Bork contributes a linguistic note on the Elamitic
(pp. 431-433). He contends that in this language the divine
determinative sign had not the value *an*, as Weissbach believes,
but *nap*. There can be little doubt that the Elamitic system of
writing developed on quite different lines to the Assyro-Babylon-
ian cuneiform. As Bork points out, the Elamites had no ancient
characters behind them, as was the case with the Babylonians,
and were therefore freer to develop their system independently.

Gottfried Nagel in "Hammurâbi's Letters to Sin-Idinnam,"
pp. 434-483, supplements L. W. King's work "The Letters and
Inscriptions of Hammurâbi," vol. i. 1898. King has not yet pub-
lished his second volume, no doubt owing to the many difficulties
presented by these texts, whose vocabulary, dating as it does
from 2250 B. C., is often very obscure and whose signs are
frequently excessively difficult to differentiate. Thus, the pairs
ga and *bi*, *ša* and *ta*, *ki* and *di*, etc. show an extraordinary and

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confusing resemblance. Nagel accordingly makes here an independent attempt to edit forty-six of these letters which King had already treated. I will merely call attention to the fact that in nr. 45, Scheil and Hommel read the name *Ku-dur-nu-ux-ga-mar* and believed that they had found the name of the biblical Chedor-Laomer. It is evident now, however, as Nagel shows (p. 473), that the correct reading is *I-nu-ux-sa-mar*, a rendering which detracts considerably from the historic interest of the passage. It would seem then that this was a premature "discovery," not so unusual among our eager Assyriologists! About half of these letters deal with legal conditions and show how astonishingly far advanced the Babylonians of Hammurâbi's time were in matters connected with litigation. Six letters have to do with building operations of various sorts which were carried out by Sin-Idinnam at the command of his king. A few of the letters are concerned with the trade conditions which then obtained between northern and southern Babylonia. It is highly interesting to notice how even at this early date the use of the precious metals as a standard of exchange had begun to take the place of the more primitive barter. A few of the letters inform us concerning some of Hammurâbi's war-like operations, unfortunately not the same as those undertaken by that ancient king in conjunction with the Elamite Chedorlaomer, Arioch of Larsa (Bible: Ellasar) and Tidal of Goi (Bible: "Nations") against the rulers of Sodom and Gomorrah, mentioned Gen. xiv. Amraphel of Shinar in that chapter has long been recognized as Hammurâbi. Nagel calls attention to two very characteristic letters, one containing commands regarding the transportation of the goddesses of Emutbal to Babylon and the other a decree directing a leap-month to be inserted in the calendar of the current year, in order to equalize the difference between the official and the actual year. These letters contain much that is valuable for the history of ancient Babylonian culture as it existed four thousand years ago and are therefore a highly important addition to our knowledge.

Nagel adds a brief grammatical and lexicographical commentary (pp. 474-483) which is most instructively supplemented by Friedrich Delitzsch's "Remarks" (pp. 483-500.) Delitzsch adds (pp. 490-500) a short sketch of the culture conditions obtaining during Hammurâbi's reign. He was the first ancient Babylonian king to establish a definite system of military service from which were exempt, on the one hand, only certain ancient families dedicated to the temple service or acting as prominent government officials and, on the other hand, shepherd lads. In this way the king guarded the interests both of the nobility and of the agricultural classes.

Cornelis Van Gelderen (pp. 501-545) transliterates and translates with commentary twenty-one Assyro-Babylonian letters selected from various sources and dealing with a number of different subjects. The word *asû* " physician " (p. 507, line 12 f),

regarding whose origin Van Gelderen expresses uncertainty is probably a Sumerian loanword in Semitic. The original form is *azu*, i. e. "father of knowledge" (*a=abu*, V R. 21, 63 c). That "father" is used here in the sense "possessor," very much as it is employed in modern Arabic, is evident, although this usage is not common in Assyrian. It is certainly found, however, in the expression *aban abi abni*, K. 240, rev. 2–4 "the father of stones" applied to a necklace of strung jewels. Sumerian *azu* is equivalent also to *barû* "seer," AL.' 313 and to *dupšarru* "scribe," Str. 5427. The evidence then is all in favour of a Sumerian origin for this combination and we must regard Assyrian *asû* as a mere loanword which later passed over into the Aramaic (see BA. i., p. 219). The Semitic form *isaû* which Nagel considers in a possible connection with *asû* must be a derivative of $\sqrt{\text{שאה}}$. It probably has no relation to a supposed stem $\sqrt{asû}$. Nagel's work is purely that of a philological editor. He makes no comments on the contents of the letters themselves.

Friedrich Hrozny (pp. 546-550) calls attention to a few curious facts regarding the later Babylonian and Persian system of currency. The Babylonian money really never lost its original character as a marketable ware. Thus, it was not sufficient to give in a contract the *name* of a piece of money, but the *quality* of its metal had to be described as well. We find in this way a shekel described as a shekel of refined metal, *piçû* and *qalû*; as a shekel of full weight *ša ginni*; of current value *ša nadânu u maxâri*, etc. It is perfectly clear that the Babylonian coins were frequently clipped or rubbed down, just as is the case in the modern East, which necessitated these legal specifications. The business world of Babylonia, therefore, took cognizance only of the weight and not of the number of coins in a payment. Indeed, in the reign of Darius, full weight coins were the exception rather than the rule.

Edward Kotalla (pp. 551-574) gives transliterations and translations of fifty Babylonian legal and government records taken from H. V. Hilprecht's IX volume of the Babylonian Expedition of the University of Penn., Series A. In these, we find interesting examples of Babylonian forms of proper names which occur in the O. T., especially in Ezra, Neh. and Esther. Thus Abda= עַבְדָא; Yaxu-natânu=יְהוֹנָתָן; Ili-zabadu=אֶלְזָבָד, etc. (see pp. 552-3). From these names we learn, 1) that Heb. ע is frequently equivalent to Bab. *x* and 2) that in the Hebrew names compounded with יה (the short form of יהוה), the full form of the divine name; viz., *Yahveh, Yahvah,* must have been pronounced. Such Babylonian forms as *Piliava, Padava, Igdaliava* would otherwise have been impossible. *This is the most important point brought forward in this volume of the Beiträge, as it establishes the pronunciation Yahve / a for the Tetragrammaton* יהוה.

Budgett Meakin (pp. 575–582) has supplemented Talcott Williams's article in BA. iii. pp. 561–587, on the spoken Arabic

of Morocco. Meakin is the author of a text-book now in use for the English missionary examinations in the Arabic of Morocco: "Introduction to the Arabic of Morocco," London. In this article in the Beiträge, he corrects Williams in a number of important points. For example, the form *Muḥ* for *Muḥammed* is never used in speech except by Rîfi Berbers, but is occasionally employed in writing in much the same manner as the unpleasant Xt. for Christ. *Darri* does not mean "dog," but ordinarily "a lad." I should add that this is a derivative from √*ḍry* and appears in Egyptian Arabic only in the form *zurrîye* and *durrîye* "posterity." *Kanûn*, the word given by Meakin for "small oven," is Egyptian Arabic for "stove, hearth, fire-place" (pl. *kawanyn*). *Akḥal* "black" does not appear in Egyptian Arabic; only *kuḥl* "*collyrium,* black dye for the eyes," and the denominative adjective *kuḥly* "light black" are in common use.

Paul Haupt closes the volume (pp. 583-7) with a most learned and instructive treatise on the Hebrew term שָׁלִישׁ. This is an abstract of a paper read before the Society for Biblical Literature in 1899 (JBL. xix. p. iii.). He shows conclusively that in every passage where the reading is certain, save 1 S. 18, 6, this word denotes originally "the *third* man in the chariot," i. e. "the armour bearer" or "shield bearer." The derivation of the Assyrian equivalent *kizû* "*Schildknappe*" is not known. I have shown in Cheyne's Encyclopedia Biblica, iii. col. 3228, nr. 3., the unlikelihood that שָׁלִישׁ in 1 S. 18, 6 means "a triangular harp," as the context in that passage leads us to suppose that the שָׁלִשִׁים were instruments of percussion. The only objection to this view is that there is no direct proof of the existence in the ancient East of *triangular* instruments of percussion. On the other hand, according to Athenaeus (Deipn. 4, 175), instruments for *shaking* like the *sistra* came to Greece from Syria. It is very probable that the word שָׁלִישׁ in 1 S. 18, 6 denotes an instrument of this character.

The contents of vols. i-iv. are given pp. 588-9.

<div style="text-align: right;">J. DYNELEY PRINCE.</div>

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BRIEF MENTION.

In his excellent *Essai sur la rhétorique grecque* M. Navarre makes a strong plea for the rehabilitation of rhetoric, which, according to his report, is fallen into unmerited neglect in Modern France (A. J. P. XXI 472). A similar plea was made some years ago by M. d' Haussonville in a critique of George Sand quoted in my *Essays and Studies* (p. 50): Les préceptes de rhétorique, he says, qui ont cours dans nos écoles ne diffèrent pas de ceux que la jeunesse studieuse recueillait autrefois sous les portiques d'Athènes et de Rome. Celui qui fait un jeu de ces préceptes et qui ne sait discerner l'éternelle vérité cachée sous leurs formules arides pourra peut-être surprendre un succès d'un jour; mais il s'exposera à voir couler tôt ou tard sa réputation fragile, comme un édifice dont l'architecte aura embelli la façade sans en asseoir la base d'après les lois de l'équilibre géométrique. No one can be surprised at these pleas, these warnings, who knows how much the sanity of French prose is due to rhetorical studies. With the new era the old charm will disappear. On the one hand, we shall have, nay, we have, utter carelessness, on the other, sublimated symbolism. And if rhetoric is neglected in France, what shall we say of the scant attention it has received in Anglo-Saxon countries? In the classical domain Mr. Sandys has done some good work, and it is to me a welcome sign of the times that Mr. ROBERTS has attracted so much attention and gained so much reputation by his admirable editions of the περὶ ὕψους (A. J. P. XX 228), and of the *Three Literary Letters of Dionysius of Halicarnassus*, to which he has now added *Demetrius On Style* (Cambridge University Press). To be sure, the author of the περὶ ὕψους, the so-called Longinus, has never lost his hold on the modern world. He is a critic of exceptional delicacy of feeling and breadth of sympathy; and while the work may be rooted in antique rhetoric, its foliage and its flowers seem to belong to our world, and we can hardly realize that we are separated from him by the whole width of the Christian centuries. Dionysios, on the other hand, is no sooner set up than he is bowled over. Blass, who has done so much to bring him back into notice, has actually suffered by reason of his championship; and almost everybody that deals with him seems to be afraid of being suspected of spiritual affinity with the schoolmasterly critic. Usener classes him among the *magistelli* and Norden vilipends him, so that I am glad to see how stoutly Mr. ROBERTS stands by him with Mr. Saintsbury as an ἔφεδρος in time of need. For my part, Dionysios

accompanies me during three out of the four years of my cycle, and, while he is not exactly the man of my counsel, he is assuredly indispensable for any serious study of Attic oratory. If he is narrowminded in his judgment of Plato and Thukydides, that very narrowness shows us how potent rhetoric was in every sphere of antique literature; and in the matter of Thukydides, I am free to confess that I would rather consider the great historian a perverse genius, as Dionysios has done, than look upon him as a Laokoon, struggling with the twin serpents of diction and syntax, which had not yet been tamed to the docility of Aesculapian snakes (A. J. P. XIV 397, Shorey, Tr. A. P. A. XXIV, 1893, p. 82.)

As for Demetrios, nothing could be more timely than the revival of his admirable manual; for though Mr. ROBERTS is kind enough to say that rhetoric is not neglected in the United States of America, the cultivation of it must be very recent. It is not so very long since James Russell Lowell said: ' If I have attained to any clearness of style, I think it is partly due to my having had to lecture twenty years as a professor at Harvard. It was always present to my consciousness that whatever I said must be understood at once by my hearers or never. Out of this, I, almost without knowing it, formulated the rule that every sentence must be clear in itself and never too long to be carried, without risk of losing its balance, on a single breath of the speaker'. In other words, he formulated a rule that he might have learned in advance from Cicero,[1] from Dionysios,[2] who gives the πνεῦμα τέλειον ἀνδρός as the measure of the period. No wonder that one hails with satisfaction the prospect of a new edition of the *De Compositione* by so competent a hand as Mr. ROBERTS, if indeed we may construe his suggestion as a promise. So, too, if Oliver Wendell Holmes, that other great light of American literature, had read Dionysios, he would not have written in so tentative a fashion of 'the pneumatic or rather pneumonic character of rhythm'. *Homo mensura* is written all over our tables of weights and measures; the lungs are the windgauge of style. But Lowell and Holmes are classics and Apollo saved them. But Apollo will not always save. If there is an elementary rule in what the ancients called composition, it is that prose rhythm and poetical rhythm must be kept apart. All classical scholars know the rule. All French stylists insist on it. Everybody remembers how absurd Buffon made himself with his quatrain on the horse; though perhaps everyone that quotes 'un poète mort jeune à qui l'homme survit' does not remember the gentle rebuke that De Musset gave Ste.-Beuve. 'Tu l'as bien dit, ami, mais tu l'as trop bien dit'. Dryden's prose is admirable, but, as Mr.

[1] E. g. De Oratore III 182.   [2] De Compositione c. 23, p. 171 (R.)

Pater says, he will fall into verse, whereas Wordsworth never does, according to the same authority, and Dickens's bad blank verse is a stock illustration. And yet, despite this simple rule, a much-admired American writer of our day has actually reeled off hundreds, if not thousands of more or less perfect decasyllabic verses under the delusion that he was translating Homer into rhythmical prose. And sometimes I cannot help thinking that it would be better if our classical scholars themselves had read something more of Quintilian than the first chapter of the Tenth Book, to which most of them seem to confine their attention. Perhaps we might have been spared the theory that every Latin sentence is constructed on the principle of a *diminuendo* toot; perhaps we might have been spared the revolt against Quintilian's doctrine (Inst. Or. IX 4, 26) that makes the verb the file-closer. In this whole range of studies, we must be content still to acknowledge the ancients as our masters. There is no appeal from the ear.

Mr. ROBERTS's Introduction gives us a sketch of the Greek study of style. To one who knows his Rhetores Graeci, his Gerber, his Blass, his Norden, the sketch seems rather too sketchy, but Mr. ROBERTS dedicates his book 'Iuventuti lucide scribendi ac venuste studiosae', and his χειραγωγία is meant for those who have yet to learn that there is such a thing as a serious study of style. And even those who are more or less familiar with the subject will be delighted with the skill and the grace of the exposition. As a translator, Mr. ROBERTS has gained high repute by his previous renderings but in the matter of translation I am prone to be a devil's advocate; and as I have not compared Mr. ROBERTS's version with the original word for word, I am not prepared to say that he has solved all the problems that the translation of any Greek work on rhetoric brings up. The task, as I know from experience, is one of great difficulty. The ordinary dictionaries are of little help, and the special vocabularies often leave one in the lurch. The latest guide is not always the most trustworthy, and old Ernesti is frequently better than more recent Volkmann. This lack of lexical resource lends especial value to the Glossary which Mr. ROBERTS has appended and which has enabled him to reduce the volume of his notes. An important feature of these notes is the number of illustrations drawn from English literature; for nothing is better calculated to carry conviction to the mind of the student than just such cogent exemplifications of the universality of rhetorical canons. For these illustrations Mr. ROBERTS acknowledges his obligations to Mr. WAY, who has won such renown by his poetical rendering of Euripides; and it is to Mr. WAY that Mr. ROBERTS owes also the versions of the poetical

citations and a number of valuable suggestions in the translation of the text.[1]

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This notice has already run beyond the bounds of *Brief Mention*, and yet I have said little about the original text, about the 'goldene Schrift des Demetrios περὶ ἑρμηνείας', as Wilamowitz justly calls it. As Milton puts 'Phalereus' next to Plato and Aristotle, I am content to leave him at the bidding of so excellent a judge in such excellent company. The book might be called a Rhetorical Testament, and a certain Biblical authority has been given to it by the short paragraphs into which it has been cut up by the old editor Victorius; and I am not surprised that Mr. ROBERTS recalls, by way of contrast, a like performance attributed to Robert Estienne. The canons of Demetrios are sharp, clear, sensible. The illustrative passages are really illustrative and have saved for us many gems from the lost literature. In one of his commandments Demetrios warns against the multiplication of metaphor lest 'we find ourselves writing dithyrambic poetry instead of prose'. This is what we always tell other people. This is what we think very fine in Paul Louis Courier's 'Dieu, délivre nous du malin et du langage figuré'. But for all that, Demetrios is not averse to figurative language. The rhetoricians were teachers, and being teachers, knew the value of metaphor and simile, which lend wings to the seeds of doctrine, and which plant them in the field of the ear, if I may use a figure that underlies the *purgatas aures* of that 'crabbed coxcomb', Persius.

[1] As I go to press I see that in the last number of the *Classical Review* (Feb. 1903), Dr. RUTHERFORD has made a savage assault on Mr. ROBERTS's edition. Dr. RUTHERFORD's peculiar acerbity always stirs sympathy with the victim of his taws. How different the tone of Henri Weil's review of Dr. RUTHERFORD's *Herondas* in the *Journal des Savants* for Nov., 1891. It is quite as effective as Dr. RUTHERFORD's scolding and yet it is radiant with the charm of a *iucunda senectus*. But instead of imitating the *mite ingenium* of the dean of French Hellenists, the critic seems to have had his perfervid genius still further heated by the example of Roemer's review of his *Scholia Aristophanica;* and Mr. ROBERTS has suffered in consequence. Why, if I were disposed to make trouble, I myself might air one grievance I have against Mr. ROBERTS. In c. 213 Mr. ROBERTS translates the δι' ἐμὲ ἐσώθης of Ktesias by 'You were saved through me', and this is the very example that I selected in my S. C. G. § 163 for the rendering 'Thanks to'. But I recognize the fact that it is hard to get rid of the equation διά c. acc. = διά c. gen., nay, impossible to quell τὴν ἀμφίκρανον καὶ παλιμβλαστῇ κύνα (A. J. P. XI 372). Dem. 6, 45: δι' οὓς is not δι' ὧν, despite Sandys, and Lys. 26, 9: δι' οὓς is 'Thanks to whom'. Even in such Greek as the Life of Aesop, which Wilamowitz has actually used for his 'Lesebuch', to the horror of straitlaced Hellenists, the distinction is carefully observed. Cf. Vit. Aesop. c. 12 (p. 259 Eberh.), οὕτως ἔμεινεν ἐπὶ τῆς οἰκίας δι' Αἰσώπου ὡς καὶ δι' ἐκεῖνον ἀπῆρε.

RADERMACHER'S *Demetrius* περὶ ἑρμηνείας (Teubner) was pub-
lished only a few months before ROBERTS'S, and the English
editor's work was virtually finished, so that he could make little
use of his predecessor. But the Demetrios of Bangor and the
Demetrios of Bonn are constructed on very different lines.
ROBERTS writes for the general student; RADERMACHER, the
able adjutant of USENER in his work on Dionysios, has the
professional in view, and the two editions supplement each other.
Both editors agree in rejecting the authorship of Demetrius
Phalereus, which has few supporters nowadays, but ROBERTS gives
a wider margin than RADERMACHER and takes in the first
century before and the first century after Christ. RADERMACHER
finds a terminus in the word σκαφίτης (c. 97), which occurs for the
first and only time in Strabo, XVII, p. 817; and he thinks it
impossible that Demetrios should be earlier than the first century
after Christ. Demetrios, according to him, is untouched by the
puristic spirit, and in language he is nearer to Plutarch than he
is to Lucian. At my time of life I do not believe in im-
pressionistic criticism, but I should not be grieved if someone
shall make out a strong case for a somewhat earlier date. But to
tell the truth, Demetrios's use of Aristotle pulls me one way, his
admiration of Xenophon another.

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RADERMACHER gives more scope to syntactical observations
than does ROBERTS, and as I took RADERMACHER in hand after
I read ROBERTS, I am naturally pleased to note here and there
coincidences of judgment. So I was much surprised to find that
ROBERTS was superstitious enough to retain, c. 269, the MS
reading εἰ συναφθῇ. Any attentive reader must have noticed that
Demetrios has a way of using εἰ + optative in the protasis and
the future in the apodosis, and RADERMACHER has rightly put
εἰ συναφθείη in the text. The optative was doomed, but it made
a brave fight before it died, and though the ideal condition is
very steady in classical times, the future indicative is occasionally
found in apodosis from Homer, Il. 10, 222, down. Another
εἰ with subjunctive occurs in c. 76, οὐδὲν οὖν θαυμαστόν, εἰ . . .
γένηται, where both editors follow the MS, but as θαυμαστόν
. . . εἰ normally takes the indicative, I should write without
much hesitation γίνεται, though Roshdestwenski's γενήσεται is
sufficiently plausible. In c. 5, ROBERTS follows Victorius and
the other editors in reading οὐκ ἂν . . . γράψειεν instead of οὐκ
ἂν . . . γράψει ἐν, which RADERMACHER defends. Now, as I have
said, S. C. G., § 432, the future indicative with ἂν is theoretically
a legitimate construction and is not to be excluded from later
Greek, but in my judgment Demetrios is not late enough for
that. As for the combination of aorist and perfect, on which
RADERMACHER has a long note (p. 84) *à propos* of ἔσχεν . . . καὶ

μεμίμηται (c. 72), I cannot grant that the earlier usage gave any real hold to the later Latinism; and there is considerable confusion in the other long note on the periphrastic use of the present participle (p. 116). See my S. C. G., §§ 191, 291. Both editors read, c. 170, μόλις ἂν ἀναγνῷ. This ἀναγνῷ Jannaris (p. 564) takes to be subjunctive for optative. RADERMACHER (p. 68) says that ἂν is for ἐάν, but the translation is exceedingly awkward, and I should read ἀναγνοίη with as little hesitation as he reads c. 215, < ἂν > αὐτὸν καλοίη, where ROBERTS sticks to the MS. There is great confusion in later times between certain forms of subjunctive and optative.

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But not to dwell unduly on these minor matters, there is one point that deserves development. In c. 155: πείθων δωρεῖσθαι Σεύθει ὅ < τι > τις ἔχοι there is really no difficulty, as πείθων carries with it the notion of ἔπειθε; but this leads RADERMACHER to the further discussion of the optative in combination with the generic present; and that is a subject about which I wish to say a few words. In my S. C. G., § 400, I call attention to the parallelism of the optative with the infinitive, and emphasize the use of the optative in complementary clauses. Leaving out ὅς (ὅστις) with the indicative, which is either particular or generic, to use the accepted terms, there are three forms of the generic relative used in combination with the universal present, which is really the thing that makes them generic, ὅς with subjunctive, which is the regular epic use, ὅς ἂν, which is the regular prose use, and ὅς with the optative, which belongs to an early period of the language and goes with the infinitive as its complement. The examples in poetry are too numerous not to have attracted attention long ago. The classical instance is So. Antig. 666: ἀλλ' ὃν πόλις στήσειε, τοῦδε χρὴ κλύειν, which Sophokles puts into the mouth of the Tory Kreon, the stickler for the rights of the throne, for the doctrine of implicit obedience to the head of the state. The tone is that of a proverb or a quotation from the Bible. In prose Xenophon seems to be the only author that is much given to it, but that is not surprising, for Xenophon has preserved many old-fashioned things. It is nearly fifty years since my attention was called to this special point by Hertlein's edition of the Cyropaedeia (1853), in which he emphasizes the matter at 1, 6, 19; and Goodwin's Xenophontean examples, MT. § 555, coincide largely with what Hertlein has in his edition of 1859. No example seems to occur in the Anabasis, and the construction is rare, after all, among the classics outside of Xenophon. Plato, Lysis, 207 E, cited by Radermacher, is in my collection. Gorgias, 482 B, is not squarely met by the commentators, and the Ps.-Platonic Riv., 133 B, while clear enough, will not be allowed to count as a classical example. But how are we to explain the construction?

Goodwin accounts for the deviation from the standard prose use on the ground of an equivalence of the leading verb and the infinitive to optative and ἄν. So in the Sophoklean passage, if χρὴ κλύειν = κλύοις ἄν, or, as Goodwin puts it, δικαίως ἄν κλύοι τις, then στήσεις ceases to be irregular. The explanation is ingenious and has, I believe, found wide acceptance, and yet to me it is not convincing. It is more like a mathematical formula than a linguistic process. χρή + infinitive = imperative, but optative + ἄν = imperative, ∴ χρή + infinitive = optative + ἄν. Optative + ἄν = imperative takes the subjunctive sequence (A. J. P. VI 69). χρή + infinitive = imperative = optative + ἄν takes the optative sequence. 'A fair exchange is no robbery'. Q. E. D. But language is eminently unfair, and while optative + ἄν is often felt as imperative, the imperative is not so readily felt as optative + ἄν. Jebb says, 'The optative puts the case in the most general way. Hence < it > suits proverbs'. But wherein is it more general than ὃς ἄν στήσῃ? Humphreys calls it the ideal condition. True, but that is only saying that it is an optative. It is used in proverbs, not because it is generic, because the generic element is represented by the leading verb, but because it is archaic, as Earle correctly says in his O. T., 314. There is, as I have stated in my S. C. G. (§ 399), a certain affinity between ἡ ἀπαρέμφατος ἔγκλισις, as the Greek calls it, and ἡ εὐκτική, between the pure idea of the verb and the pure ideal of the mood. Where we find it in classic Greek this particular optative is atavistic, and when the later Greek was holding grimly on to the optative, no wonder that he was delighted to follow such a model as Xenophon, and the construction was considered not a Latinism but a lovely Atticism (cf. A. J. P. IV 428, XXIII 130).

One more note before I tear myself away from fascinating Demetrios and his fascinating editors. In c. 302 we read: ὁ τῆς Τιμάνδρας κατηγορῶν ὡς πεπορνευκυίας, τὴν λεκανίδα καὶ τοὺς ὀβολοὺς καὶ τὴν ψίαθον καὶ πολλήν τινα τοιαύτην δυσφημίαν ἑταιρῶν κατήρασεν τοῦ δικαστηρίου. For ὀβολούς Wilamowitz, *lepidum caput*, writes ὀλίσβους, and at first I was disposed to surrender. But something is to be said for ὀβολούς. The ὄλισβος, the βαυβών of Herondas 6, 18, was a σκυτίνη ἐπικουρία, a 'leathern conveniency', as I have ventured to translate it after Mrs. Centlivre (A. J. P. XIV 261), and belonged to the *mundus muliebris* of grass widows and lone females (Ar., Lys., 109, 110), rather than to the apparatus of a πόρνη. Now Timandra was a grand lady among the hetaerae, as anyone can see for himself by consulting the dictionaries; and her unknown assailant is reducing her to the rank of a common strumpet, of whom Philemon says: εἰς ὀβολός· εἰσπηδησάτω. The λεκανίς I take to be the basin for collecting tribute, and the ψίαθος is only too familiar from Ar., Lys., 921, 925. The subject is not

a dainty one, but Wilamowitz has no more reason to blush for his conjecture than the Rev. Dr. Bentley had to blush for some of his, e. g. Philemon fr. 4, 12 (4, 4 M); and I hope that I shall be forgiven in my turn for upholding, however feebly, the more decent tradition.

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The limited space of the Journal precludes a systematic review of schoolbook literature, and I do not purpose to give a detailed account of the *Collezione di classici greci e latini con note italiane,* published by LOESCHER of Turin. But I hold it to be of importance to the Anglo-Saxon mind that we look on things through what is called nowadays the 'Romanic' medium; and apart from the substantial value of the work itself, which is not to be underrated, the recent development of Greek scholarship in Italy is an interesting phenomenon. Even the Germans are beginning to find that their Ausonian as well as their American disciples are putting forth an independent life that must be reckoned with. The Italians have learned from the Germans the cult of the 'literature', so-called. An Italian book, published in 1902, incorporates, if possible, everything up to the end of 1901. And their commentaries are modern. There is a refreshing absence for the most part of references to grammars. There is no unnecessary display of erudition. Difficulties are solved by translations, too frequently, as it would seem to old-fashioned teachers, but one must recognize the spirit of the times; and I repent me of what I said of REITER'S *Iphigenie auf Tauris* (XXI 112), my notice of which was one of the few discords in the chorus of praises. The editors of this Italian series are well equipped for the work and some of them are known everywhere. No student of Pindar but respects FRACCAROLI, and FRACCAROLI has contributed to the series a revision of FERRARI'S *Lisia.* It is a pleasant coincidence that Rauchenstein, the editor of Lysias, was a lover of Pindar and taught others to love him. No wonder. The contrast enhances the joy. ZURETTI, another contributor, is an Homeric scholar, who has made himself felt; but it would be invidious to select names from the long list of editors, and my chief object in this *Brief Mention* is to emphasize my pleasure that the land to which we owe the renascence of Greek studies is asserting itself again, ἄγχι καρποφόροις ἀρούραισιν αἴτ᾽ ἀμειβόμεναι | τόκα μὲν ὧν βίον ἀνδράσιν ἐπηετανὸν ἐκ πεδίων ἔδοσαν, | τόκα δ᾽ αὖτ᾽ ἀναπαυσάμεναι σθένος ἔμαρψαν.

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It is always invidious to quote from oneself but I cannot forbear recalling with a certain patriotic satisfaction that a quarter of a century ago, I urged as one of the needs of the time for classical study 'a resolute purpose to make an honorable position for the

American people in this department of thought and culture as in others' (*Essays and Studies* p. 84). That resolute purpose has not been lacking. What we have accomplished during the last twenty-five years in the realm of linguistics and philology, this is not the place to record, but surely what we have done in archaeology has been a surprise even to those who have wished the best things and hoped the best things for American initiative; and no one can read Professor SEYMOUR'S account of the *First Twenty Years of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens* without rejoicing that we have so much to our credit. Of three most important archaeological works on the editor's table two are due to the American Institute, one to American munificence. The first is the *Argive Heraeum* by CHARLES WALDSTEIN, with the coöperation of CHASE, DE COU, HERMANCE, HOPPIN, LYTHGOE, NORTON, RICHARDSON and WHEELER. The second is the long promised work on the *Investigations at Assos*. Neither of these works is complete and the editor has not yet succeeded in securing a competent reviewer for the *Argive Heraeum* outside of the inner circle. A *Selbstanzeige* is not a popular form of criticism in America. A competent reviewer has been found for the Assos volume, but the eminent scholar who has promised his help has promised it on the condition that the review, which is to be a thorough one, take in the whole work. The wheels of the Assos archaeologists move slowly and the review may be one of the glories of the Journal when the present editor has ceased from troubling readers and contributors. Of the *Tebtunis Papyri* Part I ed. by GRENFELL, HUNT and SMYLY which is called by the other name *University of California Publications, Graeco-Roman Archaeology*, Vol. I, something ought to be said beyond the recognition of Mrs. Hearst's liberality and something adequate will be said, I trust, ere long.

There are to be three volumes of the *Tebtunis Papyri*. The present volume deals with the papyri from the mummies of crocodiles, which belong to the end of the second or to the early part of the first century before Christ. The sheets in which the crocodiles were wrapped had to be of great size, smaller documents being used for padding. The Egyptologist may congratulate himself on the wealth of new information provided regarding the internal history of Egypt under the later Ptolemies. But to the average man, one might say the average scholar, there is a sad lack of human interest in that formidable array of documents, which remind one of nothing so much as the German mania for reports of every kind. Only two per cent of the crocodiles yielded papyri. Not two per cent of the papyri yield anything that vies remotely in interest with the famous Erotic Fragment that is ever to be associated with the name

of Grenfell.   To be sure, there is a cry of Helen, forsaken
of Menelaos, that gives a new phase of her story, and strikes
the old passionate erotic note of entreaty.   ὦ φανεὶς χάρμα μοι
haunts one like 'Da mihi hoc, mel meum'.   There is a long
descriptive passage of warbling birds and busy bees, such as
would have roused the merriment of Aristophanes.   There
are one or two reflections on love, not remarkable for novelty,
and there is the legacy of a bardash, which the editors have
rendered into Latin, a language that does not blush.   One of the
four epigrams is already extant and the papyrus gives a
better reading.   Of the others we can barely guess at the
drift, and there is not much to be got out of the lacunose
fragment of the second book of the Iliad, though there is
something, as Mr. ALLEN has shown (Cl. R., Feb., 1903).   But
there are Royal Ordinances.   There is Official Correspondence,
one of the choice bits of which conveys minute instructions for the
entertainment of a Roman Senator.   There are Petitions.   There
is an elaborate Land Survey, a Tax List, and a number of
Contracts, the most interesting of which is a marriage contract,
in which the man seems to be tied up tighter than the woman.
Most of the petitions are addressed to an ungrammatical komo-
grammateus, Menches by name, and charges of assault and
robbery seem to have been rife in the crocodile nome.   Of the
accounts, the one that attracts the modern soul most is that of
a dining club.   'The cost per head was 100 drachmae exclusive
of wine, which is reckoned separately, as are also bread and
garlands'.   The corpse must have had a fine περίδειπνον.   In all
these Tebtunis documents there is comparatively little wine to an
intolerable deal of artabae of wheat.   And though the Egyptians
were much given to beer, beer does not figure to any extent.
This suppression of beer destroys the likeness to Germany,
evoked by the 'Akten' and the 'Dorfschulze'.

The delay in the transmission of proofs has brought the issue
of the present number into the Easter holidays; and this Easter
reminds me of an Easter fifty years ago when I found my master
and friend, Schneidewin, rejoicing over the resurrection of Hyper-
eides.   'Ex longo tempore', he says, 'nullum diem laetiorem
mihi vide<o>r egisse quam eum quo praeclarum hoc Attici
eloquii exemplum in manus sumere et plenis haustibus combibere
licuit.'   In like manner our American Easter of 1903 has been
made memorable to Cis-Atlantic Hellenists by the arrival of
WILAMOWITZ's *Perser des Timotheos* (Lemcke and Büchner).
There are only 250 verses, it is true; but, as WILAMOWITZ
observes, 'historically the 250 verses of Timotheos are worth a
hundred times more than 250 new verses of Pindar or Sophokles,
no matter how far below the latter they may be in absolute value.'

We have now for the first time a clear conception not only of the character of the poet but of the class of poetry. The cynic may remark that it would have been better for the fame of Timotheos, if he had not been brought to life without his lyre, but the historian of literature is greatly the gainer, and the gain is indefinitely enhanced by the illuminating comment of the eminent editor. It is a pity that he cannot enlighten without scorching. Nothing seems to abate the strenuousness with which he wields that 'horribile flagellum' which has fallen for so many years impartially on the backs of great and small in the world of scholars. Of course, in a provisional edition like this there must be abundant room for reconsideration, to say nothing of typographical errors and incredible hastinesses. But the main features stand out with absolute distinctness and it is a pleasure to study this strange monument, undisturbed by the avalanche of conjecture and commentary that will be precipitated on us before long.

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W. P. M.: The Tennyson Memoir, vol. I, p. 7, quotes a remark made by the poet in his later years with reference to his school-days at Louth: "How I did hate that school! The only good I ever got from it was the memory of the words 'sonus desilientis aquae', and of an old wall covered with wild weeds opposite the school windows." It is not easy to find this Latin phrase in any classical author. Probably it is merely an inaccurate quotation from memory from Ovid's story of the Rape of Persephone, Fasti, IV 428:

> Valle sub umbrosa locus est aspergine multa
> Uvidus ex alto desilientis aquae.

From the preceding page of the Memoir we know that Tennyson studied Ovid while he was at Louth, and it is very likely that his school edition included this passage. In support of this guess I may add that in two other passages of the Memoir we find the late Laureate misquoting from memory the classics which he knew so well (II 239, and I 140). In a letter to Mr. Gladstone (1880) he speaks of the lovely lines of Catullus, "Multas per terras et multa per aequora vectus," etc., meaning, of course, the "Multas per gentes," etc., of ci 1. And in a letter to James Spedding (1834) he misquotes what Dionysius of Halicarnassus had to say about the qualities of Alcaeus: "I have written several things since I saw you, some emulative of the ἡδὺ καὶ βραχὺ καὶ μεγαλοπρεπὲς of Alcaeus," etc. What Dionysius actually wrote was τὸ μεγαλοφυὲς καὶ βραχὺ καὶ ἡδὺ μετὰ δεινότητος (ed. Reiske, vol. V, p. 421).

K. F. S.: Just because memory is such a saucy trickster explains, no doubt, why one is so eager to discover her devious ways, even at one's own peril. So, as one reads Professor Mustard's first comment, one is tempted to follow still further the line of thought suggested. The passage from Ovid appears to betray the fact that all Tennyson really remembered of his 'sonus desilientis aquae' was the last two words. But 'desilientis aquae' is not self-supporting, it needs an associate. The promotion of 'sonus' to that position might have been expected from the author of 'The Brook'. Indeed, it is not without interest to observe that the association is one which belongs to humanity in general. In all periods, the majority of us have been quite as deeply impressed by the sound of running water as by the sight of it. The familiar lines of Theokritos (I, 7–8) were well-known to Tennyson himself and had been especially noted by Leigh Hunt ("Jar of Honey"). The idea of them recurs again and again in antique literature. Compare Vergil, E. V, 83–4; Culex, 17; Horace, Epod., XVI, 48; Od. III, 13, 15–16, etc. Moreover, 'sonus' is a natural inference from the Ovidian lines, and Ovid himself recurs, elsewhere, to the same association of ideas. Compare Amor., III 5, 5,

> Area gramineo suberat viridissima prato
> Umida de guttis lene sonantis aquae.

The same cadence returns in Fasti, II 704 and VI 340. See also III 18. 'Sonus', itself, is nowhere found. Perhaps, as Professor Gildersleeve suggests, Tennyson's choice of the word was prompted by a distant echo of Tibullus, I 2, 78,

> Nec sonitus placidae ducere posset aquae.

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